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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the current state of international law with regards to the 
doctrine of immunity for heads of state. In particular, this thesis provides an analysis 
of the repercussions of the UN Convention against Torture (CAT) on the law of head 
of state immunity. Much academic writing has supported the view that alleged 
violations of the prohibition of torture, should lead to the restriction of immunity for 
heads of state and higher officials for alleged acts of torture. Given the fact that the 
CAT is silent on the issue of immunity, this thesis investigates whether Articles 1 
and 5 of the CAT have become customary international law (CIL). On a theoretical 
level, this thesis explores this hypothesis by scrutinizing the ‘circularity’ relationship 
between the Treaty and CIL. This involves treaty interpretation under Articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [1969]. The purpose of the 
circularity debate is to determine how the CAT affects CIL, and how CIL affects the 
interpretation of the CAT in order to ascertain whether Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT 
have become CIL. On a more concrete level, the thesis examines the evidence, in 
particular, the opinio juris elements of head of state immunity such as the UNGA 
Resolutions, and the Committee against Torture. The jurisprudence of ad hoc 
tribunals also contribute to the understanding of definition of torture and the 
jurisdiction provisions. This thesis submits that there is conclusive evidence to 
indicate that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL, and could therefore 
restrict immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state and heads of 
government. The claim that the CAT has become CIL is supported by an in-depth 
analysis of the modern formation of the CIL method under the sliding scale theory. It 
will be seen that by relying on the subjective element there is no restriction for the 
claim that new CIL can be formed, provided enough evidence has been provided. 
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1 
 
Introduction 
The law of head of state immunity presents a dilemma for international law. It is a 
matter of concern not only to international lawyers, but also to ordinary citizens. 
Certain atrocities committed during the Second World War, such as the holocaust 
and ethnic cleansing, have encouraged the expansion of human rights protection. In 
the current climate, atrocities in an obscure part of the world become instant global 
news and failures in justice systems are much more commonly detected by external 
observers from international and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Amnesty 
International is one of the prominent organisations that has raised concerns over 
failures in some justice systems.
1
 This points to the fact that some legal systems in 
the world remain deeply flawed. The effect of this is that the positions and authority 
of heads of states and senior government officials who have allegedly committed 
acts of torture, will remain strong and unchallenged. In other words, the level of 
abuses of immunity will continue to escalate unless they are stopped. This will 
inevitably have a serious impact on the contemporary world as well as hinder the 
primary objective of the doctrine of head of state immunity.  
Due to worldwide condemnation of atrocities following the world wars, the world 
has witnessed the creation of international institutions,
2
 the strengthening of existing 
national ones and the creation of certain hybrid courts, such as the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL), to combat criminal acts of torture and other human rights 
violations. It can be said that the inception of these international institutions have 
contributed to the shape of globalisation.
3
 Nevertheless, the level of exploitation of 
the doctrine of head of state immunity is still noticeable in this age of globalisation. 
This problem does not confine itself to a specific part of the world; abuses can be 
found in states on the African continent, Latin America and in the Far East. For 
instance, countries such as Cambodia and the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 
(‘Myanmar’) show the scale of the exploitation and abuses of the doctrine of head of 
                                                          
1
 See: The Amnesty International <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=19619> 
Accessed 21 October 2013. See also: <http://www.amnesty.org/es/node/3142> Accessed 21 October 
2013; <http://www.justiceforkirsty.org/AMNESTY%20REPORT%20ON%20MEXICO.pdf>  
2
 These have included: the United Nations, various International Tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).  
3
 Robert C. Power, ‘Pinochet and the Uncertain Globalisation of Criminal law’ [2007] 39 The George 
Washington International Law Review 89, 90. 
2 
 
state immunity in Asia. Similarly, in Europe, these problems occurred previously in 
the former Soviet Eastern Block. The sensitivity of the issue regarding the improper 
use of the doctrine of head of state immunity can also be found in allegations against 
the Vatican.
4
 Hence, the uses and abuses of the principle of head of state immunity 
in an age of globalisation should not be overlooked.   
A comprehensive understanding of the complexity of the rules relating to the law of 
head of state immunity has to be sought prior to a detailed analysis of the subject. 
The doctrine of head of state immunity originates from the law of state immunity. 
Immunities of senior state officials are granted to the heads of state and some select 
senior government officials. Serving heads of state enjoy absolute immunity due to 
the fact that they hold the highest office of the recognised sovereign states.
5
 This is 
to ensure the effective performance of their duties while abroad and at home.  
It is important to point out from the outset that the concept of immunity is associated 
with the adjudicatory power of courts to hear cases and claims. This means that 
when a plea of immunity is requested it prevents a court from hearing or adjudicating 
on the case.
6
 In other words, the effect of the immunity plea is that it procedurally 
bars foreign national courts from jurisdictions to hear cases relating to other states. 
This is because the defendant is either a state or an agent of a foreign state. Agents of 
states may include heads of state, heads of government and other government 
officials.
7
 The question over whether all classes of government officials are entitled 
to the immunity privileges is one which this thesis will consider in due course. 
                                                          
4
 This thesis does not specifically deal with the claims and cases concerning the Vatican. It is no 
doubt interesting subject matter. Various authors and academics have written extensively about that 
area. For some general discussions see: ; Kurt Martens, ‘The position of the Holy See and Vatican 
City State in international relations’ [2006] 83 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 729, ; Dina 
Aversano, ‘Can the Pope be a defendant in American Courts?’ [2006] 18 Pace International Law 
Review 495, .; Lucian C Martinez, ‘Sovereign impunity - Does the FSIA bar lawsuits against the 
Holy See?’ [2008] 83 Texas International Law Journal 123,  
5
 Arthur Watts, ‘The legal position in international law of heads of states, of governments and foreign 
ministers’ [1994] 3 Recueil des Cours 9, 31-67. 
6
 Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium (Arrest Warrant Case) [2002] 3 ICJ Reports 24 (ICJ) 
[60]. Ernest K. Bankas, The state immunity controversy in international law : private suits against 
sovereign states in domestic courts,( Springer 2005) 283. See also: XiaoDong Yang, ‘Immunity for 
international crimes: a reaffirmation of traditional doctrine’ [2002] 74 Cambridge Law Journal 242, 
244.; Antonio Cassese, ‘When may senior state officials be tried for international crimes? Some 
comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case ’ [2002] 13 European Journal of International Law 853, 
862.  
7
 See: Rosanne van Alebeek, The immunity of states and their officials in international criminal law 
and international human rights law,( Oxford University Press 2008) 137.  
3 
 
The adjudicatory power and jurisdiction issues are determined by international law 
of jurisdiction. It allows national law to regulate such exercise of jurisdiction within 
the confines circumstances by international law.
8
 Therefore, it can be said that the 
law relating to head of state immunity is a topic that makes reference to both national 
and international law. As far as national law is concerned, it deals with the 
contention of whether national courts have the relevant jurisdictions and are 
competent to hear cases involving heads of state or other senior government 
officials. This is because when a national court denies immunity it may give rise to 
an international dispute. On the other hand, the doctrine of head of state immunity is 
also concerned with international law issues. The reason for this is that, if national 
courts have the requisite adjudicatory choice over jurisdictions to hear proceedings 
involving heads of state, then the outcome of the case will be determined by 
international law. In other words, the question of establishing jurisdiction to try 
heads of state involves the matter of whether national courts will apply national or 
international law. Some constitutions say that the general rules of international law 
are hierarchically higher than national statutory rules. Therefore, national courts may 
have to apply them directly first. Hence, the subject of head of state immunity 
involves both national and international laws. This thesis will consider both of these 
aspects when determining the issue regarding immunity for heads of state.  
As international law currently stands, the issue of head of state immunity is still 
governed by customary international law (hereafter ‘CIL’). This is because there is 
no international treaty that comprehensively deals with the problem of head of state 
immunity.  
The Objective of this Research 
This thesis aims to examine whether the enactment of the ‘UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (1984) 
(hereafter ‘CAT’) and subsequent practice can have an impact on and abrogate 
immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state. Hence, this thesis will be a 
valuable piece of research because it provides an up-to-date analysis of the doctrine 
of head of state immunity after the enactment of the CAT. Besides, it also 
endeavours to provide answers to controversial questions, such as whether all 
                                                          
8
 Gernot Biehler, Procedures in International Law,( Springer 2008) 68.  
4 
 
government officials should be entitled to immunity; whether the violation of jus 
cogens norms itself is sufficient to abrogate immunity; whether the residual 
immunity ratione materiae can be removed for former heads of state, and whether a 
new custom can be formed based on only one of the essential elements of opinio 
juris and rely on the sliding scale theory. These are the main questions that this 
thesis will attempt to answer as well as provide justifications on the relevant 
findings. 
Some have said that the CAT purports to have an impact in relation to the immunity 
privileges attached to former heads of state. This is due to the fact that many authors 
and some courts have considered that the CAT has changed the applicability of the 
doctrine of head of state immunity traditionally given under CIL.
9
 One of the 
viewpoints is that they believed it was legitimate to deny head of state immunity to 
former heads of state as long as the states concerned in the proceedings were parties 
to the CAT.
10
 Inevitably, this view poses problems as not all states are signatories to 
the CAT or have ratified the CAT. Moreover, under international law an 
international treaty, such as the CAT, will only bind those who have agreed to its 
provisions. 
Accordingly, this thesis will attempt to explore and evaluate whether or not the CAT 
deals with the issue of head of state immunity adequately in the broader sense. This 
is because the CAT is generally silent on the immunity issue.
11
 This is the dilemma 
that this thesis seeks to investigate. Thus, the issues surrounding head of state 
immunity will be addressed, notwithstanding that the CAT is silent on the matter as 
argued by Lord Goff in the Pinochet (No.3) case.
12
 Two methods will be used to 
tackle this problem. The first approach is through treaty interpretation. Articles 31 
                                                          
9
 See for example: R v Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No.3) [1999] 2 All ER 97 (House of Lords ) [115g] (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).; Andrea Bianchi, 
‘Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case’ [1999] 10 European Journal of International 
Law 237, 243 and 247.; Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘State immunity and hierarchy of norms: Why the 
House of Lords got it wrong’ [2008] 18 European Journal of International Law 955, 960.; Dapo 
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and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (hereafter ‘VCLT’) 
will be utilised as tools of treaty interpretation to find out the ‘real’ meaning of 
Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT on the issue of head of state immunity. Article 1 of the 
CAT provides the definition of torture whereas Article 5 of the CAT describes the 
extensive jurisdiction provisions. It can be suggested that these two provisions under 
the CAT are relevant to the discussion. This is because Article 5 of the CAT 
establishes the jurisdiction over the offences of torture. Thus, Article 1 of the CAT 
also has to be taken into consideration in order to determine what encompasses acts 
of torture.  
The second approach analyses whether Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become 
CIL. It has been termed the ‘circularity issue’ debate in this thesis and it involves the 
process of ascertaining whether the CAT has become new CIL. The consequence of 
this is that if Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL, then they will 
automatically be binding on states when dealing with the issue of head of state 
immunity. When interpreting the two CAT provisions, Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT 
specifically instructs that the current CIL, that is to say the rules on head of state 
immunity under CIL, need to be put into the same equation. In other words, Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT states that when interpreting a treaty, such as the CAT, 
sensitivity should be displayed towards existing CIL rules on the law of head of state 
immunity. This corresponds with the fact that Articles 31 and Article 32 of the 
VCLT reflect CIL.
13
 Hence, when interpreting treaties such as the CAT, the current 
existing rules of CIL on immunity, namely: immunity ratione personae and 
immunity ratione materiae have to be considered. These immunity doctrines are 
essential for the application of the immunity entitlement for serving and former 
heads of state.  
Immunities of Senior State Officials  
The problematic nature of the law of head of state immunity is particularly clear in a 
contemporary context. As mentioned earlier, the law of head of state immunity is 
traditionally governed by CIL. To understand how the law of head of state immunity 
operates, it is therefore important to examine the principles of CIL first. Chapter One 
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of this thesis deals with the immunities of senior state officials. Nevertheless, it is 
important to distinguish between ‘jurisdictional immunities of states’ and 
‘immunities of senior state officials’. Although it is not within the scope of this 
thesis, it is important to differentiate these two issues from the outset. The former 
relates to the doctrine of state immunity and it is procedural bar in nature.
 14
 This is 
because it relates to traditional absolute rule of jurisdictional immunity based on the 
equal sovereignty of states expressed in the maxim ‘par in parem imperium non 
habet’.15 Nevertheless, the rule has evolved to a limited or restricted rule of 
immunity whereby national courts can only exercise jurisdiction over acts of a 
foreign state which have not been carried out in governmental acts or acta jure 
gestionis. Thus it concerns the ordinary rules of private transactions.
16
 
On the other hand, immunities of senior state officials are within the scope of this 
thesis. Under international law, CIL grants two types of immunities to head of states: 
immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae. The former is known as 
‘personal immunity’, while the latter is ‘functional immunity’. Personal immunity or 
immunity ratione personae is given to a small group of individuals, namely, heads of 
state and some senior serving government officials or ministers. Hence, it is granted 
according to the status of those individuals. This corresponds with the objective of 
the law of state immunity under CIL to ensure non-interference in official 
activities.
17
 Therefore, personal immunity will be lost once a head of state or senior 
government official has left office.
18
 The second type of immunity under CIL is 
immunity ratione materiae or functional immunity. This kind of immunity 
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theoretically covers most other state officials. However, it only covers conduct 
performed in their official capacity.
19
 In other words, it only covers former 
government officials provided that the conduct concerned was carried out in their 
official capacities whilst in office. Likewise, functional immunity also contains some 
problems in its application. For example, this thesis will deal with issues such as the 
level of seniority that government officials need to be in order to be entitled to this 
type of immunity and whether immunity also applies to other classes of government 
officials. Chapter One will attempt to answer these questions. In addition, it will seek 
to define the terms: heads of government and head of state. In the Arrest Warrant 
case, the International Court of Justice (hereafter ‘ICJ’) held that, “in international 
law it is firmly established that certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such 
as the Head of State, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil 
and criminal”.20 In other words, the Arrest Warrant case stipulated that a serving 
head of state enjoyed absolute immunity in a foreign court for criminal proceedings. 
The Arrest Warrant case concerned an incumbent foreign minister who had 
allegedly incited racial hatred, in various speeches, which led to the killing of 
hundreds of people. As far as former head of state immunity is concerned, immunity 
ratione materiae does not provide protection for private conduct or acts carried out 
in a personal capacity once they have left office. Chapter Three will further explore 
this matter when analysing the Pinochet (No.3) judgment. In this, the House of Lords 
held that former heads of state could not enjoy immunity ratione materiae for 
alleged acts of torture under the CAT notwithstanding that it was silent on the issue 
of immunity.
21
  
Violation of Peremptory Norms or Jus Cogens as an Exception to the 
Immunity Rule 
The advancement in the human rights movement has triggered the prohibition of 
torture. This has led to individual accountability for violation of peremptory norms 
such as torture.
22
 As a result, heads of state and government officials are affected by 
this alleged exception to immunity. There is often much uncertainty in deciding 
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whether violation of peremptory norms or jus cogens is an exception to the law of 
head of state immunity. Article 53 of the VCLT says that, “a peremptory norm of 
general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character”.23  
Chapter Two of this thesis expands on the above claim and ventures to provide 
answers to this contentious matter. There is evidence from state practices to suggest 
that some national courts are still reluctant to deny immunity even for violations of 
peremptory norms such as torture.
24
 The Al-Adsani case v The United Kingdom (Al-
Adsani) best illustrates the latter argument.
25
 Notwithstanding that the case was 
originally brought in the UK as a civil claim, it can be argued that the Al-Adsani case 
has provided a re-evaluation of the issues surrounding head of state immunity. It was 
held in that case by the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ‘ECHR’) that 
the prohibition of torture, which was a jus cogens norm, could not override the 
immunity rule.
26
 An analysis will also be carried out to explore the arguments 
between access to court and immunity in the same chapter. It will be seen that the 
prohibition of torture as a jus cogens norm does not necessarily provide automatic 
access to court. The majority and minority opinions from the Al-Adsani case will be 
used to demonstrate the controversy surrounding whether violation of peremptory 
norms, such as the prohibition of torture, is a legitimate way to trump the immunity 
rule. This will involve the normative hierarchy theory argument for determining 
whether one important international rule can trump another equally important one. 
Nevertheless, Chapter Two further illustrates that there should be no hierarchy of 
rules under international law. It will be shown that the arguments made by the 
minority opinions in the Al-Adsani case, that peremptory norms should trump 
immunity, are not convincing. The privileges of access to court should not trump 
immunity and vice versa. This is because they are both important international rules. 
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It would be wrong to assume that violation of jus cogens norms, such as torture, is 
the ultimate trump card that gives priority when deciding cases involving serving 
head of state. The practice of systematically relying on jus cogens norms for certain 
human rights protections remains debatable.
27
 Apart from the Al-Adsani case, other 
cases such as Bouzari and Jones
28
 also proves that some national courts are reluctant 
to deny immunity even for alleged violations of torture.
29
  
There are two groups of academics who have written extensively on the issue of 
peremptory norms or jus cogens norms. On the one hand, it has been argued by some 
academics that the violation of jus cogens norms, such as torture, should trump 
immunity of heads of state. The leading academic supporting this view is 
Orakhelashvili.
30
 He argues that there is a strong doctrinal support which means that 
the violation of peremptory norms trumps state immunity, even before national 
courts.
31
 He said that: 
it is the natural effect of peremptory norms as superior norms that they trump the 
“rules” of principles on the immunity of States and their officials, if and to what 
extent such rules actually exist.
32
  
Another academic with similar views on the matter is MacGregor.
33
 She believes 
that victims of torture should be dealt with in court and justice should be carried out. 
The second group of academics thinks that violation of jus cogens norms, such as 
acts of torture, should not necessarily trump immunity. For example, Akande and 
Shah have stated that the idea of immunity being in conflict with jus cogens norms is 
not tenable.
34
 From another perspective, Voyiakis argues that violation of 
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peremptory norms does not necessarily trump immunity.
35
 The view that he holds is 
that state immunity and peremptory norms are both equally important international 
norms. It would be impracticable to place one international norm hierarchically 
above another. The argument in this thesis falls within the latter group. It disagrees 
with those in the first group in saying that peremptory norms or jus cogens norms 
can trump immunity especially for serving heads of states as this is absolute. This is 
because there is not enough evidence or grounds to support the fact that prohibition 
of torture can be used to restrict immunity ratione personae. Nevertheless, the 
argument to support such a viewpoint is slightly different from the second group as it 
is based on the findings of opinio juris, and to a lesser extent on state practice. It will 
be submitted in this thesis that there are inconsistent state practices to suggest that 
violation of jus cogens norms can trump immunity. Moreover, there is no strong 
evidence of opinio juris by states to suggest the restriction for the doctrine of 
immunity ratione personae relating to serving heads of state and other senior 
government officials. Consequently, in order to restrict immunity under CIL, there is 
a need for a specific rule that expressly says so. One can argue that if there are 
specific rules to remove immunity privileges, then there will be no need for the 
existence of the complementary mechanism such as ad hoc international tribunals, 
the International Criminal Court (hereafter ‘ICC’) as well as the hybrid courts.  
Hence, this thesis seeks to rebut the presumption made by some academics that the 
CIL has already changed the rule of immunity ratione personae in a wider context. It 
will be seen that the decision of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case has shed light on 
the fact that an alleged violation of jus cogens by a serving minister for foreign 
affairs is not enough to remove immunity ratione personae which is absolute. 
Therefore, the other important question to be asked is whether an allegation of 
torture could potentially remove immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state 
and heads of government. It has been argued by Zappala that heads of state should 
not benefit from the functional immunity or immunity ratione materiae for 
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international crimes under CIL.
36
 In contrast, Fox argues that there is no clear CIL 
relating to the precise nature and scope of the immunities of heads of state.
37
 
Moreover, Caplan argues that the undefined nature of jus cogens norms, which may 
potentially remove immunity, can cause problems for the courts.
38
 Nonetheless, the 
issue of the issuance of immunity ratione materiae to former heads of state and 
heads of government officials will be scrutinised in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
It is also interesting to note that there are now several complementary mechanisms 
for prosecuting serious violations of human rights by high-ranking officials through 
national, international and hybrid courts. The rules of immunity relate mostly to the 
national courts
39
 because most cases are brought at national court level. Only in 
exceptional circumstances are cases heard at international tribunals or at hybrid court 
level. Thus, the complementary mechanism for prosecuting high-ranking officials 
means that there are now various pathways for victims of torture to address their 
claims. However, national courts still remain the main forum for cases to be brought 
against heads of state.
40
 Immunities are still important because it is still up to the 
discretion of national courts to decide whether they can put government officials on 
trial pending issues of jurisdiction. Any changes to the law of immunity should not 
affect other mechanisms. The reason for this is that international tribunals and, to 
some extent, the hybrid courts have their own special mechanisms of enforcement. 
For example, the international tribunals and the hybrid courts need not be concerned 
with establishing jurisdiction issues to try heads of state or government officials 
because they are created by Chapter VII of the UN Security Council Resolutions.
41
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The Pinochet (No 3) Case Effect  
The importance of the prohibition of torture was brought into the spotlight in the UK 
case of Regina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte (No 3) (Pinochet (No 3)).
42
 The outcome of this case was significant because 
the House of Lords refused the immunity ratione materiae plea from a former head 
of state. General Augusto Pinochet, a former head of state of Chile, came to London 
in 1998 for medical treatment. While he was in London, he was arrested in 
accordance with an arrest warrant issued by the Spanish Magistrate, Judge Baltasar 
Garzon. It was claimed that Pinochet allegedly committed torture, genocide and 
terrorism during his military regime. The House of Lords reached the decision of no 
immunity in accordance with the CAT because the states party to the case were all 
signatories to the CAT. The CAT was enacted by the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 39/46. It came into force on 26 June 1987. However, the ambiguity of the 
wording in the CAT on the law of head of state immunity caused a further problem. 
The problem lies in the assumption that the CAT is a well-equipped treaty to deal 
with matters regarding head of state immunity. 
There are three reasons why the debate on examining the status of the law of head of 
state immunity under the CAT is important. The first is that current CIL governing 
the law of head of state immunity is unclear. Moreover, their applications in many 
jurisdictions are not consistent. There is no uniform consensus on the law as a 
standard approach by many states. It will be seen that the law of immunity under CIL 
is quite complex, especially with regard to the doctrine of immunity ratione 
materiae. The second reason is that the CAT is generally silent on the issue of 
immunity and yet the House of Lords in Pinochet (No.3) was able to decide on the 
abrogation of immunity ratione materiae for a former head of state.
43
  
This case marks a starting point for the discussion on the legal issues surrounding 
head of state immunity. The reason for this is that the CAT is generally silent on the 
matter of immunity as correctly pointed out by Lord Goff in his dissenting 
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judgment.
44
 Whether the CAT really can have an impact on the law of head of state 
immunity, in particular those affecting former heads of state, demands further 
investigation. Cases against Pinochet had been heard twice before. In Regina v Bow 
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 1) (1998) 
(Pinochet (No. 1)),
45
 it was held by the majority that Pinochet could not benefit from 
the immunity privileges for alleged acts of torture, which was contrary to the act of 
state doctrine. In other words, the act of torture could not have been an official 
function of a head of state. This meant that the residual immunity ratione materiae 
would not be available to cover former heads of state, such as Pinochet. However, 
Lord Hoffman’s failure to disclose his involvement in the Amnesty International 
Charity Ltd as a former director has led to the disqualification of the Pinochet (No.1) 
judgment. 
However, in Pinochet (No.3), the House of Lords reached the no immunity ratione 
materiae verdict for Pinochet based on the CAT.
46
 This triggers the need to find out 
the real meaning of the CAT when dealing with the problem concerning head of state 
immunity. However, not all the Articles in the CAT are discussed here. For the 
purpose of this analysis, only Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT are considered to see 
whether they can potentially remove immunity ratione materiae for former heads of 
state and senior heads of government who have allegedly committed acts of torture. 
Chapter Three looks at the silent issue of the CAT on immunity in detail. Articles 31 
and 32 of the VCLT assist in the interpretation of both of the relevant Articles from 
the CAT. In particular, Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT mentions that, “any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” should be 
taken into consideration when interpreting a treaty such as the CAT. This means that 
any existing relevant rules of CIL in the area of head of state immunity should be 
considered, and therefore this will include immunity ratione personae and immunity 
ratione materiae.  
Article 5 of the CAT concerns the jurisdiction provision for violations of acts of 
torture.  It stipulates that: “Each State party shall take such measures as may be 
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necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged 
offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction”.47 Nevertheless, the 
definition of torture under Article 1 of the CAT also has to be considered in the 
analysis in order to find out what constitutes torture. Article 1 of the CAT defines 
torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person … when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity”.48 However, the definition of torture under 
Article 1 is problematic because the elements have to be fulfilled and yet the CAT 
does not say anything about whether all of these elements need to be present. The 
judgments of the Pinochet (No.3) case will be used to scrutinise whether the CAT is 
an effective treaty to deal with the immunity issue. Chapter Three will present a 
thorough analysis of Pinochet (No.3). This consists of examining the majority and 
minority opinions made by the House of Lords. The Law Lords were divided, even 
in the majority opinions, over the question of immunity ratione materiae for General 
Pinochet as a former head of state. The Law Lords in the first group of the majority 
opinion based their judgments on a narrow approach; they included: Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, Lord Hutton and Lord Saville. Their Lordships reasoned the findings 
according to the ‘contractual’ nature of the CAT between the member states in 
deciding the issue concerning immunity ratione materiae.
49
 The second group of 
majority judges took a broader approach.
50
 Their Lordships in this group consisted 
of: Lord Millett, Lord Phillips and Lord Hope. The Law Lords took their reasoning 
for the removal of immunity ratione materiae not just from the CAT, but also 
because of the conflict between state immunity and the position of torture as jus 
cogens under CIL. In addition to this discussion, Chapter Three will also analyse 
later decisions of the House of Lords that clarify the judgment of Pinochet (No.3). It 
will be seen that there is lack of consistent practice along the lines of Pinochet 
(No.3). 
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The third reason for the discussion of the issue of head of state immunity through the 
CAT is in relation to the hypothesis of whether CAT has become CIL. This 
indirectly relates to the minority opinion of the Pinochet (No.3) case by Lord Goff. 
His Lordship said that the CAT did not specifically mention head of state 
immunity.
51
 This thesis proposes to expand further on the reasoning given by Lord 
Goff. His Lordship correctly argued that the CAT was silent on the issue of head of 
state immunity, yet his Lordship only presented half of the argument. Hence, through 
treaty interpretation, it will be suggested whether the definition of torture and 
extensive jurisdiction provisions have become new custom. If they have become 
CIL, then they will abrogate immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state and 
heads of government who have allegedly committed acts of torture. The discussion 
on the process of formation of potentially new CIL for the CAT is known as the 
‘circularity’ issue, which will be dealt with in Chapter Four. 
The Circularity Issue on the Formation of Customary International 
Law 
In Chapter Four, the thesis moves to the debate on the circularity issue to determine 
whether Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL. This is an alternative 
suggestion to investigate whether the CAT can have an impact on the law of head of 
state immunity. Article 31 of the VCLT says that when interpreting a treaty it should 
be done in the “light of its object and purpose”. Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT states 
that, “any relevant rules of international law applicable in relations between the 
parties” shall also be taken into account along with the context. In other words, under 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, the existing CIL on head of states should be 
considered when interpreting the CAT. As a result, this creates a ‘circular’ pattern of 
thought.  
As far as the process on the formation of new CIL is concerned, it requires two 
elements: state practice (objective element) and opinio juris (subjective element). 
State practice refers to consistent case laws.
52
 Therefore, it should reflect the 
consistencies of states’ behaviour. On the other hand, opinio juris denotes the beliefs 
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of states that they are bound by certain legal obligations.
53
 The North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases confirmed the traditional approach on the formation of CIL 
which required both state practice and opinio juris elements.
54
 The Nicaragua case 
also affirmed this traditional approach on the formation of CIL.
55
  
Nevertheless, in recent years there have been suggestions that the traditional method 
of formation of CIL based on the presence of both of the elements should be put on a 
sliding scale.
56
 This provides the counter-argument in this thesis on the traditional 
notion of the formation of CIL. Kirgis suggests that there should be a modern 
approach on the formation of CIL based on the sliding scale theory.
57
 The sliding 
scale theory conveys the argument that if one of the elements has the edge over the 
other element, then it will be sufficient for the purpose of forming a new CIL.
58
  
For example, if there is strong evidence of state practice, the opinio juris requirement 
can be given less priority. Similarly, if there are strong grounds for states to 
‘believe’, then it will be adequate for the formation of CIL under the modern 
approach despite the lack of consistent state practice. However, it will be seen that 
writers such as Kirgis, Tasioulas and Roberts all say that whether CIL has been 
formed by the presence of enough opinio juris depends on the ‘moral’ nature of the 
customary rule involved.
59
 Chapter Four explores this modern approach by 
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explaining that it is possible for new CIL to be created based on the opinio juris 
element under the sliding scale theory. This is due to the fact that there is the lack of 
consistent practice along the lines of Pinochet (No.3). 
This theory will be put into practice based on the evidence of opinio juris supporting 
the fact that the CAT has become CIL. Chapter Four will produce evidence of opinio 
juris supporting the fact that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL. The 
evidence of opinio juris includes United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 
(hereafter ‘UNGA Resolutions’). Notwithstanding that UNGA Resolutions are not 
generally binding on member states, it has been argued by some that if they are 
concerned with general norms of international law, then acceptance by a majority 
vote constitutes evidence of opinions of government in the widest forum where such 
opinions can be expressed.
60
 The ICJ held in the Legality of the Threat of Nuclear 
Weapons case that despite the fact that the UNGA Resolutions were not generally 
binding, they could still contribute to the normative value for establishing the 
existence of a rule.
61
 Furthermore, even when they are framed as “general 
principles”, these resolutions still provide a basis for the progressive development of 
the law and the speedy consolidation of customary rules.
62
 This was seen in the 
Nicaragua case where the ICJ said that the opinio juris itself can satisfy the 
requirement for the conformity of state practice.
63
  
Chapter Four also takes into account the jurisprudence by the Committee against 
Torture (hereafter the ‘Committee’). In particular, the views of the Committee are 
especially useful as they present the enforcement mechanism for the CAT to ensure 
that states adhere to their treaty obligations. It will be seen that the Committee has 
reinforced the obligation on state parties for their failure to exercise jurisdiction over 
the offences of torture.  
Thus, Chapter Four will demonstrate that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become 
CIL based on the evidence of opinio juris and relying on Kirgis’s sliding scale 
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theory argument. Moreover, it will be submitted that the combined effect of Articles 
1 and 5 of the CAT strongly suggest that both of the treaty provisions can remove 
immunity ratione materiae. The effect of this is that former heads of state and senior 
heads of government will not be able to rely on the residual immunity ratione 
materiae accorded under international law for alleged acts of torture.  
Cross-Examination for the Evidence of Opinio Juris on the Formation 
of New Custom 
The penultimate chapter of this thesis complements the collective evidence of opinio 
juris supporting the fact that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL, as 
discussed in Chapter Four. Chapter Five will, therefore, provide an explanation as to 
why the state practice requirement is not needed in this instance. The cumulative 
evidence of opinio juris will be defended in the context of the CAT to support the 
claim that the two specific provisions have become CIL with the impact of 
restricting immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state. 
Furthermore, it will be argued in Chapter Five that an international treaty like the 
CAT can be treated as opinio juris. This has been supported by the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases. It will be submitted that these are strong pointers to suggest 
that the reliance on the opinio juris element in this instance can assist with the 
formation of new CIL by Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT. The consequence of this is 
that it will be argued that the CAT has had an impact on the law of head of state 
immunity. 
Moreover, Chapter Five argues that the fact that the CAT has received more than 
half of its ratifications suggests that there is a general consensus on the intention of 
the CAT to enforce the prohibition of torture.
64
 This is another factor which suggests 
that the CAT has evolved into new CIL with the effect of restricting immunity 
ratione materiae for former heads of state who have allegedly committed acts of 
torture. 
Furthermore, a critical analysis in Chapter Five supports the view that UNGA 
Resolutions can aid the formation of new custom based on a general consensus and 
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opinio juris of states. This is notwithstanding the general perception that UNGA 
Resolutions are not binding.
65
 Nevertheless, Chapter Five rejects this presumption by 
arguing that the UNGA Resolutions are forms of opinio juris, and therefore manifest 
the consensus of states with regard to particular international law issues. 
Chapter Five will analyse this from a different perspective to support these claims. 
Firstly, three recent case laws will be scrutinised in greater detail: Khurts Bat, 
Khaled Nezzar and Hissène Habré. The previous two were decided by domestic 
courts whereas the latter was decided by the ICJ. All of these cases are significant for 
the present discussion as they show that there is a trend both at domestic and 
international levels of courts being more eager to restrict immunity ratione materiae 
for former heads of state and other senior government officials.  Chapter Five will 
argue that the judgments of the cases show that the perception and law of head of 
immunity has progressed since the Pinochet (No 3) case which was decided by the 
HL.  
This chapter also explores the influence that international courts have on national 
courts. It does this by considering the jurisprudence of other courts in not applying 
the CAT, but which may have influenced other international tribunals such as the 
ICTY and the ICTR. The findings of the jurisprudence from the international 
tribunals will facilitate the interpretation of the definitions of torture (Article 1) and 
the extensive jurisdiction (Article 5) provisions under the CAT. As an illustration, 
these cases may be useful for interpretation purposes, to see whether there is any 
correlation with regard to the definition of torture under the CAT. Therefore, the 
impact of the jurisprudence by the international tribunals is that they will clarify the 
general norm relating to the issue of prohibition of torture and the extensive 
universal jurisdiction under the contemporary context through Article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT. This is vital as it illustrates the significance of the applicability of certain 
customary norms which can assist with the interpretation of the rules under the CAT. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the application of the jurisprudence of the 
international tribunals will reflect the relationship between human rights and other 
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norms.
66
 Chapter Five will submit that the jurisprudence from the international 
courts coincides with the evidence of opinio juris when it comes to the definitions of 
torture and the jurisdiction provisions. It can also be seen that the international 
tribunals are encouraged to take the UNGA Resolutions into account when deciding 
on cases.
67
 Hence, this process relates back to the fact that the UNGA Resolutions 
are considered as the opinions and consensus of states on certain legal issues. The 
third section of Chapter Five investigates the role of national courts in interpreting 
international law. It will be argued that signatories to the CAT have obligations to 
comply with the treaty. Therefore, domestic courts play an important role to ensure 
the full compliance by member states to the CAT and in overcoming obstacles to 
criminal accountability. Domestic courts also provide a pathway for the development 
of clarification of international law principles. This will be illustrated using the 
Khurts Bat case. As a result, Chapter Five will submit that the overwhelming 
cumulative evidence in Chapter Four together with the critical analysis put forward 
offer compelling evidence to state that the definition of torture (Article 1 of the 
CAT) and the extensive universal jurisdiction provisions (Article 5 of the CAT) have 
become CIL. This indicates that the residual immunity ratione materiae should not 
be granted for former heads of state. 
Finally, the concluding chapter of this thesis will summarise all the main claims 
raised in each chapter as well as providing answers to those questions raised 
throughout this work. This thesis will submit that there is  strong possibility for new 
CIL to be formed through general consensus and evidence of opinio juris.  
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Chapter One 
Immunity of Senior State Officials under Customary 
International Law 
 
In examining immunity of heads of State or other high-ranking officials, it is 
important to distinguish the different terms of immunity.  Jurisdictional immunity 
according to the International Court of Justice (hereafter ‘ICJ’) in Germany v Italy: 
Greece Intervening (‘hereafter ‘Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case’) said that 
was ‘entirely distinct from the substantive law which determines whether…conduct 
is lawful or unlawful’.68 The ICJ previously explained in the Arrest Warrant case 
that ‘may well bar prosecution for a certain period’, but it ‘cannot exonerate the 
person to whom it applies from…criminal responsibility’.69 In response to this 
apparent exception to immunity ratione personae, the ICJ clarified in the Arrest 
Warrant case that: 
Jurisdictional immunity may well bar criminal prosecution for a certain period or for 
certain offences: it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal 
responsibility.
70
 
Hence, the ICJ held in that case that jurisdictional immunity did not mean impunity 
for international crimes allegedly committed by heads of state and high ranking 
officials. This was because jurisdictional immunity did not affect the criminal 
responsibility of the defendants which were related to substantive issues. The ICJ 
made it clear in the judgment and said that: 
the rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully 
distinguished from those governing jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not 
imply absence of immunity, while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction. 
Thus, although various international conventions on the prevention and punishment 
of certain serious crimes impose on States obligations of prosecution or extradition, 
thereby requiring them to extend their criminal jurisdiction, such extension of 
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jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under customary international law, 
including those of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable before the 
courts of a foreign State, even where those courts exercise such a jurisdiction under 
these conventions.
71
 
Moreover, the ICJ said in the Jurisdictional Immunities of State case that: 
The fact that immunity may bar the exercise of jurisdiction in a particular case does 
not alter the applicability of the substantive rules of international law’.72 
 
Therefore, jurisdictional immunities related to the doctrine of state immunity and it 
is procedural in nature; whereas criminal responsibility is a question of substantive 
law.
73
 Nevertheless, it originates from the absolute rule of jurisdictional immunity 
where equal sovereignty of states expressed in the maxim ‘par in parem imperium 
non habet’. International law has since evolved beyond this formulation towards a 
limited rule of immunity. This restrict immunity only empowers national courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over those acts of a foreign state that have not carried out in 
government acts (acta jure gestionis), but subject to the ordinary rules of private 
transaction.
74
 
Essentially jurisdictional immunities relate to a foreign state in respect of a 
commercial activity the foreign state carries out while acting as would a private 
actor.
75
 It refers to the direct confrontation between the two aspects of sovereignty, 
territorial and national.
76
 Moreover, it also relates to the ‘territorial tort exception’ 
which excludes the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state in instances of tortuous 
conduct.
77
 
Immunity from jurisdiction is an immunity not merely from being subjected to an 
adverse judgment but from being subjected to the trial process. It is…necessarily 
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preliminary in nature. Consequently a national court is required to determine 
whether or not a foreign state is entitled to immunity as a matter of international law 
before it can hear the merits of the case brought before it and before the facts have 
been established.
78
 
 
Thus, jurisdictional immunity will not form part of the thesis. On the other hand, 
immunities of head of State and senior government officials will form the main basis 
of the present analysis. There are two types of immunities namely immunity ratione 
personae and immunity ratione materiae. The difference between the two concepts 
will be discussed and explained in more detail below in this chapter. 
The law relating to immunity of head of state is an area of international law which 
continues to be widely debated. The problem concerning head of state immunity has 
recently received attention due to the widely publicised outcome of R v Bow Street 
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3) (hereafter 
Pinochet (No.3)), in the United Kingdom. This is due to a problem in its application 
and some doctrinal dilemmas. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the law of 
head of state immunity is not a new legal concept per se. Hence, some evaluation of 
the rich history of state immunity is useful here before discussing the doctrine of 
head of state immunity given under customary international law (hereafter ‘CIL’). 
This is because the privileges which are attached to heads of states derive from the 
state itself.79 ‘State’ here can be used to mean a country, nation, people, or 
government
80
 and this immunity can be traced back to the principle of sovereignty.
81
 
Theoretically, a state usually enjoys immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts 
based on the dictum: par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over 
another equal).
82
 Hazel Fox defines state immunity as: 
a plea relating to the adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction of national courts 
which bars the municipal court of one State from adjudicating the disputes of 
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another State. As such it is a doctrine of international law which is applied in 
accordance with municipal law in national courts.
83
 
Therefore, the term ‘head of state immunity’ entails a procedural bar of jurisdiction 
on another state to hear or try other heads of state.84 As the law has changed 
significantly in the last century, the definition of head of state now encompasses not 
just monarchs
85
, but also presidents and prime ministers who effectively run a 
country on a day-to-day basis.86 In this way, it can be seen that the previously 
exclusive privilege of head of state immunity has now expanded to include other 
senior serving state officials. This includes those serving as the heads of their 
respective government departments. In the past, the sovereigns or heads of state had 
absolute immunity privileges.
87
 This meant that the heads of state were completely 
immune from foreign jurisdiction in all cases and in all circumstances.
88
 
Nevertheless, it will be argued in this chapter that not all serving government 
officials enjoy the immunity concession.  
The issue relating to the immunity of senior state officials is within the ambit of this 
thesis. It concerns itself with two types of immunity. The first type is termed 
immunity ratione personae or personal immunity. It is conferred according to the 
status of the individual and is limited to specific state officials.89 A classic example 
of an individual who may enjoy personal immunity is a serving head of state.90 
Immunity ratione personae is lost once officials have left office.91 Nevertheless, they 
will then be protected by a second type of immunity known as immunity rationae 
materiae or functional immunity but this only covers official acts which they have 
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carried out while in office.92 Therefore, functional immunity is given according to 
the nature of the conduct.93 
This chapter includes a discussion of the terms - heads of governments and heads of 
states. It seeks to establish which senior state officials, apart from the heads of state, 
enjoy immunity ratione personae whilst in office. It will be seen in this Chapter that 
the judgment by the International Court of Justice (hereafter ‘ICJ’) in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo v Belgium (hereafter the ‘Arrest Warrant case’ is of particular 
significance.
94
 It was held in that case that serving ministers of foreign affairs could 
be considered senior state officials and, as such, should enjoy immunity ratione 
personae whilst in office.
95
 Analysis will be made based on the ICJ’s reasoning from 
the Arrest Warrant case to determine which other ‘classes’ of senior state officials 
might deserve the same level of immunity.  
Through investigation, this chapter will show that the scope of the application of the 
rules of immunity ratione personae does not just apply to serving heads of state. An 
analysis using the ‘functional justification’ test will be used to decide which other 
senior serving heads of government - apart from heads of state - might enjoy 
personal immunity. It will be submitted that some senior serving heads of 
government who hold important governmental roles and functions might be entitled 
to the same immunity privileges as the heads of state.
96
 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section explains in detail the two 
types of immunity, namely: immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione 
materiae granted under CIL. The second part involves the analysis of which other 
class of serving senior state officials might merit the same immunity privilege as 
heads of state. 
1.1 Immunities Granted under Customary International Law 
It is necessary to be clear from the outset regarding the underlying legal principle of 
immunity. When a person claims immunity, he or she is not claiming immunity from 
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the alleged crimes committed.
97
 On the contrary, immunity is a plea of procedural 
bar for the court to exercise jurisdiction over a case.
98
 The judicial enforcement of 
international law is carried out through the domestic courts of the state, where the 
human rights violation or international crime occurred, and the courts of the state 
responsible for that violation.
99
 
As far as the issue of immunity for heads of state is concerned, the issue is which 
type of immunity, that is, immunity ratione personae or ratione materiae, should 
apply. Sinclair has suggested that: 
The answer is probably both. Immunity applies ratione personae to identify the 
categories of persons, whether individuals, corporate bodies or unincorporated 
entities, by whom it may prima facie be claimable; and ratione materiae to identify 
whether substantively it may properly be claimed.
100
 
Moreover, Watts has explained the distinction which must be drawn between 
individual responsibility and state responsibility: 
States are artificial legal persons; they can only act through the institutions and 
agencies of the State, which means, ultimately, through its officials and other 
individuals acting on behalf of the State. For international conduct which is so 
serious as to be tainted with criminality to be regarded as attributable only to the 
impersonal State and not to the individuals who ordered or perpetrated it is both 
unrealistic and offensive to common notions of justice.
101
 
1.1.1 Immunity Ratione Personae (Personal Immunity) 
Immunity ratione personae or personal immunity is conferred on people of high 
status and is only enjoyed by a limited number of serving high-ranking officials,
102
 
such as: serving heads of state, heads of government, ministers for foreign affairs, 
diplomats and other senior state officials.
103 
This is supported by domestic law, for 
example, by the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
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States, which states that the heads of government and foreign ministers enjoy the 
same immunity as the head of state for official and private acts.
104
  
The objective of immunity ratione personae is essentially to safeguard the 
performance of officials so that they are not interfering with or disrupting the 
relationship between states.
105
 Therefore, it is wide enough to cover both official and 
private acts for serving heads of state.106 Since immunity ratione personae only 
attaches to the office and not the acts, there is no distinction between private and 
public acts.
107
 This means that officials who fall under this category are secured from 
personal inviolability.108 It protects them from arrest, detention and gives them 
absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction.
109
 This is because international 
relations and cooperation between states requires unimpaired communication.
110
 It is 
widely accepted that serving heads of state and serving heads of government enjoy 
full immunity from jurisdiction to ensure the effective performance of their functions 
under international law.
111
  This was confirmed by the ICJ in Djibouti v France 
where it held that a head of state enjoyed “full immunity ratione personae from 
criminal jurisdiction and inviolability”.112 Moreover, the Institut de Droit 
International stated at the Vancouver session that: 
special treatment is to be given to a head of state or a head of government, as a 
representative of that state and not in his or her personal interest, because this is 
necessary for the exercise of his or her functions and the fulfilment of his or her 
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responsibilities in an independent and effective manner, in the well-conceived 
interest of both the state or the government of which he or she is the head and the 
international community as a whole.
113
 
However, it has been said that the granting of immunity ratione personae depends 
on the answer to one important question, whether the individual concerned holds the 
position of head of state in a country.
114
 However, international law does not define 
the term ‘head of state’. It does not determine the methods for the acquisition of the 
title, nor its general functions.
115
  
Therefore, the next section below will seek to explain the terms of ‘head of state’ and 
‘head of government. The latter part of this chapter will endeavour to establish which 
other category of ‘senior state officials’ will enjoy immunity ratione personae while 
serving in the office.  
The distinction between Head of State and Head of Government 
a) Head of States 
It is important to distinguish from the outset between the terms of head of state and 
head of government. Traditionally, the position of head of states is typically that of 
King, Queen or President. They are usually the constitutional and titular rules of the 
State.
116
 For example, Queen Elizabeth II is the head of state of the UK and fifteen 
other Commonwealth States.
117
 The Government is acting on Her Majesty’s behalf 
whereas the Governor-Generals in the Commonwealth States. Certain specific 
powers are vested in heads of states.
118
 For example, in the UK, although most of the 
powers relating to the control and conduct of international relations are conferred on 
the Queen, nevertheless matters such as treaty-making power, the power to make war 
and the annexation or cessation of territory lie with the Parliament.
119
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 Under international law, there is a presumption that a head of state may act on 
behalf of the State in its international relations.
120
  Therefore, the recognition of 
heads of state as the main representatives of a state in international law justifies their 
immunity before the national courts of other states.
121
   In the past, the sovereigns or 
heads of state had absolute immunity privileges.
122
 This meant that the heads of state 
were completely immune from foreign jurisdiction in all cases and in all 
circumstances.
123
 Nevertheless, in the UK the position on the heads of state is 
governed by Section 20 of the State immunity Act 1978, which provides that a 
sovereign or other head of state shall, subject to ‘any necessary modifications’ enjoy 
the same privileges and immunities as the head of a diplomatic mission.
124
 
In the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v Rwanda), the ICJ stated that: 
it is a well-established rule of international law that the Head of State … [is] deemed 
to represent the State merely by virtue of exercising [his] function, including for the 
performance, on behalf of the said State, of unilateral acts having the force of 
international commitments.
125
  
It can be submitted that the most senior heads of government, such as, prime 
ministers and presidents should enjoy personal immunity similar to those of  heads 
of state. These are the officials who are most likely to represent the state when they 
are abroad. As a result, they should be given immunity ratione personae due to their 
position and status. The argument for the protection of heads of state has also been 
recognised by the ICJ in the case of Djibouti v France. In that case, the ICJ 
reaffirmed the view of “full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability” of 
a head of state
126
 and drew comparison with the rule of CIL under Article 29 of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which also applied to heads of state.127 
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In addition, much legal literature has further strengthened the recognition of 
immunity ratione personae for heads of state.
128
  
Therefore, it can be said that there is a general consensus that serving heads of state 
should protected by immunity ratione personae while abroad as they are 
representing the state.129 If serving heads of state do not have such immunity, then 
they would not be able to travel overseas to carry out their duties efficiently due to 
the fear of lawsuits and be subject to the jurisdiction of another state as explained 
previously. 
b) Head of Governments 
On the other hand, the term head of government refers to the head of the executive 
branch of the state’s government.130 They may exercise the real power and authority 
within the State.
131
 The role of head of government is different from that of head of 
state notwithstanding that the same person may occupy both offices, or the two roles 
may be combined into one office.
132
 The US President is a good example of this.
133
 
In a separate office scenario, the head of government is usually referred as the prime 
Minister because he or she is the head of the executive.
134
 The Prime Minister is the 
executive authority governing the state. However, there can be sometimes confusion 
between the two terms. Nevertheless, the titles given to the types of meetings at 
which representative types may attend will often make it clear.
135
 This would 
include, for example, Meetings of Heads of States and Government of the Member 
States of the European Union.
136
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There is some evidence to suggest the general acceptance that a head of government 
should enjoy immunities similar to those of a head of state.
137
 This position is 
reflected in the 2001 Resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law on 
Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of Government in 
International Law.
138
 Article 15(1) of the 2001 Resolution states that a head of 
Government: 
shall enjoy the same inviolability, and immunity from jurisdiction recognised, in this 
Resolution, to the Head of State. 
 
It has been suggested by Murphy that many scholars take the position that immunity 
ratione personae extend to other high ranking government officials.
139
 Nevertheless, 
it will be argued in this chapter that not all senior serving government officials enjoy 
the immunity concession. This is because the state practice with regard to the 
treatment of heads of government and foreign ministers is less well developed 
compared to that for heads of state.
140
 
The section below will examine the Arrest Warrant case where the ICJ has shed 
some light with regards to the immunity ratione personae enjoyed by serving 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs.  
1.1.1.1 Immunity of Senior State Officials -  Minister for Foreign Affairs 
The Arrest Warrant case
141
 concerned an international arrest warrant, which had 
been issued in absentia, against Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (hereafter Yerodia), 
alleging that he had perpetrated crimes against humanity.
142
 Yerodia was the serving 
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Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo when the arrest warrant was issued. The 
alleged crimes committed by Yerodia were punishable under the Belgium municipal 
law.143  
Congo claimed that there were two issues in this case. Firstly, Congo said that 
Belgian law violated the principle of sovereign equality, that is to say, a state may 
not exercise its authority on the territory of another state.
144
 Therefore, Congo 
challenged Article 7 of the Belgium law which related to universal jurisdiction. 
Congo argued that a minister for foreign affairs, whilst in office, enjoys absolute 
immunity and inviolability for all his acts.
145
 On the other hand, Belgium made four 
preliminary objections.
146
 Belgium argued that the immunity given to a serving 
minister for foreign affairs was limited to ‘official acts’ only, and it could not be 
used for allegations of violations of international law, such as crimes against 
humanity or war crimes.
147
 Secondly, the Congo claimed that Belgium’s exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction on Yerodia had violated the diplomatic immunity that a minister 
for foreign affairs should enjoy.
148
 
The ICJ had to determine two questions regarding immunity in this case. The first 
question was to what extent a minister for foreign affairs was entitled to immunity 
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under international law (CIL). The second question was whether the immunity 
extended to international crimes such as crimes against humanity. In other words, it 
related to how far a State could go in granting jurisdiction to its domestic courts for 
international crimes.
149
 The ICJ explained that since there was no specific treaty 
provision regarding ministers for foreign affairs, it relied on the traditional rules of 
immunities given under CIL.
150
 
The Arrest Warrant case was the first authoritative statement of the law of state 
immunity by the ICJ.
151
 The majority of the judges in the ICJ found in favour of 
immunity rationae personae for ministers for foreign affairs. The ICJ explained that 
due to their special position: 
a Minister for Foreign Affairs, responsible for the conduct of his or her State’s 
relations with all other States, occupies a position such that, like the Head of State or 
the Head of government, he or she is recognised under international law as 
representative of the State solely by virtue of his or her office. He or she does not 
have to present letters of credence.
152
 
In addition, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in their Joint Separate 
Opinions said that: 
the purpose of the immunities attaching to Ministers for Foreign Affairs under 
customary international law is to ensure the free performance of their functions on 
behalf of their respective states.
153
 
Similarly, Judge Van den Wyngaert said that ministers for foreign affairs must be 
allowed to enjoy full immunity so that they are able to perform their functions 
diligently and efficiently. The Court further added that: 
if a minister for foreign affairs is arrested in another State on a criminal charge, he 
or she is clearly thereby prevented from exercising the functions of his or her 
office.
154
 
In other words, the judges maintained that immunity under the rules of CIL was 
granted to ministers for foreign affairs to ensure the effective performance of their 
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functions on behalf of the state.
155
 It included the fact that foreign ministers must be 
able to travel freely to other states for important meetings.
156
 As a result, the majority 
of the judges found that the issuance of the arrest warrant by Belgium had violated 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability which was given to an 
incumbent foreign envoy under CIL.
157
 Therefore, it meant that immunity was 
determined by the nature of the functions and their position.
158
 However, the scope 
of the application of immunity ratione personae for foreign ministers has been 
rejected by some. For example, Judge Oda observed that it was not clear under CIL 
as to what kind of privileges ministers for foreign affairs should be entitled to.
159
  
The ICJ has made the point that the role of minister for foreign affairs was 
comparable to that of a head of state or a head of government.
160
 However, in the 
Arrest Warrant case, it was noted that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations and the Conventions on Special Missions, which were referred to by the 
parties in the proceedings, did not contain specific immunity provisions enjoyed by a 
minister for foreign affairs.161 This arguably means that the ICJ is interpreting the 
law and granting immunity to ministers for foreign affairs and therefore treating 
them in a similar way to heads of state. The consequence of this is that the ICJ has 
been criticised for establishing a rule of CIL in an unconventional way.
162
 For 
example, Orakhelashvili has argued that not many other officials, with the exception 
of heads of state or government qualify for the same degree of protection.
163
 
However, the ICJ has explained its reasoning in paragraphs 53 and 54 of the 
judgment
164
 by stating that serving ministers of foreign affairs occupy a similar 
position to that of heads of state and heads of government.
165
 The drawback of this is 
that it could endanger the legitimacy of the principle and weaken the position of CIL 
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in international law.
166
 The interpretation of the ICJ on the immunity issue for 
serving government officials could potentially trigger the widening of its application 
for other government officials. Nonetheless, it can be submitted that the ICJ’s 
reasoning is correct in saying that ministers for foreign affairs should be entitled to 
the immunity privilege. This is due to the fact that they are very likely, for example, 
to need to travel internationally and deal with diplomatic missions around the 
world.
167
 Hence, the ministers for foreign affairs should hold an important position 
in the structure of a government. 
Nevertheless, in the Arrest Warrant case,
168
 it was held that incumbent Foreign 
Minister was entitled to immunity ratione personae from the criminal jurisdiction of 
another State because he was a serving senior Minister at the time the arrest warrant 
was issued.
169
  This means that former Minister for Foreign Affairs continue to enjoy 
immunity after leaving office. However, this immunity covers only the official acts 
they undertook while in office. Therefore, it does not cover acts before they take up 
or after leaving the office as well as private acts while in office.
170
 More importantly, 
it does not mean that they do not enjoy immunity after leaving office.
171
 However, it 
is important to note that former Minister for Foreign Affairs can be prosecuted in the 
national courts of a foreign State with jurisdiction for acts committed prior or 
subsequent to his or her term of office and acts committed in a private capacity 
during his or her period in office.
172
 
Criticism of the Arrest Warrant case – The Dissenting Views 
The reasoning by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case suffers from some weaknesses. 
It can be recalled that the minister for foreign affairs enjoys, during the tenure of his 
office, full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability in both a private 
and an official capacity.
173
 In other words, it is believed that an incumbent foreign 
minister is immune from jurisdiction even during a private visit or when acting in a 
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private capacity.
174
 Wirth has argued that the ICJ’s judgment was correct in treating 
ministers for foreign affairs the same as heads of state.
175
 However, some have 
criticised the fact that the ICJ’s argument in drawing such similarities have been 
rejected in legal doctrine.
176
 This has been supported by the dissenting opinions of 
Judges Van den Wyngaert,
177
 Al Khasawneh
178
 and the Joint Separate Opinion of 
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal.
179
 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal argued that there was “no basis for the argument that Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs are entitled to the same immunities as Heads of State”.180  
Nevertheless, the wide range of their immunity, extending to include their private 
acts, has been contested. For example, the arrest and detention of such a minister, 
while on a private visit, would arguably have a negative effect on the effective 
performance of his functions,
181
 yet this signifies that it will not affect his official 
functions as it does not involve any official activities. In other words, it does not 
necessarily mean full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and complete inviolability 
of a minister for foreign affairs under the CIL rule.
182
 Therefore, it has been argued 
that the ICJ’s judgment about the extent of immunity under CIL for private acts was 
less evident.
183
 The ICJ should have properly addressed this issue in the case.
184
  
Some commentators have criticised the obiter dictum of the majority regarding the 
extent of the immunity ratione personae of a former foreign minister.
185
 In 
particular, the narrow formulation of the following statement has been criticised: “a 
court may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State … in respect of 
acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity”.186 In the dissenting 
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opinion of Judge Oda, the issue of whether a former foreign minister was entitled to 
the same privileges and immunities as an incumbent foreign minister was raised.
187
 It 
has been criticised that the ICJ did not directly address the question of the possible 
existence of an exception in connection with the immunity ratione materiae for a 
former minister for foreign affairs.
 188
 However, the ICJ noted in the judgement that: 
after a person ceases to hold office of a Minister for Foreign Affairs, he or she will 
no longer enjoy all immunities accorded by international law in other States. 
Provided it has jurisdiction under international law a court of another State may try a 
former Minister for Foreign Affairs in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent 
to his or her period of office as well as in respect of acts committed during that 
period of office in a private capacity.
189
 
In view of these facts, it is quite likely that if immunity continues to be given to 
former ministers for foreign affairs, then it will open the floodgates for the extension 
of immunity. The consequence of this will be as stated by Judge Van den Wyngaert, 
who was also a dissenting judge: “in practice immunity leads to de facto 
impunity”.190  Hence, it cannot be denied that the law is still unclear. It is submitted 
that serving ministers for foreign affairs should have a minimum immunity ratione 
materiae protection while they are on private visits abroad for personal or private 
engagements.  
The Arrest Warrant case suggests that international crimes, which are allegedly 
committed by state officials, are official acts and immunity ratione personae would 
continue to be applied in foreign national courts.
191
 However, writers such as 
Orakhelashvili question whether the ICJ was correct in deciding that a foreign 
minister enjoys absolute immunity except for allegations of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.
192
 As explained earlier, incumbent or former state officials are 
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protected, with respect to official acts, by immunity ratione personae.
193
 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that immunity ratione  personae is no shield against 
core crimes prosecution.
194
 However, it is important to note that incumbent Minister 
for Foreign Affairs could be subjected to the criminal jurisdiction of international 
tribunals.
195
 This is because ‘certain international criminal courts may prosecute, 
where they have jurisdiction’ such as the ad-hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.
196
  The reason for this is that the ad hoc tribunals are established pursuant 
to Chapter VII of the UN Charter which overrides the immunity of anyone before 
them.
197
 
The ICJ examined various evidence of state practice - including national legislation - 
and concluded that there was no exception for absolute immunity under CIL from 
criminal prosecution of an incumbent minister for foreign affairs for crimes against 
humanity or war crimes.
198
 However, Judge Van den Wyngaert rejected the ICJ’s 
approach, in the dissenting opinion, regarding the existence of both a customary rule 
conferring absolute immunity on serving foreign ministers and the absence of any 
exceptions to such rule even in cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
199
 
In supporting her claim, she argued that she could not find either state practice or 
opinio juris to support the ICJ’s reasoning.200 Furthermore, she pointed out that full 
immunity may exist in a limited state practice for current or former heads of state, 
but not for ministers for foreign affairs.
201
 Similarly, Judge Al Khasawneh agreed 
with Judge Van den Wyngaert that there was no rule of CIL in the forms of state 
practice and opinio juris to support the proposition of full immunity for ministers for 
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foreign affairs.
202
 They maintained that the failure of the majority of the ICJ to 
distinguish between immunity ratione materiae and immunity rationae personae for 
the purpose of determining what acts were protected by sovereign immunity, did not 
reflect state practice.
203
 Furthermore, Wouters has agreed that the ICJ did not 
establish proof of state practice and opinio juris under CIL to support its 
judgment.
204
  
In terms of a counter-argument for the above claim, Judge Koroma said that, “while 
it would have been interesting if the Court had done so, the Court did not consider it 
necessary to undertake a disquisition of the law in order to reach its decision”.205 
Likewise, Cassese has claimed that the granting of immunities to a minister for 
foreign affairs, while on an official visit, was supported by state practice and opinio 
juris.
206
 Cassese argued that when a Minister for Foreign Affairs acted on behalf of 
the State, those acts were attributed to the State and not to the minister per se.
207
 It 
can, therefore, be stated that the immunity of an incumbent foreign minister is 
unlimited. Therefore, the ICJ has extended its decision to former ministers for 
foreign affairs and put incumbent and former high-ranking officials on an equal 
footing.
208
 This means that the ICJ had recognised the unrestricted nature of 
immunity for all acts committed by a former minister for foreign affairs in an official 
capacity.
209
  
As a result, such unlimited immunity would even cover allegations of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.
210
 The ICJ found that the CIL did not allow such 
exceptions.
211
 Moreover, the ICJ explained that it did not find that authorities from 
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the past practice
212
 suggested that there was an exception under CIL with regard to 
‘domestic’ courts.213 The ICJ clarified that: 
It has been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists under customary 
international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from 
criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, 
where they are suggested of having committed war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.
214
 
This reasoning has been rejected by Wirth who has said that former ministers for 
foreign affairs are entitled to immunity for core crimes prosecutions.
215
 It has been 
argued that if there was any immunity, which could be raised against the warrant, 
then it would not be an immunity attaching to the official character of the acts, but 
only to Yerodia’s official status at the time of the issuance of the warrant.216 In other 
words, Wirth disapproved of the Court’s reasoning because former officials no 
longer perform any functions which would require protection.
217
 The reasoning 
given by the ICJ regarding the lack of exceptions to the rule of immunity, even for 
crimes against humanity, is persuasive. This is because the past practices only 
restrict immunity at international tribunal level. Furthermore, the state practices at 
national level appear to be inconsistent. Therefore, it is submitted that the reasoning 
given by Judge Al Khasawned quoted earlier is convincing. This included the idea 
that serving ministers for foreign affairs should be entitled to immunity ratione 
personae whilst in office.  
 It is also interesting to see that several judges and some legal scholars have argued 
that the process of investigating criminal charges against a minister for foreign 
affairs should pass the functionality criterion that the ICJ upholds.
218
 This evokes the 
idea that, when a minister for foreign affairs goes abroad, it is acceptable for a 
criminal investigation to be carried out as it is not impinging on his overseas 
mission. This view is supported by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal who 
                                                          
212
 They are the: the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (Art.7); Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal of Tokyo (Art.6); ICTY (Art.7, para.2); ICTR (Art.6, para.2) and 
the ICC (Art 27). 
213
 Bankas (n 6) 282.  
214
 The Arrest Warrant case [58].  
215
 Wirth (n 142) 890.  
216
 ibid 881. 
217
 ibid 
218
 Wouters (n 142) 258.  
41 
 
reasoned that the commencement of an investigation did not violate the inviolability 
or immunity of that person.
219
 Furthermore, Judge Al Khasawned said that: 
A Minister for Foreign Affairs is entitled to immunity from enforcement when on 
official mission…but the mere opening of criminal investigations against him can 
hardly be said by any objective criteria to constitute interference with the conduct of 
diplomacy. A faint- hearted or ultra-sensitive Minister may restrict his private 
travels or feel discomfort but this is a subjective element that must be discarded.
220
 
It is very possible that what the judges have maintained regarding investigation of 
criminal charges against ministers for foreign affairs is valid. On the one hand, it 
would be wrong to refuse immunity to serving ministers for foreign affairs on 
government missions abroad. On the other hand, the right not to carry out criminal 
investigations at the same time as an overseas visit would be equally unjustifiable. 
The distinctions between the two contrasting issues are particularly important here. 
The ICJ observed that although various conventions impose obligations on states to 
prosecute or extradite which leads to criminal jurisdiction, it did not affect 
immunities under CIL.
221
 Nonetheless, the ICJ judgment in the Arrest Warrant case 
stated that: 
an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs, may be subject to criminal 
proceedings before certain criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. Examples 
include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda, established pursuant to Security Council 
resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and the future 
International Criminal Court created by the 1988 Rome Convention.
222
 
Equally relevant to the discussion on immunity ratione personae is that it does not 
apply to lower ranked state officials, except in very specific circumstances.
223
 One 
reason for this is that lower ranked government ministers are usually only required to 
deal with domestic and local matters rather than international affairs. Hence, it is 
logical to restrict immunity ratione personae from serving junior government 
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ministers. Withholding immunity in this way is potentially controversial but one 
should consider that if such immunity is granted to all serving government ministers 
irrespective of whether they really ought to have such a privilege, then this could 
lead to the fusion of the status of ministers in general.  
In the Pinochet (No.3) case,
224
 Lord Millett stated quite clearly that immunity ratione 
personae “should not be made available to serving heads of governments who are 
not heads of state, military commanders and those in charge of the security 
forces”.225 His Lordship meant that only those who have exclusive control of the 
security forces and armed forces should have immunity ratione personae. With due 
respect to this opinion, it can be submitted that this view may not be viable in every 
case. Although having control of military forces is vital, it indirectly refers to roles of 
ministers such as defence ministers and this goes against the long-standing view 
under international law that immunity ratione personae should be given to serving 
heads of state and certain serving senior government ministers. Besides, his 
Lordship’s suggestion may not work as the ICJ has demonstrated in the Arrest 
Warrant case, where ministers for foreign affairs should have immunity ratione 
personae notwithstanding the fact that they have no control of security forces. 
Universal Jurisdiction  
As far as the second question regarding jurisdiction is concerned, in the Joint 
Separate Opinion, the judges suggested that immunity was not a free-standing topic 
of international law but was linked to the issue of jurisdiction.
226
 This has been 
supported by writers such as Orakhelashvili, as he has said that the issue was 
connected to that of universal jurisdiction under international law.
227
 However, it is 
important to note that the ICJ did not address the issue of universal jurisdiction in 
this case.
228
 Once again, the ICJ has been criticised for failing to tackle the question 
of immunity from jurisdiction, as to whether other states can exercise extraterritorial 
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criminal jurisdiction under international law.
229
 Nevertheless, it was partly dealt with 
in the Separate Opinions230. President Guillaume distinguished between ‘universal 
jurisdiction’ and ‘universal jurisdiction by default’. The former concerns the 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes by foreigners based on the presence of the 
accused in the forum state; and the latter deals with jurisdiction, which has been 
asserted by a state, without any link with the crime of the defendant.
231
 Therefore, 
President Guillaume reasoned that there was no universal jurisdiction over war 
crimes, “committed abroad by foreigners against foreigners when the perpetrator is 
not present in the territory of the State in question”.232 He further added that there 
was no universal jurisdiction with regard to crimes against humanity
233
 and that 
international law only authorised universal jurisdiction for piracy.
234
 Treaties, on the 
other hand, oblige contracting parties to exercise universal jurisdiction proper.
235
 
Judge Rezek took a similar view on the matter.
236
 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal argued that CIL did not prohibit universal jurisdiction for other 
offences, though this was subject to a set of conditions that they set out carefully.
237
 
To support their arguments, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
distinguished between universal jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction. They 
explained that universal jurisdiction: 
is jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by foreigners against foreigners, 
without the accused being in the territory of the forum state, and territorial 
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jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events, that is jurisdiction over persons 
present in the forum state who have allegedly committed crimes abroad.
238
 
Thus, all the judges agreed on the validity of universal jurisdiction when the 
perpetrator was found on the territory of the prosecution state.
239
 On a positive note, 
the ratio decidendi judgment of the case has clarified a previously uncertain area of 
the law, as it confirmed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability of 
serving ministers for foreign affairs.
240
 Wickremasinghe submits that it is advisable 
to concentrate more on the ratio decidendi of what has been said, rather than seeking 
to draw more from conclusions on what was not said.
241
 The judgement of the Arrest 
Warrant case was followed by the Belgian Court of Cassation when it rejected a 
criminal complaint against Ariel Sharon who was the incumbent Prime Minister of 
Israel.242 
It will be argued that based on the reasoning by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case, it 
does not just apply to foreign ministers but also to other senior government 
ministers. An analysis will be made later in this chapter to attempt to apply the ICJ’s 
reasoning in the Arrest Warrant case to determine which other senior state officials 
might deserve the same immunity privilege.  
c) Other senior government officials 
As the law has changed significantly in the last century, the definition of head of 
state now encompasses not just monarchs
243
, but also presidents and prime ministers 
who effectively run a country on a day-to-day basis.244 In this way, it can be seen that 
the previously exclusive privilege of head of state immunity has now expanded to 
include potentially to other senior serving state officials.  
However, the term ‘senior state official’ is more difficult to define. This is because 
‘official’ may refer to holders of political offices or to non-political civil servants.245 
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Nevertheless, the ICJ has given some clarification in relation to ‘holders of high-
ranking office’ and ‘persons ‘of high rank’ in few cases.246 This includes those 
serving as the heads of their respective government departments.  
It can be suggested that a selective serving senior government ministers should also 
have the same immunity privileges at least similar to those of heads of government. 
This is because certain senior serving government ministers are also representing the 
states when they are abroad on government missions. The removal of their personal 
immunity would substantially affect their functions as a government spokesperson. 
The decision over which senior government officials should have the exclusive 
immunity ratione personae is problematic.
247
  
Discussion on the Immunity Accorded to Senior Government Officials  
In the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ mentioned the reason for granting immunity to 
serving ministers for foreign affairs.
248
 Despite its explanation, the ICJ did not 
specifically mention which other class of senior state officials might also be entitled 
to this immunity. Hence, this section will seek to draw an analysis, based on the 
judgment of the ICJ from the Arrest Warrant case, to establish other classes of senior 
state officials who may merit this immunity. In particular, the ICJ has indirectly 
provided some criteria for the issuance of immunity ratione personae.
249
  
One of the main questions that needs to be asked is which class of other senior state 
officials might deserve immunity ratione personae apart from heads of state and 
ministers for foreign affairs. The ICJ, in the Arrest Warrant case, explained that: 
certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of 
Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities (immunity ratione 
personae) from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal.
250
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It is important to reiterate that the ICJ, in the reasoning above, did not specifically 
mention immunities for ministers for foreign affairs, but did suggest that in order for 
the government official to have immunity ratione personae, he or she should be 
required to travel internationally frequently and to have a constant need to 
communicate with the government and representatives of another state.
251
 Therefore, 
the ICJ followed a functional justification of the immunity ratione personae. In other 
words, the ICJ determined the immunity ratione personae according to the function 
of that particular government official. In addition, it can be assumed that those 
officials, who have to deal with international matters, are very likely to hold senior 
positions in the government. This narrows down the potential recipients to those in 
the government. For example, in the UK, government ministers are collectively 
known as the executive. They are the people who run the country on a daily basis. 
However, not all ministers in the executive are entitled to this limited immunity 
privilege. 
The ICJ pointed out that the nature of the functions of the government officials 
dictate whether they can have immunity ratione personae.
252
 This means that the 
functions that he or she holds must be in charge of the government’s diplomatic 
activities and must act as a representative in intergovernmental meetings.
253
 An 
example of the similarity between the functions of government officials can be 
illustrated in Re Bo Xilai. The Bow Street Magistrates’ Court had to deal with this 
case which concerned the applicant’s request for an arrest warrant against Mr Bo 
Xilai, the former Minister for Commerce and International Trade of the People’s 
Republic of China, alleging that he committed torture.
254
 It was held that Mr Bo, 
who has been served an arrest warrant, was entitled to immunity because: 
functions are equivalent to those exercised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs and, 
adopting the reasoning of the International Court of Justice in [the Arrest Warrant 
case] … that under the customary international law rules Mr Bo ha[d] immunity 
from prosecution as he would not be able to perform his functions unless he is able 
to travel freely.
255
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The Bo Xilai case endorses the reasoning found in the Arrest Warrant case and this 
confirms the fact that Ministers for Commerce and International Trade are entitled to 
immunity ratione personae. Nonetheless, it can be submitted that different countries 
use different terms for ministers who have to deal with trade matters. For example, 
they can be called ‘International Trade Ministers’ or ‘Minister of International 
Commerce’. The wording of their title should not be a barrier to this immunity. As 
long as their roles and functions primarily deal with international trade or commerce, 
then they should be given immunity ratione personae. This corresponds with the 
reasoning, as stated in the Re Bo Xilai and Arrest Warrant cases, that the immunity is 
given to ministers so that they can carry out their duties, without the fear of 
prosecution, when they are overseas.  
Thus, according to the explanation above, the nature of the functions plays an 
important part in deciding who is entitled to immunity ratione personae. The ICJ in 
the Arrest Warrant case explained that the nature of the functions should involve 
“diplomatic activities and generally acts as its representative in international 
negotiations and intergovernmental meetings.
256
 In view of these pointers, it is likely 
that serving senior ministers holding the positions of: defence, finance,257 
international development and business are all entitled to immunity ratione 
personae. This is due to the fact that these officials are very probably going to 
represent their country in international negotiations, for instance, in international 
summits or conventions for their departments. They are also likely to represent their 
country in various intergovernmental meetings. This was confirmed and clarified in 
Re General Shaul Mofaz where it was held that “a Defence Minister would 
automatically acquire State immunity in the same way as that pertaining to a Foreign 
Minister”.258  
In the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ also said that immunity ratione personae is 
granted if the ministers concerned are required to travel internationally. This means 
that they must be able to travel freely whenever the need arises.
259
 An example of 
this is the Re Bo Xilai case where it was held that a serving Minister for Commerce 
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and International Trade was required to travel internationally to deal with 
international commerce and trade issues.
260
 Hence, the requirement to be able to 
travel internationally is one of the major factors in determining whether one senior 
serving government minister can have such immunity. 
Further evidence of this issue can be seen in Khurts Bat v Germany and others
261
 as 
well as Djibouti v France.
262
 In both of these cases, the protection of  immunity 
ratione personae was rejected because of the position of the government officials in 
question.
263
  
In the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ reached the decision that a minister for foreign 
affairs was entitled to immunity ratione personae.264 The ICJ stated that: “in 
international law it is firmly established that … certain holders of high-ranking office 
in a State, such as the Head of State … enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other 
States, both civil and criminal”.265 The decision of this case provides some 
explanations with regard to immunity ratione personae. However, a critical analysis 
will be made by referring to the reasoning made by the judges in the Arrest Warrant 
case to decide which other category of senior state officials should be entitled to the 
residue immunity ratione materiae.  This is because the obiter dictum by ICJ in the 
Arrest Warrant case implicitly recognised that the former Minister for Foreign 
Affairs enjoyed immunity ratione personae for acts committed in his official 
capacity.
266
 Nevertheless, the ICJ did not discuss about the residue immunity ratione 
materiae explicitly. Thus, the section below will seek to explore the residual 
immunity ratione materiae in more detail.  
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1.1.2 Immunity Ratione Materiae (Functional Immunity) 
Immunity ratione materiae or functional immunity is given by reference to the 
characteristics of the conduct.
267
 Therefore, immunity ratione materiae is not 
attached to the individual person, but to the actions themselves which seek to protect 
the dignity of the state.
268
 Hence, it could be described as a subject-matter based 
immunity.
269
 In other words, it only covers state officials for acts they perform in 
their official capacity.
270
 Thus, immunity ratione materiae only gives immunity in 
limited circumstances and is narrower in its application. Lord Millett explained that: 
The immunity is sometimes also justified by the need to prevent the serving Head of 
State or diplomat, from being inhibited in the performance of his official duties by 
fear of the consequences after he has ceased to hold office. This last basis can hardly 
be prayed in aid to support the availability of the immunity in respect of criminal 
activities prohibited by international law.
271
 
As a result, the scope of this immunity is much narrower than immunity ratione 
personae. State officials are generally covered by immunity ratione materiae, 
irrespective of the ranking of their positions in the state.
272
 This means that it is 
available to most state officials, such as: heads of diplomatic missions, and those 
whose conduct is called into question after they have left office.
273
 Therefore, this 
type of immunity is wide enough to be available to former ministers.
274
  
The aim of immunity ratione materiae is to prevent national courts from determining 
the legality of certain acts of foreign states and their officials.
275
 This includes the 
prosecution of former heads of state or other government officials who have 
allegedly committed crimes, for example, crimes against humanity and torture. 
                                                          
267
 International Law Commission, United Nations General Assembly 'Immunity of State Officials 
from foreign criminal jurisdiction: Memorandum by the Secretariat', (31 March 2008) A/CN.4/596, 
101. 
268
 Steffen Wirth, ‘Immunities, Related Problems, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute’ [2001] 12 
Criminal Law Forum 429, 431. 
269
 The Pinochet (No 3) case [171h] (Lord Millett). 
270
 Webb (n 264) 82 ;Toner (n 97) 902. ; Akande and Shah (n 9) 825. 
271
 The Pinochet (No 3) case  [172a] [Lord Millett]. 
272
  Chanaka Wickremasinghe, 'Immunities enjoyed by officials of States and International 
Organizations', in Malcolm Evans (ed), International Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 397. 
273
 Shelton (n 77) 803;Hans Kelsen and Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy., Principles of 
international law,( Rinehart 1952) 236-237. ; Zappala (n 36) 595. ; Cassese (n 6) 862;  Fox (n 39) 
667.; Wickremasinghe (n 139) 383.  
274
 Cf: Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium (Arrest Warrant Case) [2002] 3 ICJ Reports 24 
(ICJ) [61]. 
275
 Reed Brody and Michael Ratner, The Pinochet papers: The case of Augusto Pinochet in Spain and 
Britain,( Kluwer Law International 2000) 337. ; Akande and Shah (n 9) 831. 
50 
 
Nevertheless, as will be seen in the later chapters of this thesis, immunity from 
criminal jurisdictions is still a sensitive area in the law at national court level.  
However, the scope of immunity for civil jurisdiction is more transparent.276 This 
statement has been supported by Wickremasinghe who has stated that, “immunity 
ratione materiae potentially apply to the official acts of all the State officials … from 
at least the civil jurisdiction of the Courts of other States, where the effect of 
proceedings would be to undermine or render nugatory the immunity of the 
employer State”.277 This illustrates the fact that immunity ratione materiae will not 
prevent former heads of state or any other government officials from standing trial in 
civil courts regarding their personal or private matters. 
Some writers, such as Cassese, believe that it is necessary for immunity ratione 
materiae to be made available to government officials even after they have left 
office. This is to safeguard them for acts that they have carried out whilst in an 
official capacity.
278
 Cassese states that immunity ratione materiae “covers official 
acts of any de jure or de facto state agent”.279 This reasserts the fact that immunity 
ratione materiae should be given to former government officials for official acts 
notwithstanding that they have left office. This view is supported by Robertson, a 
distinguished human rights lawyer, who said that, “ex heads, along with agents such 
as generals and police chiefs and ministers, enjoy only restrictive immunity ratione 
materiae, which covers all acts performed officially but does not include actions 
taken for private gratification”.280  
The views mentioned above appear to be practicable. However, there are many 
problems associated with immunity ratione materiae. One of them is whether 
immunity ratione materiae should apply to every government official irrespective of 
their ranking.  
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1.1.2.1 Other Government Officials  
As mentioned earlier, this type of immunity is theoretically available to all 
government officials irrespective of their position provided that the acts have been 
carried out in an official capacity. Nevertheless, it will be argued that such an 
extensive scope of application of functional immunity is not tenable. An explanation 
is required to determine which class of senior state officials deserve immunity 
ratione materiae. This more restrictive approach to the applicability of immunity 
ratione materiae and it aims to prevent the exploitation of this rule.  
As far as other government ministers or junior officials are concerned, it has been 
suggested that they should enjoy immunity as they are individuals acting as 
representatives of the state.
281
 In the Armed Activities in the Congo (Congo/Rwanda) 
case, the ICJ noted the similarity in the functions between some high ranking 
government officials with other junior government officials. It said that: 
with increasing frequency in modern times other persons representing a State in 
specific fields may be authorised by that State to bind it by their statements in 
respect of matters falling within their purview. This may be true, for example, of 
holders of technical ministerial portfolios exercising powers in their field of 
competence in the area of foreign relations, and even of certain officials.
282
 
In addition, Lord Millett in the Pinochet (No.3) case said that: 
Immunity ratione materiae … is available to former heads of State and heads of 
diplomatic missions, and any one whose conduct in the exercise of the authority of 
the State is afterwards called into question, whether he acted as head of government, 
government minister, military commander or chief of police, or subordinate public 
official. The immunity is the same whatever the rank of the office-holder.
283
 
Furthermore, this is supported by Article 15(2) of the Resolution on Immunities of 
Heads of State and of Heads of Government by the Institute of International Law 
where it states that: 
without prejudice to such immunities to which other members of the government 
may be entitled on account of their official functions.
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The first aspect to point out is that there appears to be some indication, as above, to 
suggest that junior ranked government ministers, apart from other senior officials, 
should be given some kind of immunity while they are serving in the government. 
This is because there seems to be an impression that the functions of some senior and 
junior government ministers are very similar. From the outset, bestowing immunity 
to government ministers irrespective of their rank may seem to be an ideal solution. 
However, this may not work in practice because some of these junior government 
ministers do not hold important roles compared with their senior counterparts. The 
purpose of differentiating between senior and junior government officials is based 
primarily on practicability. By way of illustration, it can be said that junior ministers 
should be given the same type of immunity as the head of state or minister for 
foreign affairs. However, this will not work to a large extent. Firstly, it is very likely 
that junior ministers do not deal with major international issues such as diplomatic 
relationships involving other states. Secondly, their scope of duties is potentially 
limited only to their home country. These two reasons are strong enough to support 
the view that junior government officials should not be given immunity or if they 
are, it should be at a basic level only. Most national laws seem to be reluctant to 
extend the same privilege of immunity for heads of state to other state officials.
285
 
This can be seen, for example, under Section 20 of the SIA and Section 36 of the 
Australian Foreign States Immunities Act of 1985.  
Conclusion 
This chapter began by defining the terms ‘head of state’, ‘head of government’ and 
other ‘senior government official’. This is because it is important to ascertain which 
class of senior state officials may be entitled to immunity ratione personae. It has 
explained that ‘immunities of senior state officials’ is the focus of this thesis.  There 
are two types of immunities given under the CIL doctrines for senior state officials: 
immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae. Immunity ratione 
personae or personal immunity is given according to the status of that individual. 
Therefore, serving heads of state and some other senior state officials, such as 
serving ministers for foreign affairs, are entitled to this absolute immunity. On the 
other hand, functional immunity or immunity ratione materiae is generally given to 
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other state officials including former heads of state. Nevertheless, it only covered 
‘official acts’. In other words, in order to claim this second type of immunity, the 
government officials have to prove that he or she is protected by immunity ratione 
materiae due to the official nature of his or her conduct.  
The Arrest Warrant case held by the ICJ said that a serving minister for foreign 
affairs was entitled to immunity ratione personae. Hence, the main question that this 
chapter sought to answer was which class of state officials should enjoy absolute 
immunity. An analysis has been carried out based on the judgment of the Arrest 
Warrant case. The ICJ has set out the criteria as to which other state officials may 
potentially benefit from immunity ratione personae. Notwithstanding that the ICJ 
has set out certain criteria aimed specifically at ministers for foreign affairs, it is still 
applicable to other senior government ministers provided they fulfil certain 
requirements. In other words, it is based on the ‘functional justification’ of the 
positions and tasks that the heads of government hold. Provided that the heads of 
government have satisfied the functional justification test, then they should be given 
immunity ratione personae while serving.  
It has been argued that not all government ministers should be given immunity 
ratione personae. Only a limited number of senior serving government ministers 
deserve to have the same exclusive immunity as the serving heads of state. Thus, this 
chapter has submitted that those who should enjoy immunity ratione personae 
include heads of government in the areas of defence, finance, international 
development and business. The reason for this result is that the heads of government 
mentioned earlier have significant roles in dealing with other states as well as 
representing their states in the international arena. Hence, they should be given this 
exclusive absolute immunity in order for them to carry out their duties while abroad 
without the danger of being subject to the jurisdiction of other states. As explained 
earlier, immunity ratione personae will be removed once they are no longer the 
heads of such governmental departments.  
From another perspective, it can be seen in Khurts Bat and Djibouti v France that 
other senior government officials do not enjoy immunity ratione personae. In 
addition, the ICJ has made it clear that in order to claim immunity privileges, the 
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forum state must be notified so that the entitlement to immunity is respected. This 
was also the case in Khurts Bat. 
The doctrines of immunities given under CIL have been investigated and explained. 
The next chapter explores a different and controversial question, whether torture, 
which is classified as a peremptory norm, can challenge the ambiguous law on head 
of state immunity. It has been argued by some that the violations of peremptory 
norms by heads of state and government officials should be treated outside the scope 
of immunity ratione materiae.
286
 Chapter Two will address this issue and analyse 
whether the violation of jus cogens norms, such as torture, can trump the rules of 
immunities under CIL due to its allegedly special status under international law. 
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Chapter Two 
The Impact of Jus Cogens on the Law of Head of State 
Immunity 
This chapter will examine the effect of peremptory norms in more detail, to ascertain 
whether they are a factor in restricting the application of head of state immunity. 
Specifically, this chapter intends to find out whether the qualification of torture, as a 
crime under jus cogens, serves to deny immunity to serving heads of state. The 
notion of prohibition of torture is a relatively new concept. It was established 
between the two world wars.
287
 After the wars, it was determined that acts of torture 
were jus cogens violations.
288
 The doctrine of jus cogens is based upon the 
acceptance of a set of fundamental and higher shared principles within the system.
289
 
It is said to be similar to those of public order or public policy in domestic legal 
systems.
290
 
The concept of peremptory norms was introduced into contemporary international 
law through the enactment of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
291
 Due 
to the rapid development of human rights in a contemporary context, the prohibition 
of jus cogens crimes, such as genocide and torture, are said to be so serious that they 
override the privileges attached to individuals, notwithstanding their positions as 
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heads of state or government officials.
292
 This relates to the ‘normative hierarchy 
theory’, the theory which holds that one international law principle prevails over 
another.
293
 The argument that the violation of torture can trump head of state 
immunity has inevitably attracted criticism.
294
 The argument involves two distinct 
international law doctrines, namely: state immunity and peremptory norms. As far as 
head of state immunity is concerned, the privileges attached to serving heads of state 
are said to belong to the former.
295
 It is important to note that jus cogens norms are 
‘substantive’ in nature; whereas the doctrine of immunity is ‘procedural’.296 Lord 
Hoffman clarified this in the Jones (Respondent) v Minister of Interior Al Mamlaka 
Al- Arabiya AS Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) (Jones) case, where he stated 
that: 
To produce a conflict with … immunity, it is therefore necessary to show that the 
[substantive jus cogens prohibition] has generated an ancillary procedural rule 
which, by way of exception to … immunity, entitles or perhaps requires States to 
assume … jurisdiction over other States in cases in which torture is alleged.297 
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It is important to point out that a jus cogens norm is different from an erga omnes 
obligation.
298
 Erga omnes obligations are directed at everybody.
299
 Thus, obligation 
erga omnes is considered largely a concept of state responsibility.
300
 However, erga 
omnes obligations mainly affect jurisdictional issues rather than immunity issues.
301
 
Therefore, the only obligations that can effectively precede obligations under 
immunity rules are those obligations imposed by Chapter VII of the UN Security 
Council.
302
 In addition, Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that: 
in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
303
 
This Chapter will argue that violations of jus cogens, such as torture, do not 
necessarily abrogate the doctrine of head of state immunity. A critical analysis will 
be carried out to support this view, in particular, from the judgments of the Al-
Adsani case.
304
 Notwithstanding that the prohibition on torture had achieved the 
status of international jus cogens, the majority of judges were unable to discern any 
firm basis in the current state practice for concluding that a state no longer enjoyed 
immunity from civil claims in the court of another state for alleged acts of torture.
305
 
This view is also supported by the majority of judges in the Arrest Warrant case. In 
this case, the ICJ held that an alleged violation of jus cogens was not enough to 
remove immunity ratione personae, which is absolute for serving heads of state.
306
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Hence, heads of state and some heads of government enjoy immunity ratione 
personae while they are still in office.  
This Chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section defines and 
explains the general principles of jus cogens rules. The second section investigates 
the effect of jus cogens on the law of head of state immunity where examples of state 
practices, such as those in the Al-Adsani and the Bouzari cases, are debated. The 
majority and the dissenting judgments (minority view) in the Al-Adsani case will be 
considered, particularly to uncover whether the prohibition of torture is a factor and 
has the substance to outweigh the doctrine of state immunity. Finally, the third 
section dissects the arguments regarding ‘access to court’ and immunity. It will be 
argued that the ‘normative hierarchy theory’ does not necessarily supersede another 
international law norm; on the contrary, they complement each other on a more 
subtle level.  
2.1 The Definition of a Peremptory Norm and Jus Cogens 
2.1.1. Jus Cogens Rule 
The starting point for defining peremptory norms or jus cogens can be Article 53 of 
the VCLT 1969. The Article states that: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm 
of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by 
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.
 307
 
 
It is interesting to note that the International Law Commission (hereafter ‘ILC’) has 
said that the notion of peremptory norms, as contained in Article 53 of the VCLT, 
“had been recognised in public international law before the Convention existed, but 
that instrument gave it both a precision and a substance which made the notion one 
of its essential provisions”.308 Article 53 of the VCLT sets out two requirements for 
the formation of jus cogens. Firstly, a norm will not be jus cogens unless it is 
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accepted and recognised by the international community of states as a whole.
309
 In 
other words, jus cogens will only reach such special status if it has been accepted as 
being a superior value by the international community.
310
 In a way, it is rather 
similar to the notion of public order or public policy in domestic legal orders.
311
 
Therefore, in order for a jus cogens rule to be binding, it requires the universal 
acceptance of the proposition as a legal rule by states and the recognition of it as a 
rule of jus cogens by an overwhelming majority of states, crossing ideological and 
political divides.
312
 Macdonald maintains that, ‘the consent of a ‘very large majority’ 
will suffice to create a rule of jus cogens’.313 Moreover, Alexidze has explained that, 
since jus cogens norms are based on the common will of the international 
community and are absolute, they should bind even the dissenting states.
314
 
However, Danilenko has pointed out that Article 53 of the VCLT states that the 
peremptory norms of general international law should be accepted and recognised 
not by individuals per se, but by ‘the international community of states as a 
whole’.315 Therefore, the main problem here relates back to the primary issue of 
consent by states as to whether they should be bound by something they have not 
explicitly agreed upon. 
Secondly, according to Article 53 of the VCLT, jus cogens must be a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted, and which can only be modified by a subsequent 
general international law norm that has a similar character.
316
 Therefore, jus cogens 
is a notion in international law which cannot be subject to contracting out.
317
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Furthermore, Article 64 of the VCLT says that if a new peremptory norm of general 
international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm 
becomes void. The effect of this is that any treaty which conflicts with it will be void 
ab initio.
318
 A state is not free to decide whether to be bound by a legal rule; for jus 
cogens norms, states are automatically bound by it and they cannot ignore it.
319
 
Therefore, jus cogens rules apply in the context of customary rules and no derogation 
is permitted either by local or special custom.
320
  
Jus cogens rules are substantive rules which are recognised as having a higher 
status.
321
 They have now been accepted on the international stage as norms of 
superior value.
322
 Writers like Bassiouni have argued that jus cogens can be 
considered “compelling law”, and to be in the highest hierarchical position among all 
other norms and principles.
323
 Therefore, jus cogens norms are deemed to be 
absolutely binding and restrictive of the freedoms enjoyed by the parties.
324
 
Bassiouni has proposed three other considerations which must be taken into account 
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in determining whether a given international crime has reached the status of jus 
cogens.
325
  
The first has to do with the historical legal evolution of the crime. Clearly, the more 
legal instruments that exist to evidence the condemnation and prohibition of a 
particular crime, the better founded the proposition that the crime has risen to the 
level of jus cogens. The second consideration is the number of states that have 
incorporated the given proscription in their national laws. The third consideration is 
the number of international and national prosecutions for the given crime and how 
they have been characterised. Additional supporting sources that can be relied upon 
in determining whether a particular crime is a part of jus cogens is other evidence of 
general principles of law and the writings of the most distinguished publicists.
326
 
The effect of jus cogens is said to preserve the legal relationships established by 
certain norms by prevailing over and invalidating rules which threaten the integrity 
and the foundation of the law.
327
 Therefore, it has been argued that peremptory 
norms should trump the rules on immunity of states and their officials if the two 
stand in conflict with each other.
328
 Academics like Chigara believe that peremptory 
norms overarch national constitutions and deny states the defence of national 
sovereignty for breaches of international law.
329
 He has stated that: 
Norms of peremptory general international law sometimes referred to as norms jus 
cogens are of such importance to the international legal system that even in the 
exercise of their sovereign right to enter treaties one with another, States may not 
breach norms of this category.
330
 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the scope of jus cogens is limited to treaties and 
does not extend to acts and other rules.
331
 Therefore, it does not extend to the 
question of immunity.
332
 This is because states are only bound by treaties which they 
have agreed to.
333
 As far as serving heads of state are concerned, it can be submitted 
that they are still being protected under immunity ratione personae. This is the case, 
notwithstanding the fact that the qualification of torture as a crime falls under jus 
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cogens. The basic issue here effectively relates back to the consent of states; that is, 
whether they have agreed to any international treaties that could affect state 
immunity, which subsequently influence the privileges enjoyed by their serving head 
of state.  
However, it has been argued that the effect of jus cogens on crimes against humanity 
is that it permits universal jurisdiction for their breach which means that they are 
subjected to the principle of aut dedere aut judicare.
334
 Having said this, it has been 
suggested that the aut dedere aut judicare principle is merely theoretical.
335
 In terms 
of the universal jurisdiction provision that is triggered by the crime of torture, states 
have attempted to implement the universal jurisdiction provision more systematically 
through their domestic legislations.
336
 One reason for this is because of the conflict 
between realpolitik or diplomacy and the doctrine of universal jurisdiction.
337
 There 
is undoubtedly some truth in the friction between the two doctrines. The reason for 
the friction is due to the fact that the law of head of state immunity may be affected 
as it involves the exercise of extensive jurisdiction. The problem relating to the 
universal jurisdiction as a result of allegations of a jus cogens crime will be dealt 
with later in the thesis in the context of Article 5 of the CAT. 
The definition of jus cogens has already been discussed in relation to Article 53 of 
the VCLT. However, it is important to distinguish it from the older voluntarist view 
of international law on jus cogens because it does not support the modern approach 
towards jus cogens under Article 53 of the VCLT. 
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The Voluntarist Approach towards Jus Cogens 
The voluntarist theory on jus cogens maintains that states are sovereign; so they 
cannot be bound by legal obligations without their express consent.
338
 This theory 
applies to both treaties and custom.
339
 In S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (hereafter the 
‘Lotus’), the Permanent Court of International Justice (hereafter ‘PCIJ’) explained 
that: 
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as 
expressed by ... usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and 
established in order to regulate the relations between these coexistent independent 
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.
340
   
In other words, international rules of jus cogens only bind those who have accepted 
and recognised them.
341
 This was supported by the decision in Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) 1986 
(hereafter  ‘Nicaragua Case’): 
In international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by 
the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a 
sovereign State can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without 
exception.
342
 
Therefore, it can be seen that both the Lotus and Nicaragua cases have outlined a 
voluntarist approach which does not support the aim of the jus cogens doctrine to 
remove state immunity without the states’ prior consent on certain issues. This 
means that states do not accept the fact that the violation of jus cogens norms, such 
as torture, can trump the doctrine of state immunity. As far as head of state immunity 
is concerned, the voluntarists argue that states have never wanted to be bound by jus 
cogens norms in the first place. The effect of this is that the prohibition of torture 
will not affect immunity privileges of heads of state given under state immunity.  
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The Consequences of Jus Cogens Norms 
2.1.2. Erga Omnes Obligations 
Erga omnes obligations are, literally, directed towards everybody.
343
 The ICJ 
described erga omnes norms as obligations towards the international community of 
states as a whole.
344
 In other words, erga omnes means a sense of legal obligation 
incumbent on all states and that each state can exercise the protection of its own 
interest and the interests of the international community in general.
345
 It is said that 
jus cogens norms which are derived from custom and treaty law are connected to 
obligations erga omnes.
346
 Therefore, any crime which attracts obligations erga 
omnes has no territorial restrictions.
347
 In other words, obligations erga omnes affect 
jurisdictional issues but not immunity issues.
348
 
2.2 The Effect of the Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) on the Law of Head 
of State Immunity 
2.2.1. The Growth of Human Rights Protection 
Since the Second World War, there has been a surge in emphasis on the protection of 
human rights in general due to certain crimes that have affected the interests of the 
world community as a whole. These have threatened the peace and security of 
humankind and have shocked its moral conscience.
349
 For example, the prohibition 
of torture has been widely recognised in the international community. This can be 
seen specifically in: Article 7 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
(ICCPR); Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECvHR); Article 
5 of the American Convention on Human Rights 1969 (ACHR); and the UN 
Convention Against Torture (CAT).
350
 Some have suggested that it has now been 
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established that torture is absolutely prohibited in all circumstances.
351
 Legal 
literature also suggests that the following international crimes are also jus cogens: 
aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy, slavery and 
slave-related practices.
352
 Furthermore, a substantial amount of evidence has been 
gathered to suggest that the legal rules prohibiting torture, the use of force, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity are peremptory in nature.
353
  
Significant developments in the protection of human rights have led to the idea of 
individual criminal responsibility for violations of humanitarian law and acts of 
torture.
354
 This means that the growth of human rights norms do not protect the 
interests of states, but the interests of individuals and mankind.
355
 Verdross agrees 
with this and has made the point that: 
a very important group of norms having the character of jus cogens are all rules of 
general international law created for a humanitarian purpose.
356
 
2.2.2. Torture as an Exception to Head of State Immunity  
The issue of head of state immunity has been discussed in many cases. These cases 
have shed some light on the law surrounding the current status of the head of state 
immunity for alleged acts of torture. 
The nature of the general prohibition of acts of torture is not just visible in 
international conventions and treaties, but is also seen in case law from various 
jurisdictions. In the American case of Filartiga v Pena-Irala it was held that, “the 
torturer has become, like the pirate and the slave trader before him, hostis humani 
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generis, an enemy of all mankind”.357 This is supported by the decision in Siderman 
de Blake v Republic of Argentina:
358
 
International law does not recognise an act that violates jus cogens as a sovereign 
act. A State’s violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture therefore 
would not be entitled to the immunity afforded by international law.
359
 
In the Furundzija case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(hereafter ‘ICTY’) noted the jus cogens status on the prohibition of torture and the 
implications this could have at international and domestic law were spelt out.
360
 It 
also said that international rules “should prohibit the failure to adopt the national 
measures necessary for implementing the prohibition, and the maintenance in force 
or passage of laws which are contrary to the prohibition”.361 
As far as the law of head of state immunity is concerned, it is governed by CIL as 
discussed in Chapter One.
362
 These privileges will most probably be curtailed if a 
head of state commits a crime against humanity which has a jus cogens element. The 
emphasis on the protection of human rights has been put into practice. This has been 
achieved by the enactment of various international conventions. 
The first attempt to restrict head of state immunity was introduced by the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal. Article 7 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal stated that:  
The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible 
officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from 
responsibility or mitigating punishment.
363
 
The International Criminal Court (hereafter ‘ICC’) stated in Article 27(1) that: 
In particular, official capacity as Head of State or Government, a member of the 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall 
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in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall 
it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
364
 
Article 27(2) goes on to say: 
Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a 
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
365
 
One would expect that, since the prohibition of torture has a jus cogens character, it 
would result in the courts having no difficulty in reaching decisions on torture cases. 
However, this has not been the case. Differences of opinion can be found in the 
following cases. 
a) Case Law by International Courts where the Immunity Plea Is Not 
Accepted 
The treaties mentioned above only restrict head of state immunity before 
international courts and not national courts. The proceedings involving Charles 
Taylor, the Liberian President accused of crimes against humanity, brought up many 
legal issues. These included: the legal basis for the Special Court for Sierra Leone; 
whether the Special Court was an international criminal tribunal; and whether it had 
jurisdictional immunity. Essentially, the main issue was whether the Special Court 
had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to try Charles Taylor, an incumbent head 
of state. This was because the Special Court was not set up through the traditional 
method, by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter like other ad hoc tribunals 
such as the ICTY and ICTR.
366
 However, in the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
concerning Charles Taylor, the Special Court said that it has a mixed ratione 
materiae jurisdiction whereby the Prosecutor could invoke both international and 
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Sierra Leonean law to prosecute offenders.
367
 Nevertheless, it was argued by the 
Prosecution that the question of whether there was any immunity from the exercise 
of jurisdiction must be distinguished from that of whether jurisdiction existed.
368
 
Notwithstanding that the Special Court was set up in a different setting, it did not 
necessarily mean that it would not have jurisdiction to try the case, as explained by 
Article 6(2) of its governing Statute: 
The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or 
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such a person 
of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. 
This Special Court Statute mirrored Article 7(2) of the Statute of the ICTY, Article 
6(2) of the Statute of the ICTR and Article 27(2) of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.
369
 In May 2004, the Special Court held that Charles Taylor did not 
enjoy immunity from prosecution notwithstanding the fact that he was a serving 
head of state at the time. The Special Court said that:  
We hold that the official position of the Applicant as an incumbent Head of State at 
the time when these criminal proceedings were initiated against him is not a bar to 
his prosecution by this Court. The Applicant was and is subject to criminal 
proceedings before the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
370
 
Furthermore, the Special Court said that, “[s]ince we have found that the Special 
Court is not a national court, it is unnecessary to discuss the cases in which 
immunity is claimed before national courts”.371 This suggests that the privileges of 
immunity only restrict national courts and not international ones.
372
 In other words, 
only an international court such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the ICTY, the 
ICTR and the ICC may properly adjudicate on torture cases since such courts are not 
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organs of any particular state.
373
 In this way, the exercise of jurisdiction does not 
infringe the principle of sovereign equality which is the backbone of state 
immunity.
374
 
b) Cases showing the Reluctance of Courts to Deny Immunity over 
Allegations of Torture by National Courts 
i) The Al-Adsani case 
It is important to point out from the outset that the Al-Adsani case concerned civil 
proceedings rather than criminal proceedings.
375
 The claimant sought compensation 
in a UK court for physical and mental health injuries allegedly perpetrated by the 
Sheikh and the Government of Kuwait.
376
 The applicant, who held dual UK-Kuwaiti 
nationality, was accused of being responsible for the circulation of videos containing 
sex scenes involving the relatives of the Sheikh. The claimant, Al-Adsani, claimed 
that he was kidnapped, taken to a prison in Kuwait and tortured by security guards. 
The Queen’s Bench dismissed the case due to its lack of jurisdiction and explained 
that Kuwait was entitled to foreign state immunity under the UK State Immunity Act 
1978 (hereafter ‘SIA’).377 In other words, the claimant could not claim compensation 
because the UK court barred the case due to state immunity.
378
 
The case was then taken to the Court of Appeal after two additional individuals were 
added as defendants.
379
 The Court reasoned that it was up to the applicant to prove, 
on the balance of probabilities, that the Government of Kuwait was not entitled to 
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immunity under the SIA.
380
 Nevertheless, it has been said that international law 
could only be used to assist in the interpretation, if a statute was ambiguous and the 
terms were unclear.
381
 The Court of Appeal subsequently held that the applicant had 
failed to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the Kuwaiti Government was 
responsible for the threats made in the UK.
382
 The applicant’s case was refused leave 
to appeal to the House of Lords in November 1996 because of the Kuwaiti 
Government’s entitlement to state immunity.383 The claimant then brought the case 
to the ECHR. He argued that the UK had failed to ensure his right not to be tortured, 
which was contrary to Article 3 of the ECvHR.
384
 This case is important because it 
has provided a re-evaluation of the law regarding the privileges normally attached to 
head of state immunity at the European court level. 
The case also raised the question as to whether the granting of immunity to a foreign 
state for the acts of torture violated Article 6 of the ECvHR, which allowed the right 
to access to court.
385
 The ECHR explained that foreign states were generally immune 
from civil claims not incurred in the forum territory.
386
 Since Article 3 of the ECvHR 
prohibited torture, the main issue of this case was whether these torture acts, being 
jus cogens norms, were excluded from immunity.
387
 The ECHR rejected the 
violation of jus cogens norms as an excuse to refuse state immunity in civil 
claims.
388
 The ECHR reasoned that: 
Notwithstanding the special character of the prohibition of torture in international 
law, the Court is unable to discern in the international instruments, judicial 
authorities or other materials before it any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter 
of international law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suits in the courts 
of another State where acts of torture are alleged.
389
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The ECHR granted immunity to Kuwait despite the fact that the Court noted that 
torture as “a violation of a fundamental human right … is a crime and a tort for 
which the victims should be compensated”.390 The ECHR held that: 
[we do] not accordingly find it established that there is yet acceptance in 
international law of the proposition that States are not entitled to immunity in 
respect of personal injury for damages for alleged torture committed outside the 
forum State.
391
  
A dissenting judge, Judge Ferrari Bravo said that the Court had, missed “a golden 
opportunity to issue a clear and forceful condemnation of all acts of torture”.392 
Other dissenting judges
393
 in the Al-Adsani case reasoned that the prohibition of 
torture, as a rule of jus cogens, should prevail over the law of state immunity.
394
 
They argued that Kuwait could not legitimately hide behind the rules of State 
immunity to avoid proceedings for a serious claim of torture before a foreign 
jurisdiction.
395
 They claimed that a number of authorities have shown that the 
prohibition of torture has steadily crystallised to become a jus cogens rule.
396
 
Therefore, according to the dissenting judges, the acceptance of prohibition of 
torture as a jus cogens, would mean that it was hierarchically higher than any other 
rules of international law.
397
 This would suggest that a jus cogens norm would 
override any other rule which did not effectively have the same status.
398
 This view 
corresponds with the normative hierarchy theory which will be discussed in section 
three (2.3). The dissenting judges’ opinions obviously contradicted those of the 
majority - that state immunity which was derived from both customary and 
international law did not fall within jus cogens.
399
 It has also been argued that states 
sometimes waived their immunity rights and this showed that state immunity rules 
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did not enjoy as high a status as jus cogens norms.
400
 According to the dissenting 
judges: 
The acceptance … of the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of torture entails that a 
State allegedly violating it cannot invoke hierarchically lower rules (in this case, 
those on State immunity) to avoid the consequences of the illegality of its actions.
401
 
ii) The Bouzari Case 
In Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran,
402
 Houshang Bouzari claimed that he was 
tortured in Tehran for eight months. He alleged that he was also subjected to several 
fake executions by hanging, suspension by the shoulders for lengthy periods of time 
and beatings to the head which damaged his hearing.
403
 Bouzari brought civil 
proceedings against the Islamic Republic of Iran under Canada’s State Immunity Act 
1985 (hereafter ‘Canada SIA’) for the allegation that he was tortured.404 The Ontario 
Court of Appeal held that none of the enumerated exceptions in the Canada SIA 
applied.
405
 It was explained that the statute had a civil rather than a criminal nature 
and therefore it did not have the commercial activity exception.
406
 In other words, 
the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the Canada SIA provided no exception for 
torture.
407
 Nevertheless, it was agreed that the prohibition of torture constituted a jus 
cogens norm but it did not encompass the civil remedy sought by Bouzari.
408
 The 
reasoning made in Bouzari  is supported by the dissenting judges in the Al-Adsani 
case, where Judges Rozakis and Caflisch said that the prohibition of torture “in the 
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international sphere, the doctrine acts to deprive the sovereign of immunity and the 
criminal or civil nature of the [subsequent] domestic proceeding is immaterial”.409  
The decision of this case caused controversy, notwithstanding that the Court 
acknowledged the peremptory status of the prohibition of torture under international 
law, but it refused to read a human rights exception into the Act.
410
 As a result, the 
UN Committee against Torture (UNCCAT) said, with respect to Canada’s failure to 
provide a civil remedy, that: 
the absence of effective measure to provide civil compensation to victims of torture 
in all cases … and Canada should review its position under article 14 of the 
Convention to ensure the provision of compensation through its civil jurisdiction to 
all victims of torture”.411 
The Bouzari case posed the important question as to whether states may continue to 
claim immunity in foreign courts for jus cogens violations. The lawyer acting on 
behalf of Bouzari argued that the prohibition of torture constituted a peremptory 
norm which overrode the civil immunity given to foreign sovereigns.
412
 The reason 
for this is that those jus cogens norms are said to have a higher status. Nevertheless, 
writers like Caplan have argued that there was no international norm and inherent 
right of state immunity to shield foreign states from human rights litigation.
413
  
iii) The Jones Case 
In Jones, Jones, who was a British national, claimed that the agents of the Saudi 
government tortured and abused him. The purpose of the torture was to extract a 
confession from him. When Jones returned to the UK, he claimed that he suffered 
from a severe psychological condition and was unable to work. Jones brought claims 
against the Ministry of Interior for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Lieutenant-
Colonel Abdul Aziz, who was one of the alleged torturers. In response to the claim, 
the Ministry sought to strike out the claim due to state immunity under the SIA. The 
claimant’s claim was refused. The House of Lords held that state officials, when they 
have committed an act of torture when performing official duties, were immune from 
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jurisdiction if the act concerned was ‘in discharge or purported discharge of their 
public duties’.414 
Lord Bingham explained that, as far as the jus cogens norm issue was concerned, 
Bouzari involved substantive matters.
415
 Therefore, it did not affect the procedural 
issue on which the courts were entitled to enforce it.
416
 Moreover, his Lordship 
reasoned that domestic courts were not suited to the task of enforcing the jus cogens 
prohibition against torture.
417
 Both Lord Bingham and Lord Hoffman, in their 
dissenting judgments, clarified the difference between the two concepts, by quoting 
Fox who said that: 
State immunity is a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national court. It 
does not go to substantive law: it does not contradict a prohibition contained in a jus 
cogens norm but merely diverts any breach of it to a different method of settlement. 
Arguably then, there is no substantive content in the procedural plea of State 
immunity upon which a jus cogens mandate can bite.
418
 
The main question in this case was whether or not proceedings against state officials, 
who have allegedly committed torture, were to be dealt with by judicial assessment 
of their appropriateness and proportionality on a case by case basis.
419
 As far as the 
SIA is concerned, Lord Bingham explained that it represented an external rule 
barring court proceedings in the relevant case.
420
 However, the English Court could 
not be said to be denying access to justice, contrary to Article 6, when they had no 
such access to give.
421
 His Lordship was unconvinced by the argument that the issue 
of immunity was ratione materiae, and it did not cover the torture allegations 
because they were outside the official capacity of the defendants.
422
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2.3 Discussions on the Dichotomy Between Access to Court and State 
Immunity 
The doctrine of sovereignty and the concept of human rights are increasingly in 
conflict.
423
 Richard Falk observed that “sovereignty and democracy are profoundly 
affected by the realization of human rights…”.424 The conventional view states that 
international law cannot grant immunity for prosecution in relation to acts which 
international law condemns as criminal and as attacks on the interest of the 
international community as a whole.
425
 This corresponds to those who subscribe to 
the normative hierarchy theory, who believe that the litigation problem in human 
rights stems from a conflict between two international law norms: state immunity 
and jus cogens.
426
 Just as jus cogens norms overrule conflicting rules of international 
law, so too does the prohibition on torture prevail over state immunity which 
traditionally grants the head of state immunity.
427
 In other words, this theory 
postulates that the jus cogens norm trumps state immunity due to its superior 
status.
428
 In Princz v Federal Republic of Germany, Wald J stated that: 
A State is never entitled to immunity for any act that contravenes a jus cogens norm 
… The rise of jus cogens norms limit state sovereignty in the sense that the ‘general 
will’ of the international community of states, and other actors, will take precedence 
over the individual wills of states to order their relations.
429
 
In other words, jus cogens outweighs the individual interests of any one state, such 
as the immunity from foreign domestic proceedings.
430
 Nevertheless, it has been 
explained that since there are no accepted multilateral treaties to govern state 
immunity law, the normative hierarchy theory has to be based on the assumption that 
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state immunity is either the fundamental principle of international law or a rule of 
customary international law.
431
  
There are two interesting claims made in the Al-Adsani case on whether access to 
courts should override state immunity. This can be seen in the conflicting majority 
and minority opinions from the Al-Adsani judgments which will be dealt with below.  
2.3.1. The Majority Opinion in Al-Adsani 
The decision in the Al-Adsani case was based on “generally recognised rules of 
public international law on State immunity”.432 The majority held that compliance 
with the prohibition of torture did not mean the suspension of immunity.
433
 They 
explained the importance of state immunity as follows: 
Sovereign immunity is a concept of international law, developed out of the principle 
of par in parem non habet imperium, by virtue of which one State shall not be 
subject to the jurisdiction of another State. The Court considers that the grant of 
sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of 
complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between 
States through the respect of another State’s sovereignty.434 
In other words, the majority rejected the idea that the prohibition of torture enjoyed 
an advantage over the rule of state immunity.
435
 It has been argued that granting state 
immunity to offending states and their agents in such civil cases undermines the jus 
cogens prohibition against torture, which is a well established CIL.
436
  The ECHR 
noted that the Al-Adsani case was not concerned with criminal liability, but was a 
civil suit, explaining that: 
notwithstanding the special character of the prohibition of torture in international 
law, the Court is unable to discern the international instruments, judicial authorities 
or other materials before it any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of 
international law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of 
another State where acts of torture are alleged.
437
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Hence, the rationale and practice on immunities have shown that the availability of 
immunity was never going to be determined on the basis of the type of proceeding 
involved.
438
 Rather, the type of proceedings, whether criminal or civil, should not be 
a factor used to decide on the presence of immunity. Voyiakis criticised the majority 
opinion that the act of torture was a peremptory norm, as the judges did not provide 
an authority to say that the superior status of peremptory norms would suspend the 
immunity of states in civil proceedings at foreign courts.
439
 
2.3.2. The Minority or Dissenting Opinion in the Al-Adsani Case 
The view of the minority or dissenting judges was that the recognition of the 
prohibition of torture in international law would automatically overturn any other 
international law rules as they were of a lower status.
440
 They argued that state 
immunity did not belong to the category of peremptory norms as was generally 
perceived.
441
 Therefore, states which have violated their rights to immunity cannot 
use hierarchically lower rules, such as state immunity, to avoid an action.
442
 Some 
writers, like McGregor, have argued that states have chosen to waive their rights to 
immunity on some occasions
443
 and so head of state immunity would not apply in 
such circumstances.  
The normative hierarchy theory seems to support the minority view in the Al-Adsani 
case, the view that the violation of peremptory norms would lead to a plea of no 
immunity. The significance of this theory is explained as follows: 
because jus cogens, by definition, is a set of rules from which states may not 
derogate, a state act in violation of such a rule will not be recognised as a sovereign 
act by the community of states, and the violating state therefore may not claim the 
right of sovereign immunity for its actions.
444
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Bianchi supports the normative hierarchy theory, and has stated that, “reliance on the 
hierarchy of norms in the international legal system is a viable argument to assert 
non-immunity for major violations of international human rights”.445 He has further 
claimed that the application of international law requires judges to give more weight 
to international law norms, such as the protection of human rights, than state 
immunity which was considered of lesser importance.
446
 For instance, it has been 
argued that state sovereignty is unable to engage in acts of ‘official torture’.447 This 
has been explained by Glueck in the following way: 
In modern times a state is … incapable of ordering or ratifying acts which are … 
contrary to that international law to which all States are perforce subject. Its agents, 
in performing such acts, are therefore acting outside their legitimate scope.
448
 
Nevertheless, D’Amato has argued that the proponents of the normative hierarchy 
theory have failed to provide a precise list of human rights norms with a peremptory 
character.
449
 In addition, Caplan has argued that state immunity is not an absolute 
right under the international legal order.
450
 He explained that the normative hierarchy 
theory failed to acknowledge that it was the forum state and not the foreign state 
defendant which enjoyed ultimate authority through a domestic legal system for 
human rights violations.
451
 He further argued that the availability of state immunity 
was based on a presumption.
452
 This is because state immunity is seen as an 
exception to the jurisdictional authority of the forum state that would otherwise 
exist.
453
 Nevertheless, he argued that those who support the normative hierarchy 
theory presumed that there was an inherent right to state immunity.
454
 In other 
words, Caplan maintained that the normative hierarchy theory is based purely on the 
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assumption that state immunity was either the product of a fundamental principle of 
international law or a rule of CIL.
455
  
As far as the normative hierarchy theory argument is concerned, its main objective is 
to enforce the prohibition of torture which its supporters believe has a superior status 
in the law as it is a peremptory norm. However, Voyiakis argued that the minority 
had failed to provide a concrete rule following the principle of prohibition of 
torture.
456
 As a result, both the majority and minority have to prove that their 
answers have a better claim to reflect international law.
457
 In other words, both of 
these claims are effectively saying that state sovereignty and access to courts are 
both affected by different jus cogens norms when it comes to dealing with the 
prohibition of torture. Nevertheless, it can be submitted that access to court applies 
directly to this prohibition of torture to ensure justice is achieved for its victims. On 
the other hand, immunity is applied to the political independence of states. 
The distinctions between access to court for the protection of human rights against 
immunity in relation to the protection of the functions of serving heads of state is 
theoretically problematic. Therefore, the paradoxical dilemma of differentiation as to 
which peremptory norms are more important has to reach some conclusion. This 
issue will be discussed next to ascertain whether there really is a conflict between 
access to court and immunity. 
2.3.3. A Critical Assessment of the Connection Between Access to Court 
and Immunity 
As the law currently stands, there is no universally accepted multilateral treaty to 
govern the law of state immunity.
458
 Judge Loucaides, in his dissenting opinion, 
argued that the key issue was the conflict between a peremptory norm and another 
norm under international law.
459
 The conflict between access to court (the minority 
view) and state immunity (the majority view) is a fine one. It can be argued that the 
argument which favours immunity is also applicable to the prohibition of torture. 
From the outset, these two principles may seem to be completely different legal 
concepts. Nevertheless, it can be said that state immunity is equally important to the 
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prohibition of torture. Immunity plays an important role in the protection of the 
dignity of states. Supporters of immunity in general, would argue that the torture 
allegations made by victims towards states may not necessarily be true. It has been 
suggested that in cases where victims cannot identify the individual perpetrators of 
the torture because they were blindfolded during the incident, suing the state may be 
the only option available to the victim in his or her efforts to obtain a judicial 
remedy.
460
 This, however, does not mean that each case that alleges torture may be 
wrongly claimed. To illustrate this point, Voyiakis has argued that the conventional 
theory of jus cogens prevailing over state immunity does not provide a convincing 
picture of conflicts between the international rules.
461
 Therefore, it is rather 
impossible to strike a balance between the two - to say that state sovereignty trumps 
access to the court, because both of these are supported by different and equally 
important jus cogens norms. On the one hand, those who support the prohibition of 
torture argue that it is supported by the higher international law norm of jus 
cogens.
462
 On the other hand, those who support state immunity say that the doctrine 
of state sovereignty is more important.  
Looking at the issue from another perspective, the dilemma of differentiation in the 
outcomes of claims from criminal and civil proceedings do not prove to be helpful 
either. It can be argued that since torture has never been an ‘act of state’, therefore 
immunity would not come into the picture of the debate. Furthermore, it can be 
submitted that maintaining state immunity is as important as access to court where 
victims of torture can have a fair trial and remedy. Voyiakis has argued that if one 
agreed with the minority view that prohibition of torture would prevent immunity, 
then the conflict between access to court and immunity would have been resolved at 
the substantive level.
463
 Moreover, he explained that if that was the case, then the 
conflict could be said to be solved long before the issue could ever come into 
existence in the first place.
464
 Therefore, there would not have been the need to make 
any further claims that those rules which have a lower status than the peremptory 
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norm of prohibition of torture would succeed.
465
 Hence, it would be wrong to place 
peremptory norms over state immunity. They are both effectively different 
international law norms which have their own functions and purposes.  
At the same time, the arguments put forward by the minority of judges in the Al-
Adsani case who believed that the prohibition of torture should trump other rules, 
such as state immunity, were not plausible either. The issues become more 
complicated if it is assumed that the individuals are acting on behalf of the state, and 
if the case involves the issue of immunity afforded to them by state immunity. This 
is because the prohibition of torture, which ensures victims of torture have access to 
courts, is equally important to the concept of state immunity for the protection of the 
political independence of the state. These two hypotheses are also significant in 
international law. For example, Voyiakis has questioned whether state immunity 
constituted a legitimate aim for the refusal of access to court, by saying that the aim 
was related more to “policy objectives pursued by national governments, such as 
public safety, national security, the protection of public health and economic well-
being of the country, or the rights of other individuals”.466 It has been suggested that 
each of these principles (access to court against immunity) must be viewed in the 
light of the others in order to see coherence and consistency among them.
467
 
Therefore, in order to set criteria and specifications as to which legal rules are more 
important requires more evidence to support them. An analogy that illustrates this 
point is that of the Houses of Parliament in the UK. When deciding whether the 
House of Lords or the House of Commons is more important, it can be seen that they 
both have equal status and have their own particular functions. Therefore, the 
protection of human rights for torture victims, allowing them to bring actions and 
claims is equally vital to the protection of immunity.  
The problematic nature of the equal bargaining power between state immunity and 
access to court can be viewed from another perspective. If a state is stable; in its 
politics, economic growth and legal system, then it will lead to the fact that 
individuals will have access to the courts more easily because they know that their 
cases will be tried fairly. This indicates that a state with a fair legal system upholds 
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the prohibition of torture in the first place. This permutation of state immunity, 
access to court and prohibition of torture to a lesser degree, will form a virtuous 
circle. At the same level, the topic of access to court also applies to immunity. This 
will allow an individual to conceptualise the consequence of the access to court for 
the prohibition of torture to ensure that a state upholds its international law 
obligation to ensure that it maintains its sovereignty. In other words, it must ensure 
that it can maintain the stability of its own internal politics in order to sustain the 
state immunity doctrine.  
It is clear that the normative hierarchy theory assumption can be rebutted. However, 
upon close critical analysis the matter is not as straightforward as it seems. Access to 
court and immunity are interrelated and support each other in a subtle way. They 
transcend the ordinary meaning as understood by the wider public. It can be 
submitted that they complement each other in such a way that while one ensures that 
justice can be served, the other encourages the legal system of a state to be sound 
and decent. Therefore, it will be wrong to assume that jus cogens norms can be used 
as a ‘sword’ to defend its validity. The analogy between the two Houses of 
Parliament is a good example of negating the normative hierarchy theory about one 
superior rule: jus cogens norms trumping another principle law of equal footing: 
state immunity.  
Conclusion 
The main issue that this chapter has dealt with has been whether the qualification of 
torture as a crime under jus cogens serves to deny immunity to serving heads of state 
and heads of government. This chapter has come to the conclusion that an alleged 
violation of jus cogens alone is not sufficient to remove immunity ratione personae 
for serving heads of state, which is absolute. The reasoning given by the ECHR in 
the Al-Adsani case has been scrutinised. It found that a violation of torture cannot 
trump immunity ratione personae.
468
 This view is further supported by cases such as 
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Bouzari and Jones. There is no doubt that a case like Al-Adsani is concerned with 
civil jurisdiction.
469
 Still, all these cases shared common ground when dealing with 
the act of torture. The important point here is not to assume that violation of 
peremptory norms (jus cogens) is the ultimate yardstick to justify that any other 
international law rules  which conflicts with it will prevail under international law. 
The normative hierarchy theory has been rejected in this chapter because it is wrong 
to assume that one rule of international law is hierarchically higher than another 
similarly important rule. The wider international legal doctrines have to be taken into 
consideration when evaluating two different legal principles which are on a par 
under international law.  
Furthermore, this chapter has also considered the conflict between access to court 
and state immunity. As it was explained earlier, the relationship between the two is 
not as simple as it appears to be. It is wrong to assume that access to court overrides 
immunity or vice versa. It has been submitted that they both complement each other 
because one ensures that justice can be served, while the other encourages the legal 
system of a state to be sound and decent. As far as heads of state are concerned, the 
immunity privilege is important for them to be able to perform their duties abroad 
without any fear of being prosecuted.
470
 Therefore, the existing practices show that 
immunity ratione personae’s specific function has been preserved and is absolute in 
respect of serving heads of state and some other senior serving heads of government, 
such as, serving ministers for foreign affairs as held in the ICJ Arrest Warrant 
case.
471
 
The problems relating to immunity for serving heads of state has been dealt with. 
The only problem left to consider is whether former heads of state, who have 
allegedly committed acts of torture, will be protected by immunity ratione materiae 
once they have left office. The next chapter will examine the claim regarding 
whether an allegation of torture could potentially remove immunity ratione materiae 
from retired former heads of state and heads of government. This contention will 
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provide a contrasting viewpoint from the one that states that serving heads of state 
are protected under immunity ratione personae whilst still in office. The landmark 
Pinochet (No.3) case considered by the House of Lords has shed some light on this 
residual immunity issue at a domestic level. Therefore, the judgment of the House of 
Lords will be analysed in detail as the Law Lords reached the conclusion that 
General Pinochet was not entitled to immunity ratione materiae according to the 
CAT instead of relying on the traditional rules of immunity accorded under CIL.  
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Chapter Three 
The Impact of the Convention against Torture (CAT) on 
the Law of Head of State Immunity 
 
The previous chapter concluded that torture as a crime under jus cogens did not 
appear to deny immunity ratione personae from serving heads of state and other 
senior serving senior government officials. The judgment by the ICJ in the Arrest 
Warrant case supports this claim. This chapter deals with the question regarding the 
potential removal of immunity ratione materiae from former heads of state and 
heads of government.
472
 This is because the Law Lords in Pinochet (No.3),
473
 
interpreted the CAT, rather than the more traditional CIL rules, and because of this 
reached the decision to refuse head of state immunity to General Pinochet as a 
former head of state.
474
 The Pinochet (No.3) case was said to be a landmark case 
because it was “the first time that a local domestic court has refused to afford 
immunity to a head of state or former head of state on the grounds that there can be 
no immunity against prosecution for certain international crimes”.475 More 
importantly, it was explained in that case that torture was not the official function of 
a head of state and hence no immunity ratione materiae could be granted as a 
result.
476
  
This Chapter examines the position of the law of head of state immunity after the 
enactment of the CAT. In particular, it will examine the effect of the CAT on 
immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state and heads of government. The 
central question that requires an answer is whether an allegation of torture potentially 
removes immunity ratione materiae. This question really concerns the impact of the 
CAT on jurisdiction matters. There are two Articles (1 and 5) under the CAT which 
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are relevant to the discussion of head of state immunity. Both of these Articles are 
found under the substantive provisions of the CAT. Article 5 obliges states to 
establish jurisdiction over the offence of torture. Article 1 also has to be taken into 
consideration as it defines what acts constitute torture. These two Articles purport to 
affect the rule of immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state.  
Both of these Articles will be examined through their keywords to understand the 
‘object and purpose’ of the Convention and whether they can influence issues of 
immunity. As the CAT is silent on the immunity issue, one way of determining the 
impact of the CAT on CIL is to find out whether the CAT can affect heads of state 
under the ‘circularity’ issue debate. The ‘circularity’ issue involves interpreting 
Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT to discover whether they can indeed restrict immunity 
for heads of state for alleged violations of torture or peremptory norms. In order to 
interpret any treaties, such as the CAT (Articles 1 and 5), it is necessary to refer to 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969 (hereafter 
‘VCLT’). These Articles provide guidelines as to how one should interpret a treaty 
such as the CAT. Not only do Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT provide rules on 
interpretation, they also reflect CIL.
477
 In other words, they are not just ordinary 
treaty provisions. This is because Article 31 of the VCLT also requires one to 
consider existing CIL when interpreting a treaty. Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT says 
that, “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” should be taken into 
consideration when interpreting a treaty.
478
 Hence, any cases which deal with the 
application of the CAT should be considered when interpreting Articles 1 and 5 of 
the CAT. Furthermore, when interpreting Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT, the current 
law of immunity under CIL also needs to be taken into consideration. It is this 
process of referring back to existing CIL, as required by Article 31(3)(c ) of the 
VCLT, which creates the effect of ‘circularity’ between the CAT and CIL.  
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The discussion on circularity, in terms of the relationship between a treaty and CIL, 
will be examined in more detail in the form of evidence of opinio juris in Chapter 
Four. It will show that the UK has jurisdiction in respect of the issue of international 
crimes under CIL, notwithstanding the absence of specific domestic legislation to 
give effect to it.
479
 It will be submitted that the evidence of the UN General 
Assembly Resolutions (hereafter ‘UNGA Resolutions’) and the Security Council 
Resolutions are examples of opinio juris and these reflect the view that Articles 1 
and 5 of the CAT have become CIL. 
Through analysis and discussion in this chapter, it will be argued that the combined 
effect of Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT do appear to remove immunity ratione 
materiae. The findings from the majority opinions in Pinochet (No.3) showed that 
the CAT has restricted immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state who had 
allegedly committed acts of torture. The outcome of this case was important for 
many reasons, not least because the CAT is generally silent on the issue of 
immunity.
480
 However, the Law Lords were able to interpret the CAT in a particular 
way, based on the extensive jurisdiction provision contained under Article 5 of the 
CAT. The minority opinion given by Lord Goff will also be analysed as it provides a 
counter-argument to the whole discussion about the rule of immunity. 
Therefore, this chapter intends to show that the CAT can abrogate immunity ratione 
materiae at a domestic level for former heads of state as shown in the Pinochet 
(No.3) case, and that the CAT has had an impact on the law of head of state 
immunity, in particular, as it affects former heads of state and heads of government. 
This chapter consists of two main sections. The first section seeks to undertake a 
thorough analysis of the Pinochet (No.3) case opinions. The majority and minority 
opinions of the Law Lords will be evaluated for their discussions on refusing 
immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state. Furthermore, later decisions of 
the House of Lords, in particular the R v Jones case
481
, which have clarified the 
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judgment of the Pinochet (No.3) case will also be considered. The second section of 
this chapter provides a critical analysis of the interpretation of Articles 1 and 5 of the 
CAT based on the Pinochet (No.3) case judgment. The treaty interpretation method 
as contained under Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT will be used to analyse whether 
Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT can affect immunity ratione materiae for former heads 
of state and heads of government in general.  
3.1 Critical Analysis of Pinochet (No.3) Case 
The Facts of Pinochet (No.3) Case 
The facts of this case are well reported and published.
482
 Nevertheless, these will be 
briefly mentioned here to set out the background for the discussion.
483
 General 
Augusto Pinochet was the military ruler of Chile from 1973 to 1990. He was arrested 
in London on the 16
th
 October 1998 while he was having medical treatment. It was 
the Spanish Judge, Baltasar Garzon, who requested that Pinochet be extradited from 
the UK to Spain for egregious human rights violations. The alleged crimes were 
committed by the military junta led by General Pinochet. Some of the charges were 
linked to Spain, but none of them had any connection with the United Kingdom.
484
 
The Pinochet case was the first case where a former head of state was subjected to 
the jurisdiction of a foreign court for crimes that were in violation of international 
law.
485
 Furthermore, this case was the only municipal court decision which denied 
immunity to a recognised ex-head of state for crimes committed while he was in 
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office.
486
 The outcome of the case was hailed as a precedent for future trials of ex-
dictators.
 487
  
The Law Lords, by a majority of six to one relied on the CAT instead of CIL to find 
that Pinochet had no immunity ratione materiae.
488
 The judges relied on the 
extensive jurisdiction provision under Article 5 of the CAT to establish that the 
crimes allegedly committed by Pinochet could lead to universal jurisdiction.
489
 This 
is because Article 5 of the CAT authorises states party to exercise jurisdiction over 
those suspected of being responsible for acts of torture, irrespective of where the 
alleged acts took place, the nationality of the alleged perpetrator or that of the 
victim.
490
 General Pinochet was held not to be immune under Article 5 of the CAT, 
to which all three states, namely; UK, Chile and Spain were party.
491
 Nevertheless, 
the majority of the judges in Pinochet (No.3) have been criticised for avoiding the 
issue of determining the outcome of the case under the traditional doctrine of head of 
state immunity, which some believe has lost its place under customary law.
492
  
In the Pinochet (No.3) case, the HL had to decide two major issues.
493
 Firstly, the 
Law Lords had to consider whether the Spanish charges constituted ‘extradition 
crimes’ within the meaning of the Extradition Act 1989.494 Secondly, they had to 
consider whether General Pinochet, as a former head of state, was entitled to 
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immunity from arrest and prosecution in the UK for crimes committed in Chile.
495
 
Their Lordships had to consider two types of immunity, namely: immunity ratione 
personae and immunity ratione materiae. The former covers immunity for both 
public and private acts while in office; whereas the latter covers acts committed 
while in office, but excludes private acts. Both of these are given under CIL as 
discussed earlier in Chapter One. It is important to note from the outset that the focus 
of the discussion here is on Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT.  
As far as the extradition crimes claims are concerned, the discussion relates to the 
jurisdiction provision contained under Article 5 of the CAT. This is because if 
jurisdiction is exercisable over a former head of state, then it will affect the 
privileges bestowed by immunity. When it comes to the issue of immunity ratione 
materiae for former heads of state, Article 1 of the CAT defines whether the acts of 
torture can be classified as official acts.  
The majority and minority opinions of the Pinochet (No.3) case are worth examining 
in detail. This is because it will provide a good platform for the thorough analysis of 
the Pinochet (No.3) case judgment along with later House of Lords decisions 
clarifying it. One relevant example is R v Jones.
496
 The Jones case was held by the 
House of Lords, and it commented on the Pinochet (No.3) case judgment. It is worth 
pointing out that even within the majority opinions of the Pinochet (No.3) case, there 
appeared to be two separate views on the justifications for the restriction of 
immunity ratione materiae for Pinochet. These can be termed the narrow approach 
and the broader approach. The former relies mainly on the CAT to abrogate 
immunity ratione materiae for Pinochet, whereas the latter focuses on the CAT as 
well as the jus cogens norms arguments. The analysis of the two main questions in 
Pinochet (No.3) will be explored further, together with the majority and minority 
opinions. 
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3.1.1 The Majority Opinion 
3.1.1.1  The Narrow Approach 
The majority opinions can be divided into two groups. The first group encompasses 
those who relied on the CAT to refuse immunity ratione materiae.
497
 Their 
Lordships in this narrow approach group included: Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord 
Hutton and Lord Saville of Newdigate.
498
 The majority judges, both in the narrow 
and the broader approaches, held that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity ratione 
materiae as a former head of state.
499
 Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained the 
reasoning, which is worth quoting in full here: 
Finally, and to my mind decisively, if the implementation of a torture regime is a 
public function giving rise to immunity ratione materiae, this produces bizarre 
result. Immunity ratione materiae applies not only to ex-heads of state and ex-
ambassadors but to all state officials who have been involved in carrying out the 
functions of the state. Such immunity is necessary in order to prevent state immunity 
being circumvented by prosecuting or suing the official who, for example, actually 
carried out the torture when a claim against the head of state would be precluded by 
the doctrine of immunity. If that applied to the present case, and if the 
implementation of the torture regime is to be treated as official business sufficient to 
found an immunity for the former head of state, it must also be official business 
sufficient to justify immunity for his inferiors who actually did the torturing. Under 
the convention the international crime of torture can only be committed by an 
official or someone in an official capacity. They would all be entitled to immunity. It 
would follow that there can be no case outside Chile in which a successful 
prosecution for torture can be brought unless the state of Chile is prepared to waive 
its right to its officials' immunity. Therefore, the whole elaborate structure of 
universal jurisdiction over torture committed by officials is rendered abortive and 
one of the main objectives of the Torture Convention - to provide a system under 
which there is no safe haven for torturers - will have been frustrated. In my 
judgment all these factors together demonstrate that the notion of continued 
immunity for ex-heads of state is inconsistent with the provisions of the Torture 
Convention.
500
 
Thus, the Law Lords in the first group of the majority opinion depended on the 
‘contractual’ nature of the CAT when dealing with the issue of state immunity.501 
Their Lordships accepted that torture was an international crime, and yet they 
declined to exercise universal jurisdiction over it.
502
 This was because the UK had no 
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jurisdiction over torture crimes prior to the enactment of the UK Criminal Justice 
Act 1988 (hereafter ‘CJA’).503 They reasoned that, in order to have jurisdiction to 
hear the case in the House of Lords, they would have to rely on the CAT rather than 
the rules under CIL.
504
 Therefore, as all three countries (UK, Spain and Chile) in this 
case are signatories to the CAT, and torture was a prohibited act in the UK when the 
CJA came into force on 8
th
 December 1988, this led to the restriction of immunity 
for former heads of state.
505
 As part of this, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said that the 
UK could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over offences which occurred within its 
geographical boundaries.
506
 Lord Browne-Wilkinson reasoned that: 
the issue is whether international law grants state immunity in relation to the 
international crime of torture and if so whether the Republic of Chile is entitled to 
claim such immunity even though Chile, Spain and the United Kingdom are all 
parties to the Torture Convention … and are therefore “contractually bound” to give 
effect to its provisions from these dates.
507
 
Thus, his Lordship believed that the scope of jurisdiction was obtained through the 
enactment of the CAT into UK domestic law. It has been argued that the UK had no 
jurisdiction over crimes of torture before 28 September 1988, the date in which the 
CJA came into force.
508
 The CJA, which brought the CAT into force in the UK, 
reinforced the assertion that an act of torture could not be an official function for the 
purpose of immunity.
509
 
The House of Lords was unanimous in its decision on the first question regarding the 
extradition crimes claims.
510
 The Law Lords, by a majority of six to one, held that 
Pinochet, as a former head of state, was not entitled to immunity ratione materiae.
511
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Nevertheless, all the Law Lords rejected the construction which held that, “the 
double criminality rule required the conduct to be criminal under English law at the 
conduct date and not at the request date”.512 According to the law, Pinochet could 
only be extradited for ‘extradition crimes’ contained under Section 2 of the 
Extradition Act 1989.
513
 This Section requires that the alleged conduct must be a 
crime under both UK and Spanish law.
514
 In other words, the Law Lords reasoned 
that in order for the offence to be extraditable, the alleged conduct must be a criminal 
offence under English law at the time it was committed.
515
 
It is important to note that both Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Saville accepted 
that immunity ratione materiae under CIL would technically be available to 
Pinochet for the extradition claim. Therefore, according to their Lordships, immunity 
ratione materiae would still be available unless it had been expressly removed or 
waived by Chile.
516
 Both Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Saville clarified that all three 
states to the proceedings were parties to the CAT from 8 December 1988.
517
 As a 
result, their Lordships argued that the Articles of the CAT were inconsistent with the 
doctrine of immunity ratione materiae granted to former heads of state.
518
 It has 
been criticised that the CAT specifically outlawed official acts of torture, whereas 
the remit of immunity ratione materiae was to protect the acts performed in an 
official capacity.
519 
Nevertheless, their Lordships believed that the CAT had 
crystallised the fact that official acts of torture were an international crime.
520
 Thus, 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson claimed that immunity ratione materiae was not removed 
by express waiver from Pinochet. Rather, this was due to the objectives and 
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jurisdiction in which the CAT was established.
521
 In this way, it created contractual 
relationships and obligations for states who were signatories to the Convention.
522
 
This meant that states party to the CAT were unable to assert immunity ratione 
materiae due to their “contractual obligation” under the treaty.523 This has been 
supported by the fact that the drafters of the UN Working Group in the travaux 
preparatoires
524
 of the CAT said that the Convention’s purpose was not to define 
torture, but, in the absence of international tribunals, to provide a mechanism in a 
states’ local courts to ensure that a torturer could not find safe haven in another 
country.
525
 
 The other question to be asked was whether Pinochet was entitled to any immunity 
for alleged acts of torture and conspiracy committed after 29 September 1988.
526
 
This is an important question because the CAT only came into force after 8 
December 1988, and Pinochet could potentially be immune from the alleged acts of 
torture committed prior to that date. Lord Hutton held that Pinochet was not entitled 
to immunity after 29 September 1988, due to the fact that the alleged acts of torture 
were not the functions of a head of state under international law.
527
 Lord Hutton 
explained that torture could not be regarded as a function of a head of state because 
international law prohibited it, and the United Kingdom gained extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of acts of torture through the CJA.
528
 Furthermore, Lord Hutton reasoned 
that the CAT provisions expressly outlawed acts of torture by a state.
529
  Similarly, 
Lord Saville argued that the unequivocal terms of the CAT constituted an express 
waiver by Chile.
530
 Therefore, it can be submitted that both Lord Hutton and Lord 
Saville agreed with the explanation made by Lord Browne-Wilkinson that the 
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objectives in which the CAT was established set the authority over the offences of 
torture, which was contained under Article 5 of CAT. 
An interesting point was raised in the Jones case in the House of Lords.
531
 In the 
judgment, Lord Bingham differentiated the situation in Pinochet (No.3), when he 
explained that it concerned criminal proceedings falling within the universal criminal 
jurisdiction as set out in the CAT.
532
 Lord Bingham explained that: 
The essential ratio of the decision, as I understand it, was that international law 
could not without absurdity require criminal jurisdiction to be assumed and 
exercised where the Torture Convention conditions were satisfied and, at the same 
time, require immunity to be granted to those properly charged.
533
  
The points made by Lord Bingham in the Jones case regarding the Pinochet (No.3) 
judgment are interesting because he claimed that international law could not acquire 
criminal jurisdiction even if the CAT conditions had been satisfied. Furthermore, 
Lord Bingham said that immunity should be granted to those who were properly 
charged. It can be submitted that the view posed by Lord Bingham was correct to a 
certain extent. As the CAT is an international treaty, it would only be enforceable if 
the states party to the proceedings were parties to the CAT. Problems will arise if the 
criminal jurisdiction provision is created through an international treaty, such as the 
CAT, when none of the states party to the proceedings are parties to the treaty. In 
such a situation, it would be more valid to establish the criminal jurisdiction 
provisions under international law rules. Lord Bingham in Jones, correctly stated 
that immunity should “be granted to those properly charged”.534 This is because if 
the alleged acts have been carried out under the scope of official duty, then it would 
be unjust not to grant immunity for those circumstances. Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that it would be wrong to assume criminal jurisdictions and the refusal of 
immunity outright. It should depend on the facts of each individual case.  
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One should, nevertheless, consider the defences’ arguments from another 
perspective. Pinochet, the former head of state of Chile, gave two counter-arguments 
for the claims which had been brought against him. Firstly, he claimed that the 
English courts had no jurisdiction over offences committed by a foreigner abroad.
535
 
As far as the defence for the extradition crimes of torture were concerned, Pinochet 
argued that as a former head of state he enjoyed immunity from these proceedings.
536
 
These arguments appeared to be rather convincing because the UK did not 
technically have jurisdiction as none of the victims or the alleged crimes took place 
in the UK. As UK common law is based on territorial jurisdiction, the Law Lords 
would have found it difficult to justify their scope of jurisdiction in the Pinochet 
(No.3) case due to the international law doctrine of state sovereignty. It was 
interesting to see that the Law Lords used the ‘contractual’ relationship between all 
three states party to the proceedings to avoid this sensitive question of state 
sovereignty and subsequently exercised their jurisdiction. If the UK was not a 
signatory and had not ratified the CAT, then the Law Lords would have to proceed 
with the complex rules of law of immunity under CIL. Nevertheless, the Law Lords 
could argue that the UK had jurisdiction to try Pinochet under the universal 
jurisdiction principle. A good example to support this is the Attorney General of 
Israel v Eichmann case.
537
 The court held in that case that: 
International law is, in the absence of an International Court, in need of the judicial 
and legislative organs of every country to give effect to its criminal interdictions and 
to bring the criminals to trial.
538
 
Despite this argument, one should accept that the Law Lords had carefully fashioned 
the jurisdiction issue reasoning in the Pinochet (No.3) case for the extradition claims 
based on a treaty, such as the CAT, instead of under international law principles. It is 
vital to point out that the CAT does not specify explicitly in its wording that it will 
abrogate immunity for former heads of state. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
CAT does not technically apply to Pinochet. However, it is submitted that Article 5 
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of the CAT provided similar jurisdiction provisions to those under CIL to extradite 
Pinochet. This is because Article 5 of the CAT creates obligations on states to 
establish jurisdiction over the offences of torture.
539
 Therefore, there was no need for 
the Law Lords to mention the international law obligations under CIL. The 
discussions on both CIL and the CAT only caused further confusion in the law. This 
led to one academic to argue that, “the Pinochet case provided minimal guidance on 
the vexed question of former head of state immunity in general”.540 
As far as the second question in the Pinochet (No.3) case is concerned, the issue is 
whether CIL requires the grant of immunity from prosecution to a former head of 
state in respect of allegations of torture, murder and hostage-taking when carried out 
as an instrument of state policy.
541
 Lloyd Jones QC suggested that the main point 
about Pinochet was whether CIL required the grant of immunity from prosecution to 
a former head of state in respect of allegations of torture, murder and hostage-taking 
when used as an instrument of state policy.
542
 In the Pinochet (No.3) case, the House 
of Lords had to decide which type of immunity would apply, i.e., immunity ratione 
personae or immunity ratione materiae. As the CAT did not mention anything about 
immunity, both types of immunities under CIL were raised. This was because if the 
alleged torture acts were ‘official’, then Pinochet would be immune under immunity 
ratione personae, which was a status-based immunity. As a consequence, if the 
alleged torture acts were ‘official’, he would also be entitled to immunity ratione 
materiae, which was a ‘subject matter’ immunity, after he has left office. Inevitably, 
the arguments as to which type of immunity given under CIL should be granted were 
greatly debated at the time. 
It is interesting that Lord Hutton sought to confine the issue regarding the immunity 
question about the CAT on technical grounds. His Lordship explained that: 
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As your Lordships hold that there is no jurisdiction to extradite Senator Pinochet for 
acts of torture prior to 29 September 1988 … it is unnecessary to decide when 
torture became a crime against international law prior to that date.
543
 
This point links back to Article 1 of the CAT and its definition of torture. It restricts 
torture when carried out, “at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of 
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”.544 This wording seeks 
to distinguish between official and private acts.
545
 It has been argued under 
international law that torture is committed by states and their agents.
546
 Therefore, 
immunity is not enjoyed by an individual, but rather by a State which he or she is 
representing.
547
 Lord Browne-Wilkinson argued that torture could only be committed 
by someone in an official capacity.
548
 He went on to say that: “How can it be for 
international law purposes an official function to do something which international 
law itself prohibits and criminalises?”.549 Inevitably, this connects back to the issue 
of sovereignty because heads of state are the official representatives of their states, 
and hence reflect sovereignty. This has led to Biersteker and Weber to claim that the 
doctrine of sovereignty is an artificial social construct of states operating within 
international society.
550
 It is very possible that the concept of sovereignty under 
international law is merely an operating mechanism for the interaction between 
states in the international arena, but it would be wrong to dismiss its importance 
because of this, as submitted in Chapter Two previously. Nevertheless, Keohane 
suggests that states exercise their sovereignty by choosing to sign an agreement;
551
 as 
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a result, they curtail their sovereignty.
552
 It can be argued that since Chile has signed 
and ratified the CAT there is a strong presumption that it has unwillingly waived part 
of its state sovereignty. This may reluctantly affect heads of state to a certain extent. 
As far as the immunity defence is concerned, Pinochet asserted that as a former head 
of state he was entitled to state immunity for acts committed as part of his official 
function.
553
 Furthermore, he argued that the CJA, which gave the court 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, was not retrospective.
554
 It is submitted that Pinochet was 
correct to argue that the CJA had no retrospective effect. Due to the limitations set 
by the CJA’s lack of retrospective effect, the Law Lords reduced the number of 
claims which could be heard by them. In view of these restrictions, the Law Lords 
could only consider the torture charges from the second warrant-murder, and 
conspiracy-to-murder charges which were added after the first Pinochet case was 
heard.
555
 If one weighs the pros and cons of the case, one soon realises that Pinochet 
can potentially be considered a victim of justice himself because the Law Lords were 
constantly redefining the facts of the case to enable them to legitimately hear the 
case. From these facts, one may argue that the Law Lords interpreted the Pinochet 
(No.3) case in order to achieve the ‘desired’ outcome. Thus, a major problem with 
this kind of wide interpretation is that it will inevitably attract criticism. Therefore, if 
Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL, as this thesis seeks to prove, then 
perhaps this will clear up the ambiguity in the law and set a consistent precedent. 
3.1.1.2 Broader Approach 
The second set of judges of the majority opinions based on the broader approach, 
comprised of: Lord Millett, Lord Phillips and Lord Hope. It has been suggested by 
the five Law Lords in the Pinochet (No.3) case that the crimes allegedly committed 
by Pinochet were of a specific customary nature.
556
 The Law Lords in this category 
based their opinions not just on the CAT, but also on the discord between state 
immunity and the status of torture as jus cogens under CIL, in order to restrict with 
the issue of immunity ratione materiae for Pinochet.  
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In terms of the extradition claims regarding Pinochet, Lord Millett conceded that he 
could not be extradited for any acts of torture committed prior to the coming into 
force of Section 134 of the CJA.
557
 Nevertheless, his Lordship argued that: 
As with the Pinochet case, the moral justification is that some crimes are so great 
that they are not just crimes against domestic law and order but crimes against 
humanity itself. Those who commit them do not merely offend against their own 
domestic law, but are ‘enemies of all mankind’.558 
Therefore, according to Lord Millett the courts would not need any statutes to confer 
the power to exercise universal jurisdiction.
559
 His Lordship explained that: 
Customary international law is part of the common law, and accordingly I consider 
that the English courts have and always have had extra-territorial criminal 
jurisdiction in respect of crimes of universal jurisdiction under customary 
international law.
560
 
Lord Millett’s reasoning would have been more persuasive if his Lordship had used 
the jurisdiction provision under Article 5 of the CAT when providing reasons for his 
findings. This is because when a jurisdiction provision is established through an 
international treaty, such as the CAT, then the enforcement argument is likely to be 
stronger than those under common law. Notwithstanding that the common law legal 
system is a well established legal system, relying on the CAT to establish the 
jurisdiction provision for the extradition claims in the Pinochet (No.3) case will 
reduce the difficulty relating to the enforcement date of the CJA in the UK. 
Furthermore, Lord Millett reasoned that “the systematic use of torture on a large 
scale and as an instrument of state policy” had become an international crime under 
CIL.
561
 The effect of this was that it would attract universal jurisdiction for such a 
crime.
562
 Therefore, perpetrators of these alleged crimes could be prosecuted by any 
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state irrespective of their nationality, the nationality of their victims, or the country 
in which the acts were committed.
563
 His Lordship explained that:  
the English courts have and always have had extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in 
respect of crimes of universal jurisdiction under CIL.
 564
  
It is also interesting to note that in spite of torture having become an international 
crime, the difference between the definition of the crime of torture under the CAT 
and CIL are noticeable. One of the unclear issues was whether the applicable rules of 
English law were to be found in the SIA, or in common law rules reflecting public 
international law.
565
 It has been argued that judges in national courts are not usually 
experts on international law.
566
 Therefore, they are often hesitant about relying 
heavily on it when making their decisions.
567
 In view of these facts, it is quite likely 
that this was the case in Pinochet (No.3). This is because the majority opinions 
depended on the CAT, which is silent on the immunity issue, to enable the 
jurisdiction provisions for the extradition claims which subsequently led to the 
restriction of immunity ratione materiae for Pinochet. This view has been supported 
by Byers who has argued that it took more than twenty national judges in the 
Pinochet case, none of whom were young enough or specialists in international law, 
to decide the case.
568
 Their Lordships would have been more comfortable with the 
traditional, state-centric model. Bradley and Goldsmith are particularly critical on 
this point. They have argued that: 
Many Law Lords reasoned, or at least insinuated, that Pinochet’s immunity was 
abrogated in or by 1988 not because of the Convention per se, but rather because of 
the status of torture as an ‘international crime’ under CIL. The Law Lords were 
extraordinarily casual in their identification of torture as an international crime, 
relying in varying degrees on the writing of scholars, unadopted International Law 
Commission codes, and General Assembly resolutions that did not at the time of 
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their issuance have the status of law. In addition, the Law Lords were imprecise 
regarding when torture became an international crime, and why.
569
 
Perhaps even more problematic is answering the second question in the Pinochet 
(No.3) case. The main issue here is whether the head of state immunity, which is 
accorded in respect of acts performed in the exercise of official functions, could 
extend even to alleged international crimes by former heads of state after they leave 
office.
570
 Similar to the explanations for the extradition claims above, it was held that 
Pinochet had no immunity ratione materiae after 8
th
 December 1988, the enactment 
date of the CJA. Section 20 of the SIA is the provision which is suggested governs 
the immunity of a former head of state.
571
 This is because under the SIA, incumbent 
heads of state enjoy the same privileges of immunity as heads of a diplomatic 
mission.
572
 In R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte (No.1)
573
 (‘hereafter ‘Pinochet (No.1)’), the Divisional Court held that 
Section 20 of the SIA did not apply to proceedings with respect to matters that 
happened before the Act came into force.
574
 On the contrary, Lord Millett in 
Pinochet (No.3) suggested that CIL had become part of English common law by 
1973.
575
 Therefore, no immunity ratione materiae would have been allowed even 
prior to the enactment of the CJA on the 8
th
 December 1988.
576
  
From another perspective, Lord Phillips stated that the UK courts had attained 
universal jurisdiction over international crimes from 1988.
577
 His Lordship adopted a 
different approach when deciding on the conflict regarding state immunity and 
criminal proceedings in UK courts.
578
 Lord Phillips alone found the relevant rules 
under CIL.
579
 His Lordship examined the sources of law under Article 38 of the 
Statute of the ICJ. The key sources of international law under Article 38 can be listed 
as follows: international treaties, custom, judicial decisions, the writings of 
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authors.
580
 Lord Phillips reasoned that no international law rule required that 
immunity ratione materiae be given in relation to the prosecution of an international 
crime of a certain category.
581
 According to Lord Phillips: 
no established rule of international law requires state immunity ratione materiae to 
be accorded in respect of prosecution for an international crime. International crimes 
and extra-territorial jurisdiction in relation to them are both new arrivals in the field 
of public international law. I do not believe that state immunity ratione materiae can 
co-exist with them. The exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction overrides the 
principle that one state will not intervene in the internal affairs of another.
582
 
As a result, his Lordship concluded that immunity ratione materiae was 
incompatible with the terms of the CAT.  However, from the majority opinions, the 
Law Lords held that Pinochet, as a former head of state, was not entitled to immunity 
ratione materiae with respect to the extradition proceedings for the alleged 
conspiracy to torture committed by him after 8 December 1988.
583
 This was because 
these alleged acts were contrary to international law.
584
 Therefore, the majority 
opinions agreed that had the alleged acts of torture occurred prior to 8 December 
1988, Pinochet would be entitled to claim immunity ratione materiae.
585
  
On the other hand, in Pinochet (No.3), the Law Lords accepted that immunity 
ratione personae was applicable even for international crimes.
586
 Lord Saville and 
Lord Hope commented that torture could be a function of a head of state, and that 
CIL would grant immunity to former heads of state even for systematic and 
widespread violations of international law.
587
  In other words, their Lordships 
conceded that, under CIL, former heads of state enjoyed immunity from criminal and 
civil proceedings in other countries for official acts done in the capacity of head of 
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state.
588
 This has been supported by the Hatch v Baez case.
589
 However, Lord Millett 
argued that: “These were not private acts. They were official and governmental or 
sovereign acts by any standard”.590 His Lordship clarified that: “The official 
governmental nature of the act, which forms the basis of the immunity, is an 
essential ingredient of the offence. No rational system of criminal justice can allow 
an immunity which is co-extensive with the offence”.591 In addition, Lord Millett 
emphasised that, “in future, those who commit atrocities against civilian populations 
must expect to be called into account if fundamental human rights are to be 
protected”.592 
In approaching this issue, Lord Browne-Wilkinson was cautious about the jus cogens 
argument of trumping the immunity doctrine. His Lordship said that: 
I have doubts whether, before the coming into force of the Torture Convention, the 
existence of the international crime of torture as jus cogens was enough to justify the 
conclusion that the organisation of state torture could not rank for immunity 
purposes as performance of an official function. At that stage there was no 
international tribunal to punish torture and no general jurisdiction to permit or 
require its punishment in domestic courts. Not until there was some form of 
universal jurisdiction for the punishment of the crime of torture could it really be 
talked about as a fully constituted international crime. But in my judgment the 
Torture Convention did provide what was missing: a worldwide universal 
jurisdiction.
593
  
Powell and Pillay have suggested that Pinochet would have lost immunity either as a 
former head of state or incumbent head of state because the doctrine of immunity 
was contrary to the existence of international crimes.
594
 This relates back to the 
argument regarding the conflict between state sovereignty and immunity in Chapter 
Two. Nevertheless, it can be argued that their assumption was incorrect. As 
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explained in Chapter Two, it is inaccurate to say that incumbent and former heads of 
state will be immune from allegations of international crimes. This is because, from 
the evidence shown, immunity ratione personae is still intact for incumbent heads of 
state or high-ranking government officials. The judgment in the Arrest Warrant case 
strongly supports this view. Another problem with their approach is that they fail to 
take into account the complex arguments behind the doctrine of state sovereignty. It 
has been submitted that sovereignty and immunity are two correspondingly 
important international law principles. Therefore, one norm cannot trump another, as 
correctly indicated by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in his judgment. Nevertheless, one 
should accept that the situation is different for former heads of state and high-
ranking government officials, in particular, regarding the application of immunity 
ratione materiae. The next chapter will consider this matter further. 
It is interesting to see that Lord Hope based his judgment on the relationship 
between the CAT and the loss of immunity.
595
 His Lordship explained that the CAT 
must be “construed in accordance with the customary international law and against 
the background of the subsisting residual former head of state immunity”.596 Lord 
Hope was not convinced, however, that there was an express waiver by Chile or an 
implied term that former heads of state should be restricted from their immunity 
ratione materiae for all acts of official torture.
597
 His Lordship clarified that: 
It is just that by the date at which Chile ratified the Convention, the obligation under 
customary international law with respect to … [the prohibition against systematic 
torture as an instrument of state policy] were so strong as to override any objection 
by [Chile] on the ground of immunity ratione materiae, once the UK had jurisdiction 
over these crimes.
598
 
This view is supported in the later House of Lords case of Jones. Lord Bingham said 
that: 
The reason why General Pinochet did not enjoy immunity ratione materiae was not 
because he was deemed not to have acted in an official capacity that would have 
removed his acts from the Convention definition of torture. It was because, by 
necessary implication, international law had removed the immunity.
599
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It is important to note that, notwithstanding the majority findings that immunity had 
been lost, there is still no clear ratio decidendi for this decision.
600
 It has been 
criticised that the Law Lords “failed to explain why official immunities were 
consistent with the international crime of torture established by custom, but not 
consistent with the international crime of torture established by treaty”.601 This 
means that the Law Lords have failed to clarify two interconnecting points. The 
point relates to the question of why custom allows immunity for acts of torture; and 
yet immunity is not consistent under international treaty. Lord Bingham explained in 
Jones that: “Torture cannot be justified by any rule of domestic or international law. 
But the question is whether such a norm conflicts with a rule which accords state 
immunity”.602 It can be submitted that Lord Bingham is correct to identify the 
conflicts of rules given under the doctrine of immunity. This is because the Law 
Lords had combined the CIL points and the CAT when deciding on the Pinochet 
(No.3) case. As all the states party in the Pinochet (No.3) case were signatories to the 
CAT, there was no need to refer to CIL when dealing with the immunity issue. It 
would be much easier for the Law Lords to deal with the CAT in their judgments as 
it would provide a much clearer explanation to the law of head of state immunity. 
Therefore, the solution is to strike a balance between the two sources of international 
law. The fact that the Law Lords brought in the discussion about the prohibition of 
torture under CIL only muddled the conflict between the two sources of international 
law.  
Furthermore, one writer has suggested that the delicate question coming out of the 
Pinochet (No.3) case was whether the international public interest in suppressing 
violations of international norms, does or should prevail over, the principle of 
immunity from domestic legal process traditionally invokable by foreign heads of 
states and the states themselves.
603
 In approaching this issue, some of the Law Lords 
in the Pinochet (No.3) case spontaneously conceded that the principles of 
international criminal law took precedence over sovereign immunity.
604
 For 
example, this can be seen in the judgment of Lord Phillips regarding the sovereign 
immunity issue, where his Lordship said that: 
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If … we are bound by the 1978 Act to accord to Senator Pinochet immunity in 
respect of all acts committed, ‘in the performance of his functions as head of state’, I 
would not hold that the course of conduct alleged by Spain falls within that 
description … I do not believe that those functions can … extend to actions that are 
prohibited as criminal under international law.
605
 
Thus, some believe that the Pinochet (No.3) judgments have contributed to 
customary international criminal law.
606
 The importance of human rights as a 
legitimate international concern became apparent in the aftermath of the Second 
World War.
607
 It is generally agreed that human rights has achieved great importance 
in the international political agenda and international legal discourse.
608
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that it has only done so with the consent of 
states.
609
 Thus, domestic courts should assume a supportive role in upholding the 
core concepts of the international community.
610
 Notwithstanding that the general 
issues on the protection of human rights are important, it is submitted that domestic 
or municipal courts are not the suitable forum to handle cases relating to 
international crimes. This is because domestic courts would have to deal with the 
problems of infringing the state sovereignty of another state. Therefore, the Pinochet 
(No.3) precedent is arguably an exception. It seems that Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 
the majority opinion of the Pinochet (No.3) case has foreseen this dilemma. As a 
result, his Lordship has interpreted the Pinochet case (No.3) by refusing immunity 
ratione materiae based on the CAT rather than under the difficult rules under CIL. 
This has been supported by one academic who has argued that the mutual 
coexistence of human rights and state sovereignty is problematic as the realisation of 
either is incommensurable with the fulfilment of the other.
611
  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the majority judges in the Pinochet (No.3) 
case acknowledged that had the claims being brought against Pinochet while he was 
a serving head of state, he would then have been protected by immunity ratione 
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personae.
612
 In other words, Pinochet would have enjoyed immunity had he still 
been a head of state.
613
 Moreover, if the issue of immunity was governed by common 
law, which reflected the position in public international law, then one would expect 
that immunity ratione personae would be governed by the current law at the time the 
plea was raised and decided.
614
 The key dilemma with this is that Pinochet could 
potentially argue that he should be immune under the current law at the time of the 
plea which was governed by the CIL. Therefore, immunity ratione materiae should 
continue to apply to him as the CJA would not have retrospective effect. One major 
criticism of the interpretation in the Pinochet (No.3) case is that the “Torture 
Convention withdrew immunity against criminal prosecutions, but did not affect the 
immunity for civil liability” as noted by Lord Bingham in the Jones case.615 
Effectively, this brings to the fore whether cases such as Pinochet (No.3), are 
suitable for adjudication by a foreign domestic court consistent with basic notions of 
international justice and fairness.
616
 
It will be interesting to assess the dissenting or minority opinion in the Pinochet 
(No.3) case given by Lord Goff. In contrast to the majority, his Lordship critically 
evaluated the CAT to say that it was generally silent on immunity and therefore 
should not affect Pinochet’s immunity privileges. This counterpoint will provide a 
comprehensive debate to the judgment of the Pinochet (No.3) case and will be 
examined next. 
3.1.2 The Minority Opinion 
In his dissenting judgment, Lord Goff considered why the CAT did not specifically 
mention head of state immunity
617
 by summarising the main points from the CAT.
618
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There are a couple of points that are worth examining here, namely, points 4 and 5 
from his summary. Point 4 deals with the fact that the CAT did not explicitly deal 
with head of state immunity. Lord Goff explained that: 
In broad terms I understand the argument to be that, since torture contrary to the 
convention can only be committed by a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity, and since it is in respect of the acts of these very persons that states 
can assert state immunity ratione materiae, it would be inconsistent with the 
obligations of state parties under the convention for them to be able to invoke state 
immunity ratione materiae in cases of torture contrary to the convention.
619  
 
More importantly, his Lordship argued that if the CAT intended to exclude state 
immunity it would have included an express clause to that effect.
620
 Thus, Lord Goff 
suggested that immunity ratione materiae had been refused by implied terms by the 
majority.
621
 Furthermore, his Lordship argued that those terms were not properly 
formulated.
622
 His Lordship said that: 
the proposed implied term has not been precisely formulated; it has not therefore 
been exposed to that valuable discipline which is always required in the case of 
terms alleged to be implied in ordinary contracts.
623
 
 
It followed that Lord Goff agreed with Lord Slynn from Pinochet (No.1) that there 
was no settled practice relating to torture outside the context of armed conflict until 
after 1989.
624
 Moreover, Lord Goff claimed that as he could not find any state 
practice relevant to the issue, he would not have found Pinochet to be criminally 
liable for the alleged torture acts.
625
 His Lordship reached such a reasoning as there 
was no settled practice which caused immunity not to be applicable before a national 
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court for torture and other crimes against humanity.
626
 For this reason, Lord Goff 
argued that, since the CAT did not explicitly remove immunity, Pinochet could 
technically still claim immunity ratione materiae as a former head of state.
627
 It is 
worth arguing that despite the fact that Chile had signed the CAT, it had waived 
some of its state sovereignty. However, as the CAT did not mention specifically 
head of state immunity, Chile could argue that it still had most of the state immunity 
attached. Had Chile intervened in the Pinochet (No.3) case proceedings under state 
immunity, it would be very possible that the outcome of the case would have been 
very different.  
As a means of clarification, the drafters of the CAT should have included and 
mentioned the immunity position of heads of state and other senior government 
officials when they have allegedly committed acts of torture. It is due to this reason 
that this thesis proposes to explore the subject from another angle. One way of 
analysing this is through the ‘circularity issue’ argument. This involves the argument 
as to whether Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL. Since the CAT does not 
refer to head of state immunity, one way of dealing with such an issue is through 
treaty interpretation as stipulated under Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. This means 
that the current customary norms relating to the law of head of state immunity may 
determine the interpretation of international treaty law, such as the CAT. Therefore, 
the CIL rules of immunities “shall be taken into account” when interpreting whether 
Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL. 
Hence, the hypothesis of finding out whether Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have 
become CIL in this thesis originated and expanded from the dissenting judgment by 
Lord Goff in Pinochet (No.3). His Lordship was correct to argue that the CAT was 
generally silent on the immunity issue. Furthermore, Lord Goff correctly pointed out 
that there would be express terms on the restriction of immunity ratione materiae in 
the CAT if that was the intention of the drafters. He also convincingly argued that, if 
immunity ratione materiae was removed, it would restrict the protection for heads of 
state when they were abroad. Without doubt his Lordship has made very important 
findings on the intention and drawbacks of the CAT. However, it can be suggested 
that his Lordship’s interpretation of the CAT is a rather narrow one.  
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Therefore, this thesis will argue that the CAT, in particular Articles 1 and 5, have 
become CIL. The impact of this is that they will remove the residual immunity 
ratione materiae from former heads of state and some senior heads of government. 
This answers the point on the disadvantages of the CAT, as maintained by Lord 
Goff, that there was no express terms in the CAT which could abrogate immunity 
ratione materiae for former heads of state. The advantage of arguing that the CAT 
has become CIL is that the latter is automatically applicable to states. Furthermore, 
Chapters Four and Five will prove that the argument regarding the circularity issue 
that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL is plausible. Besides, it will 
submit that the consistent state practice requirement is not really needed on the 
formation of new CIL. This is because under the sliding scale theory, if sufficient 
evidence of opinio juris is collected to suggest that the CAT has become CIL, then it 
can subsequently abrogate immunity ratione materiae. Besides, through the treaty 
interpretation under the VCLT, it supports the proposition that former heads of state 
and certain senior heads of government should not benefit from their alleged acts of 
torture.  
Another question that needs to be asked is whether the nature or the seriousness of 
the alleged acts will affect the immunity issue. Lord Goff, in the minority opinion, 
suggested that, notwithstanding that an act was criminal in nature and performed by 
a head of state, it did not render that act ‘non-governmental’ in character.628 In 
approaching this issue, Lord Goff explained the aim of the immunity rule: 
state immunity ratione materiae operates … to protect former heads of state, and 
(where immunity is asserted) public officials, even minor officials, from legal 
process in foreign countries in respect of acts done in the exercise of their functions 
as such, including accusation and arrest in respect of alleged crimes.
629
 
One cannot deny that Lord Goff has made an important contribution, and one which 
points back to the basic foundation of the rule of immunity under international law. 
Lord Goff goes on to state that: 
if immunity ratione materiae was excluded, former heads of state and senior public 
officials would have to think twice about travelling abroad, for fear of being the 
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subject of unfounded allegations emanating from states of a different political 
persuasion.
630
 
Therefore, if the restrictions on immunity ratione materiae apply, it would defeat the 
purpose of having the rule of immunity in the first place. One should not forget, 
however, that the situation is different because the three states party to the 
proceedings were signatories to the CAT, the Law Lords could therefore rely on the 
CAT to abrogate immunity ratione materiae for Pinochet.  
Indeed, Lord Goff was correct to say that the CAT did not mention anything on the 
issue of head of state immunity. As a matter of fact, it can be argued that the CAT 
would not be the appropriate treaty to deal with the issue of head of state immunity 
in the Pinochet (No.3) case. This is because Pinochet’s residual immunity 
entitlement problem should have been dealt with under the traditional CIL rules as 
they are well established and clearer in their scope of application. Nevertheless, it 
has been suggested by Fox that only Lord Slynn in Pinochet (No.1) and Lord Goff in 
Pinochet (No.3) in their dissenting judgments, show recognition of the fact that 
“international law is immature, weak in its supporting theoretical structure and based 
on pragmatic compromise to avoid political confrontation”.631 Thus, in the Pinochet 
(No.3) case, the Law Lords found that the principles of international criminal law 
took precedence over sovereign immunity.
632
 Their views point to the conflict 
between UK legislation and international law.
633
  
In the same way, it has been criticised that the House of Lords decision in the 
Pinochet (No.3) case did not seem to address the issue, but that the judges were 
content to “hand over to the Home Secretary”.634 This is due to the fact that it was 
essentially up to the discretion of the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, to decide 
whether Pinochet should be extradited from the UK. The outcome of the House of 
Lords decision only provided the view from the judiciary legal perspective. In spite 
of this, the ultimate point of action is determined by the executive. This has led some 
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to believe that Lord Millett, and possibly Lord Hutton, wanted Pinochet to be 
allowed to leave for Chile.
635
  
There is no doubt that the facts of the Pinochet case have given rise to a legal 
proceeding which was highly political and emotionally-charged.
636
 Ultimately, the 
Pinochet (No.3) case concerned the relationship between State sovereignty and 
human rights.
637
 The main question in this case was whether Pinochet could enjoy 
immunity for the alleged acts of torture committed for which his extradition was 
sought.
638
 Thus, the Pinochet (No.3) case magnified the problematic relationship 
between international law and politics.
639
 On the one hand, the growth of protection 
of human rights has penetrated the barrier of the rule of immunity which has 
traditionally been well guarded for its obvious purpose. On the other hand, there is 
continued resistance at state level to put a stop to immunities enjoyed by official 
foreign agents accused of international crimes, notwithstanding that jurisdiction has 
been accepted.
640
  
In spite of the fact that both the majority and minority judges have provided valid 
points on the discussion of immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state, who 
have allegedly committed acts of torture, the next section will interpret Articles 1 
and 5 of the CAT to suggest that the combined effect of these serves to remove 
immunity ratione materiae as put forward by the House of Lords. 
3.2 Ways of Interpreting the Convention against Torture 
This section will focus on the interpretation of Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT based on 
the decision in Pinochet (No.3) examined previously. Through the analysis, it will be 
submitted that the combined effect of Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT can remove 
immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state. The interpretation of both of 
these CAT Articles and their keywords, by means of treaty interpretation under 
Article 31 and 32 of the VCLT, will support this finding.  
The starting point to interpret any treaties such as the CAT is to refer to Article 31 of 
the VCLT. Article 31 of the VCLT states that: 
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A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. 
It has been said that Article 31 of the VCLT reflects CIL.
641
 This means that the 
rules of interpretation under Article 31 of the VCLT is significant and is accepted in 
practice in relation to all kinds of treaties.
642
 Furthermore, Article 31 of the VCLT 
establishes that a treaty should be interpreted in good faith, ordinary meaning of its 
terms and ‘object and purpose’.643 Therefore, the text, context and ‘object and 
purpose’ must be viewed together as a package and none may be given greater 
weight than the others.
644
 Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT is particularly useful in the 
interpretation of Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT. This is because it demonstrates that the 
current customary international law norms can provide an interpretation of treaty 
law. Thus, it will present the most accurate view of the norms relating to prohibition 
of torture under the CAT and the immunity rules privileges. 
Besides this, Article 32 of the VCLT is the supplementary tool of treaty 
interpretation. It provides that if the wording of the articles leaves the meaning 
ambiguous, obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, 
then the preparatory work or the travaux preparatoires of the treaty should be taken 
into account. Therefore, it can be suggested that Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT are 
useful tools for interpreting Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT. They can be used to find 
out what Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT mean in terms of the immunity issue even if it 
has not been specifically mentioned in the CAT. Thus, the ‘object and purpose’ of 
the texts of Articles 1 and 5 of CAT will be examined in relation to the discussion 
regarding immunity ratione materiae.  
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3.2.1 The Dissection of Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT 
3.2.1.1 The Definition of Torture under the CAT - Article 1 of the CAT 
Lord Goff, in his minority opinion, correctly noted that the CAT was generally silent 
on the immunity issue. In approaching this issue, one should firstly explore the 
wording of Article 5 of CAT. This Article essentially creates an obligation upon 
states to establish jurisdiction over the offences of torture. Therefore, the meaning of 
‘torture’ also has to be examined as it will provide a list of torture acts over which 
member states can exercise jurisdiction. Article 1 of the CAT provides the definition 
of torture.  
The forerunner of the CAT is the 1975 UN Declaration against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment. Article 1 of the 1975 
Convention includes the definition of ‘torture’.645 It is based on Article 5 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
646
 and Article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
647
 Thus, the 1975 UN Declaration’s 
definition of ‘torture’ serves as the framework for the definition of CAT.648  
The aim of the CAT is to strengthen the existing provisions and procedures with 
regard to the issue of prohibition of torture and other forms of illegal treatment.
649
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the CAT was not the first international law 
document to outlaw torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments or 
punishments.
650
 On the contrary, it serves as a recognition of existing practices 
which already outlawed torture under international law.
651
 Article 1(1) of the CAT 
defines torture as: 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
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person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or 
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
There is a general acceptance of the main elements contained in the definition of 
Article 1.
652
 This is because the definition of torture under Article 1 of the CAT 
mirrors various other international instruments. Therefore, the question that needs 
addressing here is whether the CAT impliedly withdraws immunity, and secondly 
whether this is withdrawn because it is inconsistent with the CAT’s definition of 
torture as an “official act”? As far as the first question is concerned, in the Pinochet 
(No.3) case judgment, the majority opinions believed that the definition of torture 
under Article 1 of the CAT would cover former heads of state, such as Pinochet. 
However, rather surprisingly, the majority judges in the ‘narrow’ approach were 
silent on the question of whether CAT impliedly removed immunity. On the other 
hand, only Lord Hope and Lord Goff held in the judgments that the CAT had not 
impliedly withdrawn immunity.
653
 This finding by the majority Law Lords has been 
supported by two leading academics. Burgers and Danelius have said that the 
wording, ‘such purposes as’, contained in Article 1 of the CAT should include 
bodies which have a connection with the interests or policies of the state and its 
organs.
654
 Therefore, the definition of torture under the CAT means that public 
officials who directly participate in torture and those who turn a blind eye to acts of 
torture by unofficial groups such as paramilitary organisations are criminally 
responsible.
655
 Furthermore, it is suggested that, ‘other persons acting in an official 
capacity’, which includes certain non-state actors whose authority is comparable to 
government authority, should also be held accountable.
656
  
In addition, it is important to recall that the CAT is silent on the issue of immunity 
for public officials. In the thirty-fourth session of the Commission on Human Rights, 
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the Working Group of the Commission was unable to decide upon a definition of the 
term ‘public official’.657 This naturally creates a problem over the question of 
immunity when a public official is involved. Nevertheless, the 1975 Declaration of 
the Torture Convention together with the original Swedish draft, reflected the view 
that states could only be held accountable for human rights violations through state 
actors.
658
 Therefore, it can be submitted that since the CAT is one of the human 
rights treaties, it should prima facie give priority to its intended beneficiaries, that is 
to say, torture victims. Hence, the CAT should be interpreted in a manner that 
protects individual rights, and not for the mutual benefit of the parties to a 
convention.
659
 This means that former heads of state should not enjoy the immunity 
privileges as given to them under state sovereignty. 
3.2.1.2 Problems of the Definition of Torture under Article 1 of the CAT 
When it comes to the second question about whether immunity ratione materiae is 
removed because it is inconsistent with the CAT’s definition of torture as an “official 
act”, the ‘object and purpose’ element of treaty interpretation requires that treaty 
articles be interpreted with the most appropriate interpretation in order to realise the 
aims and achieve the object of a treaty.
660
 Therefore, for an act to qualify as torture, 
it must: (a) cause severe physical or mental suffering; (b) be inflicted for a purpose; 
and (c) be inflicted by, or with the acquiescence of, an official.
661
 
Furthermore, Article 31 of the VCLT says that treaty interpretation may raise issues 
of more general applicability.
662
 This could mean that the ‘object and purpose’ of the 
CAT are for the regulation and prohibition of all governmental conduct which 
inflicts pain or suffering under Article 1.
663
 It can be said that the purpose and effect 
of the conduct are the significant elements in determining whether they constitute 
torture.
664
 Some commentators have said that the purpose requirement is 
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inadequate.
665
 Nevertheless, in the Pinochet (No.3) case most of the Law Lords, with 
the exception of Lord Hope and Lord Goff, argued that immunity ratione materiae 
was removed due to the fact that it was incompatible with the CAT’s definition of 
torture as an “official act”. However, Burgers and Danelius have warned that Article 
1 of CAT should be seen as providing a description for the instruction of torture, and 
not be considered a legal definition which can be directly incorporated into national 
law.
666
 Besides, they also maintained that the underlying meaning of Article 4 of the 
CAT, aiming to criminalise torture did not incontrovertibly mean that there should 
be a specific isolated offence covering the conduct as described under Article 1 of 
the CAT.
667
 Moreover, they explained that torture could be interpreted in other types 
of offences, such as assault.
668
 What has been suggested by Burgers and Danelius 
certainly creates problems.
669
  
From another perspective, Article 2(3) of the CAT further reinforces the idea that no 
defence is available for ‘superior orders’ which excuses criminal charges against 
torture.
670
 It was further added that the “general principles of international law” 
especially in the Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, allowed 
consideration of superior orders in mitigation of sentence.
671
 In addition, Boulesbaa 
has argued that the ILC implied that superior orders could be considered in 
mitigation of sentences.
672
 Therefore, under international humanitarian law, a 
commander is not responsible due to his position of authority.
673
 Staff officers are 
only responsible if they have participated in the delivery and execution of criminal 
orders which can be proven.
674
 However, the doctrine of ‘command responsibility’ 
will prevent superiors from making a defence for the crimes committed by their 
subordinates. The concept of command responsibility means that no actions have 
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been taken to prevent or punish crimes which have occurred or are likely to occur.
675
 
Hence, people who have knowingly failed to prevent or punish their subordinates for 
illegal acts such as torture are liable under command responsibility.
676
  
3.2.2 Jurisdiction Provisions under Article 5 of the CAT 
Under international law, jurisdiction refers to the power of each state to prescribe 
and enforce its municipal laws with regard to persons and property.
677
 As far as 
immunity is concerned, immunity from jurisdiction means that a court cannot hear a 
case as it is procedurally barred from doing so.
678
 In order to have a procedural bar 
under the doctrine of immunity, jurisdiction must first be established.
679
 On the 
contrary, one academic has been suggested that immunity signifies the presence of 
jurisdiction rather than the absence or lack of it.
680
  
In the Pinochet (No.3) case, the Law Lords relied on the CAT to exercise jurisdiction 
to extradite Pinochet for alleged acts of torture. It is, therefore, important to 
understand the wording of the jurisdiction provision, that is to say, Article 5 of the 
CAT, to ascertain whether it has any effect on the law of head of state immunity 
since it is generally silent on the issue.  
3.2.2.1 Article 5(1) CAT 
Article 5(1) of the CAT states that: 
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Article 4 in the following cases: a) When 
the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship 
or aircraft registered in that State; b) when the alleged offender is a national of that 
State; c) when the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it 
appropriate.
681
 
Article 5(1) of the CAT ensures that states’ domestic criminal law recognises 
territorial jurisdiction over offences of torture in their national criminal law. It would 
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ensure that alleged perpetrators cannot avoid safe havens for perpetrators of 
torture.
682
 The jurisdiction provision under Article 5 of the CAT is echoed in various 
treaty provisions which are already in force such as: aircraft hijacking, protection of 
diplomats, and hostage taking.
683
 The relevant Articles and their Treaties in this 
respect are: Article 4 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft (1971); Article 5 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1973); Article 3 of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons 
(1973); and, Article 5 of the International Convention against the Taking of 
Hostages. It is, therefore, this universality principle which constitutes the problem 
for some countries. This is because some States were unenthusiastic about provisions 
such as Article 5 of the CAT, as they feared that it would cause problems within 
their own domestic criminal legal systems. This problem is particularly evident 
especially for those who adhere to the rigid rules of the principle of territoriality.
684
 
Sweden, during the early drafts of the Convention, said that the extra-territorial or 
‘universal’ jurisdiction was of key importance because it reduced the ability of 
torturers being held individually responsible, from fleeing to other foreign states.
685
 
However, the only exception to this can be found under Article 5(1)(c) of the CAT
686
 
in the passive nationality principle. This is where states enjoy the discretionary 
power to decide whether or not to apply it.
 687
  
3.2.2.2 Article 5(2) CAT 
Article 5(2) of the CAT says that: 
Each State party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any 
territory under its jurisdiction.  
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This provision requires states to exercise criminal jurisdictions over all other 
offences of torture.
688
 This includes those outside its territory, to nationals of other 
states.
689
 Therefore, this Article, for the first time in a human rights treaty, 
established the obligation for states party to establish universal jurisdiction.
690
 This 
would include trying all cases where an alleged torturer is present in any territory 
under their jurisdiction.
691
 A similarity can therefore be found between Article 5(2) 
of the CAT and Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
692
  
Article 5(2) of the CAT requires states to take the necessary legislative measures to 
establish jurisdiction and to take specific steps in order to bring suspected torturers to 
justice.
 693
  
3.2.2.2.1 Necessary Legislative Measures to Establish Jurisdiction 
This means that states must take necessary actions in their domestic criminal laws to 
comply with the principles laid down in Article 5.
694
 It relates back to one of the 
issues that the House of Lords had to deal with in the Pinochet (No.3) case. The 
question is whether conventional application is necessary before the UK can 
establish jurisdiction. Most of the Law Lords held that the conventional application 
was required, with the exception of Lord Millett, who said that no conventional 
application was necessary.
695
 The conventional application means that a state must 
have enacted domestic legislation to give it the power to exercise jurisdiction over 
alleged offences of torture. In the UK, it has enacted the SIA. However, in the 
Pinochet (No.3) case, the jurisdiction issue was decided by the majority based on the 
CAT rather than traditional CIL. Their Lordships relied on the CJA which brought 
into effect the jurisdiction provision of the CAT. The effect of the CJA is that it 
makes an international crime, such as torture, part of the UK legal system. As a 
consequence, the UK is under an obligation to extradite the alleged offender to 
another state if required.  
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Furthermore, it can be argued that Article 5(2) of the CAT provides no obstacle to 
the application concerning the immunity for former heads of state. Extra-territorial 
prosecution can only occur in cases where immunity ratione materiae would 
ordinarily be applicable.
696
 Thus, the CAT limits the offence of torture to acts 
committed in an official capacity.
697
 This has been supported, for example, by Lord 
Saville in the Pinochet case whereby his Lordship said that the application of 
immunity ratione materiae would deprive the objective of Article 5 of the CAT.
698
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Law Lords used the jurisdiction 
provisions under Article 5 of the CAT to great effect since all three of the states 
party to the proceedings were signatories to the CAT.
699
 As a result, the so-called 
universal jurisdiction was carried out in relation to the aut dedere aut judicare 
dictum.
700
 
Moreover, another question that needs addressing here is whether immunity is only 
withdrawn for systematic torture, that is to say, for a crime against humanity. The 
Law Lords were divided on this issue. Lords Browne-Wilkinson, Hutton, Saville and 
Phillips were all silent about it. Lord Hope and Lord Millett reasoned that immunity 
should only be withdrawn for systematic torture.
701
 Lord Goff, the minority and 
dissenting judge, argued that immunity should not be withdrawn for systematic 
torture.
702
 This corresponded with the earlier decision by Lord Slynn in Pinochet 
(No.1) who said that “the fact even that an act is recognised as a crime under 
international law does not mean that the Courts of all States have jurisdiction to try 
it”.703  
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The Pinochet (No.3) case can be distinguished from the case of Hissene Habré
 704
 
which involved Article 5(2) of CAT. This case concerned a government’s resistance 
to implement its obligation under the CAT to establish universal jurisdiction.
705
 The 
Committee found that Senegal had violated Article 5(2) of the CAT in failing to take 
the necessary legislative measures to establish the legal possibility for Senegalese 
courts to exercise universal jurisdiction.
706
 The Committee also found that Senegal 
had violated its obligations under Article 7 of the CAT, that is, aut dedere aut 
iudicare.
707
 Due to the fact that some countries are reluctant to establish universal 
jurisdiction as in the Habré case, it has been suggested that the former dictator of 
Chad should be tried by an African member state such as: Senegal, Chad or any 
other African country. The Habré case was an example of where governments and 
courts try to avoid universal jurisdiction for fear of its political implications.
708
 The 
Committee argued that a state party: 
could not invoke the complexity of its judicial proceedings or other reasons 
stemming from domestic law to justify its failure to comply with [the extradite or 
try] obligations under the Convention.
709
 
Therefore, it was suggested that a state party was obliged to prosecute Habré for 
alleged acts of torture.
710
 However, the obligation to not prosecute can be considered 
only if there is insufficient evidence to prosecute.
711
 
3.2.2.2.2 The Role of the Administrative and Judicial Authorities of States 
This is where the administrative and judicial authorities of states must take specific 
steps in order to bring suspected torturers to justice.
712
 It is said that criminal 
investigations should be initiated as soon as the authorities of a state party have 
sufficient information to assume that an act of torture has been committed in any 
territory under its jurisdiction either by one of its nationals or against one of its 
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nationals.
713
 Ingelse argued that the wording of Article 5(2) of the CAT only 
required states to establish jurisdiction where at least one of the states have 
jurisdiction on the basis of territory; nationality of the perpetrator; or nationality of 
the victim.
714
  
According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the Pinochet (No.3) case, the point about 
the CAT was not to create a new international crime, but to provide an international 
system where international criminal torturers would not go unpunished.
715
 It ensures 
that national legal systems must ensure that they have strong enforcement 
mechanisms, usually in the form of domestic legislations, to perform the jurisdiction 
power, or right to hear a case involving alleged perpetrators of torture. Essentially, 
the aim is to prevent alleged torturers from having a safe haven for their crimes. The 
Pinochet (No.3) case, through the reasoning of the majority opinions, seemed to 
adhere to the objective of the CAT. 
To sum up, the combined effect of the interpretation of Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT 
by the House of Lords in the Pinochet (No.3) case had served to remove immunity 
ratione materiae for former heads of state. Article 1 of the CAT defines torture. 
Nevertheless, the definition of torture under Article 1 of CAT seems to be 
ambiguous and problematic when considered alone. However, when it is used in 
combination with Article 5 of CAT, it provides a much stronger enforcement 
mechanism to ensure that alleged torturers cannot have safe haven for their criminal 
acts. Article 5(2) of the CAT sets out that states party should establish universal 
jurisdiction over torture in cases where the alleged offender is present in its 
territory.
716
 The judgment in the Pinochet (No.3) case best illustrated this where 
immunity ratione materiae was abrogated as a result.  
Conclusion 
This Chapter principally discussed the efficiency of the CAT in dealing with the 
residue issue of immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state. It started by 
analysing the judgments offered in the Pinochet (No.3) case. This case was 
significant as it was the first time that a domestic court refused immunity ratione 
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materiae to a former head of state.
717
 The judgment of the Pinochet (No.3) case has 
triggered criticism as the majority Law Lords decided the immunity in the case based 
on the CAT instead of CIL rules on immunity. This was because the CAT was 
generally silent on the immunity issue.
718
 Lord Goff, in his dissenting judgment, 
correctly noted this vital fact.
719
 The outcome of the case would have been different 
had one of the parties to the proceedings not been a signatory to the CAT.  
The chapter then proceeded to analyse whether the CAT could really have an impact 
on the law of head of state immunity notwithstanding the fact that it was silent on the 
issue. This thesis has identified two treaty provisions under the CAT which might be 
relevant for the debate relating to the immunity issue. They were Articles 1 and 5 of 
the CAT. The former related to the definition of torture whereas the latter concerned 
the extensive jurisdiction provision. It has been argued that these two Articles can 
help in the argument of whether immunity ratione materiae should be abrogated for 
former heads of state. Thus, the wordings of these two Articles have been 
investigated.  
However, the most important point that this chapter has discussed is whether Articles 
1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL. This claim sought to expand on the point 
suggested by Lord Goff, that the CAT was silent on this type of immunity. If the 
CAT had become CIL, then it would have solved the dilemma over whether the CAT 
did not apply to non-signatories.  
The two relevant provisions under the CAT had to be interpreted to see if they had 
any impact on the law of head of state immunity. This was achieved through treaty 
interpretation under Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Upon close examination, the 
definition of Article 1 is less than perfect. Not only is the definition of torture under 
Article 1 of the CAT problematic, but it has also proved to be difficult to apply to 
cases regarding former heads of state in terms of immunity ratione materiae. On the 
other hand, Article 5 of CAT, which deals with jurisdiction factors, proves to be 
more convincing. This is because the extensive scope of jurisdiction, that is to say, 
universal jurisdiction, can cover a variety of situations. It has been submitted in this 
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chapter that the combined effect of these two Articles appears to have removed 
immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state. However, this view has 
received some criticism.  
Therefore, one way of proving that the CAT really could abrogate immunity ratione 
materiae for former heads of state would be to suggest that it had become CIL. 
Chapter Four will provide the evidence of opinio juris supporting both Articles 1 and 
5 of the CAT - that they have indeed become CIL and can restrict the residue of 
immunity for former heads of state who have allegedly committed acts of torture. 
The result will be achieved through the sliding scale theory and by focusing on the 
opinio juris element. This is due to the fact that, if there is a general consensus by the 
international community that the prohibition of torture and the universal jurisdiction 
provision are widely accepted, then it would be fair to say that these contributed to 
the formation of a new CIL. 
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Chapter Four 
The Evidence of opinio juris indicating that Articles 1 and 5 
of the CAT have become CIL 
 
The implications of the Pinochet (No.3) opinions on the law of immunity ratione 
materiae have been scrutinised in the previous chapter. The main focus of this 
chapter is to provide evidence of the subjective element - opinio juris - which asserts 
that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL. The consequence of this is that it 
will arguably remove immunity ratione materiae from the alleged acts of torture by 
former heads of state and heads of government. 
In recent years, some commentators have suggested a modern conception of the 
formation of CIL that abandons the traditional approach to its formation.
720
 This is 
due to the fact that the traditional approach to the formation of CIL requires both 
elements of state practice and opinio juris.
721
 State practice means, “any act or 
statement by a State from which views about customary law can be inferred”.722 
Opinio juris, on the other hand, means that the state practice must be accepted as 
law, and its usage followed out of a sense of obligation.723 In other words, the states 
concerned must feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal 
obligation.
724
 Nonetheless, it has been argued that substantial changes of the two 
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elements (state practice and opinio juris) have taken place.
725
 Some believe that the 
opinio juris has assumed prime significance.
726
 This is because opinio juris is said to 
be used for declaratory purposes on the existence of customary law which arises 
independently.
727
 Therefore, it is this argument of the weight of opinio juris on the 
formation of a new custom that this chapter will focus on instead of the more rigid 
process under the traditional way. 
The sliding scale theory will be utilised as a more modern device to show that 
Articles 1 and 5 of CAT have generally been accepted by the international 
community as custom. Through the accumulation of the evidence of opinio juris, this 
chapter will demonstrate that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT are potentially new CIL. 
The reason for adapting the sliding scale approach for the discussion is that it is more 
flexible than the traditional method as stipulated by the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases.
728
 This view has been supported in the Paquete Habana case where the US 
Supreme Court recognised that the traditional method of formation of CIL could take 
decades to develop.
729
 Besides, the traditional process of the formation of CIL would 
make it impossible for new customary rules to develop.
730
 The controversial sliding 
scale theory is not the traditional approach for the formation of a new custom. 
However, it will be argued that, notwithstanding its limitation, the sliding scale 
theory by Kirgis is well designed to support the methodological approach in this 
thesis. This means that provided there is strong evidence in favour of one of the 
elements of formation of CIL, that is to say, either state practice or opinio juris, then 
it would be adequate to claim that a new CIL has been formed.
731
 It will be shown 
that despite the fact that the sliding scale theory is not the most accepted theory, it is 
nevertheless a well constructed technique to support the methodology of this thesis. 
Therefore, by focusing on the opinio juris rather than the state practice element, this 
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chapter seeks to provide a contrasting evaluation regarding the formation of new CIL 
through Kirgis’s sliding scale theory. 
Thus, the main aim of this chapter is to prove that there is adequate evidence of 
opinio juris to support the claim that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become 
custom, and subsequently removed immunity ratione materiae from alleged acts of 
torture. On the other hand, some have suggested that the method of the formation of 
CIL, especially in the area of human rights and international humanitarian law, is 
different from the traditional method under international law.
732
 Therefore, it has 
been argued that it would allow opinio juris to play a major role in the formation of 
CIL compared with the traditional method which requires both consistent state 
practice and opinio juris.
733
 Nonetheless, this chapter will challenge this claim and 
present a counter-argument. 
In order to achieve this, this chapter will centre on examining evidence of opinio 
juris, such as the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions (hereafter ‘UNGA 
Resolutions’), and the Committee against Torture (hereafter the ‘Committee’).734 As 
a result, it will be submitted that this evidence points in favour of Articles 1 and 5 of 
the CAT becoming custom, and therefore restricts immunity ratione materiae for 
former heads of state and government officials. 
This chapter consists of two main sections. The first section explains the sliding 
scale theory argument, where it places more emphasis on one of the elements to 
suggest that a new CIL has been formed. In addition, the meaning and the 
implication of the opinio juris element will be explained. The second part of the 
chapter centres specifically on evidence of opinio juris, which includes UNGA 
Resolutions, and the Committee that matches the understanding of Articles 1 and 5 
of the CAT. This evidence will support the claim that a strong presence of an opinio 
juris element can lead to the formation of a new custom, and subsequently restrict 
immunity ratione materiae for alleged acts of torture.  
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4.1 The Sliding Scale Theory and the Opinio juris element 
4.1.1 Sliding Scale Theory 
Kirgis has suggested that the traditional approach of requiring both state practice and 
opinio juris as found in North Sea Continental Shelf cases should be viewed as 
interchangeable along a sliding scale.
735
 The explanation of how the sliding scale 
works is worth quoting in full here: 
On the sliding scale, very frequent, consistent state practice establishes a customary 
rule without much (or any) affirmative showing of an opinio juris, so long as it is 
not negated by evidence of non-normative intent. As the frequency and consistency 
of the practice decline in any series of cases, a stronger showing of an opinio juris is 
required. At the other end of the scale, a clearly demonstrated opinio juris 
establishes a customary rule without much (or any) affirmative showing that 
governments are consistently behaving in accordance with the asserted rule.
736
 
In other words, it put forward the view that the requirements of state practice and 
opinio juris should be rationalised on a sliding scale.
737
 This has been confirmed in 
the Nicaragua case where the ICJ adopted the view that “the elements of custom 
[are] not [regarded] as fixed and mutually exclusive, but as interchangeable along a 
sliding scale”.738  
Moreover, Kirgis explains that the conflict between state practice and opinio juris 
depends on the importance of the activity in question and the reasonableness of the 
rule concerned.
739
 On the point regarding the opinio juris element, Kirgis added that: 
Exactly how much state practice will substitute for an affirmative showing of an 
opinio juris, and how clear a showing will substitute for consistent behaviour, 
depends on the activity in question and on the reasonableness of the asserted 
customary rule … The more destabilising or morally distasteful the activity – for 
example, the offensive use of force or the deprivation of fundamental human rights – 
the more readily international decision makers will substitute one element for the 
other, provided that the asserted restrictive rule seems reasonable.
740
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Therefore, the sliding scale theory suggests that if the available evidence of state 
practices is consistent, then it will be adequate to substitute the opinio juris element 
on the sliding scale. Similarly, if there is compelling evidence to suggest that states 
do not approve of certain behaviour, then custom may still be formed 
notwithstanding the inconsistency of the state practice. Thus, the sliding scale theory 
effectively creates two scenarios. On the one hand, if there are consistent and 
frequent state practices, then an opinio juris requirement may be relied upon less. On 
the other hand, if the state practices are not consistent, more weight will be put on 
the opinio juris element. It is this latter claim, which emphasises opinio juris, which 
this chapter seeks to demonstrate, and to claim that Articles 1 and 5 of CAT have 
become CIL and subsequently restrict immunity for heads of state and government 
officials. 
Advocates in favour of the opinio juris element over state practice for the formation 
of CIL say that a lower standard of practice may be tolerated for customs with a 
strong moral content. This is because violations of ideal standards are expected.
741
 It 
has been said that a court may be less exacting in requiring state practice and opinio 
juris elements in cases dealing with important moral issues.
742
 
Cheng mentioned the process of “instant customary international law” in his 1965 
article on the UN Resolution on Outer Space when passed by the unanimous vote of 
member states.
743
 He suggested that prolonged state practices were unnecessary and 
not needed provided that the relevant states clearly established their opinio juris 
through, for example, their votes on UNGA Resolutions.
744
 The meaning of opinio 
juris and what constitutes the subjective element will be explored next. 
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4.1.2 The Opinio Juris element on the formation of CIL 
Opinio juris (opinio juris sive necessitatis) means the “belief” held by states that the 
practice in question is obligatory by virtue of a rule of law requiring it.
745
 In the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ explained the opinio juris requirement in 
the traditional approach: 
[it] must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief 
that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it 
… The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what 
amounts to a legal obligation.
746
 
The ICJ in the Nicaragua case further clarified the opinio juris requirement: 
opinio juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from, inter alia, the 
attitude of the Parties and the attitude of States towards certain General Assembly 
resolutions … The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot be 
understood as merely that of a “reiteration or elucidation” of the treaty commitment 
undertaken in the Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood as an acceptance of 
the validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves.
747
 
4.1.3 UNGA Resolutions as a source of opinio juris 
Some view the UNGA Resolutions not as practice, but as evidence of opinio juris.
748
 
In addition, it is believed that international judicial decisions can lead to evidence of 
state practice and opinio juris for establishing CIL. The ILC has given some 
examples of sources which provide CIL. They are: treaties, decisions of national and 
international courts, national legislation, opinions of national legal advisors, 
diplomatic correspondence and practice of international organisations.
749
 This 
chapter concentrates on examples of treaties to establish whether they can contribute 
to the findings that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have indeed become CIL. 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ reached the outcome of the case regarding Articles 1 
and 3 of the Geneva Conventions by primarily looking at opinio juris instead of state 
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practices.
750
 The effect of the Nicaragua case is that it contributed to the recognition 
that resolutions can play an important role in the formation opinio juris.
751
 The ICJ 
expressly confirmed the importance of the subjective element by saying that: 
they must also be such or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence a belief that 
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The 
need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the 
very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis.
752
  
It is fair to say that the decision of the Nicaragua case led to the strengthening of the 
position of UNGA Resolutions as an appropriate mechanism for creating customary 
norms.
753
 In other words, resolutions which have been adopted by unanimous 
decisions of the UNGA could have a creative role in the formation of new custom.
754
 
This is because the UNGA has become entitled to speak in the name of all the states 
of the world, and its decisions have become the decisions of the world community.
755
 
The ICJ explained in the ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion’ that: 
The General Assembly Resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes 
have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence 
important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris. 
To establish whether this is true of a given General Assembly Resolution, it is 
necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary 
to see whether an opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of 
resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the 
establishment of a new rule.
756
 
Moreover, the view that UNGA Resolutions are evidence of emergent customary 
rules has been supported by the US domestic courts as well as international 
tribunals.
757
 For example, the decision in Siderman de Blake v Republic of 
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Argentina, confirmed that “a resolution of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations … is a powerful and authoritative statement of the customary international 
law of human rights”.758 
In addition, it has been said that under certain circumstances UNGA Resolutions can 
“declare existing customs [or] crystallise emerging customs”.759 This is supported by 
the US Department of State, where it explained that: 
General Assembly resolutions are regarded as recommendations to Member States 
of the United Nations. To the extent, which is exceptional, that such resolutions are 
meant to be declaratory of international law, are adopted with the support of all 
members, and are observed by the practice of States, such resolutions are evidence 
of customary international law on a particular subject matter.
760
 
However, the ICJ explained that whether a particular UNGA Resolution should be 
treated as evidence of a new rule of CIL would depend on its “content and the 
conditions of its adoption”.761 For example, one of the main considerations is a 
vote’s outcome.762 Moreover, the position of important players relative to the subject 
matter of the resolution is also vital.
763
 
As far as the vote outcome is concerned, the important decisions of the UNGA have 
become enforceable throughout the world, provided that they have been adopted 
unanimously or by consensus.
764
 This means that at least a two-thirds majority is 
required for a substantive decision.
765
 In the Eichmann Case, the Israeli Supreme 
Court said in relation to the UNGA Resolution 95(1) that: 
if fifty-eight nations [i.e. all members of the UN at the time] unanimously agree on a 
statement of existing law, it would seem that such a declaration would be all but 
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conclusive evidence of such a rule, and agreement by a large majority would have 
great value in determining what is existing law.
766
 
In relation to the ‘content and condition of its adoption’, it has been suggested that 
certain UNGA Resolutions do have normative legal force due to the wide and 
consistent support they attract from a large number of states.
767
 It can be submitted 
that it is very likely that most states will vote in favour of the ‘content and condition’ 
of a Resolution relating to human rights. However, whether states will follow their 
treaty obligations strictly is another more problematic question relating to 
enforcement. It is believed that the content of the resolutions and the responses of 
states to them are what gives them legal effect.
768
 An example of this is the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and People 
(UNGA Res 1514) 1960. 
UN Resolutions fall into two areas under international law. The first type concerns 
‘force and intervention’, and the second category involves ‘other human rights’.769 
The former may involve, for example, how the Resolutions can provide an extra 
enforcement mechanism on the issue of jurisdiction for torture. This can be related 
back to the Commission against Torture which was created by the UNGA Resolution 
39/46 in relation to the enactment of the CAT. Two cases heard by the Committee in 
relation to Article 5 of the CAT will be dealt with in this chapter. These cases are 
important for the discussion mainly because they concerned heads of state and the 
impact of the jurisdiction provision under Article 5 of the CAT. One of the cases was 
about an extradition claim for Pinochet which related back to the earlier discussion 
as to whether the CAT can have an impact on the law of head of state immunity. The 
other example given relates to the case of Questions Relating to the obligation to 
prosecute or extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (hereafter the ‘Hissène Habré case).770 
The Commission had to deal with Article 5 of the CAT in that case. Both of the 
cases illustrate that the failure by states to exercise jurisdiction can lead to a breach 
of obligations under the CAT.  
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The second category of resolutions relates to ‘other human rights’. This means 
resolutions which have been created for the purpose of protecting human rights. The 
next section will illustrate the evidence of opinio juris supporting Articles 1 and 5 of 
the CAT. These will include: UNGA resolutions. 
4.2 Evidence of opinio juris in Article 1 of the CAT 
This section explores the evidence of opinio juris which supports the view that 
Article 1 of CAT has become CIL. It can be recalled that Article 1 of the CAT 
provides the definition of torture. One of the examples of evidence of opinio juris 
supporting the definition of torture can be seen in the UNGA Resolution (7 March 
2013) - ‘Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.771 
In its Preamble, the Resolution reaffirmed that “no one shall be subjected to torture 
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. It also reaffirmed the 
definition of torture as contained in Article 1 of the CAT: 
the prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm of international law and that 
international, regional and domestic courts have held the prohibition of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to be customary international law. 
Paragraph 1 of the Resolution “condemns all forms of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.772 Furthermore, paragraph 2 
emphasises that: “States must take persistent, determined and effective measures to 
prevent and combat all acts of torture”.773 These two paragraphs from the Resolution 
show that all forms of torture are outlawed. The effect of the prohibition of torture is 
that states will have to take all necessary measures to reduce the acts of torture. It 
can be suggested that the 2012 Resolution is not something new. This is because few 
resolutions have been passed prior to the current resolution. In terms of the wording 
of the Resolution - the definition of torture and the mechanism to combat it, they can 
be traced back to previous resolutions, such as: Resolution 3059 [1973],
774
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Resolution 3452 [1973]
775
 and Resolution 3453 [1975]
776
. These Resolutions 
generally reflected the aims of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Furthermore, 
it can be suggested that Resolutions 66/150 was based on Resolution 95(1) 1946.
777
  
4.2.1 Evidence of opinio juris for Article 5 CAT 
Article 5 of the CAT creates an obligation on states to establish jurisdiction over the 
offences of torture. The evidence of opinio juris, which suggests that the universal 
jurisdiction under the CAT has become CIL, and that this consequently restricts 
immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state will be discussed in this section. 
Paragraph 20 of Resolution 67/161 (2013) calls for: 
States parties to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment to fulfil their obligation to submit for 
prosecution or extradite those alleged to have committed acts of torture, and 
encourages other States to do likewise, bearing in mind the need to fight impunity.
778
 
This corresponds with Article 5 of the CAT which obliges states to establish 
jurisdiction over offences of torture. Nonetheless, the wording in Resolution 67/161 
places more emphasis on states exercising their obligations to extradite or prosecute 
alleged torturers in order to combat impunity. The argument here is that the 2013 
Resolution further strengthens the responsibility placed on states to exercise their 
jurisdiction rights, and more importantly to ensure that impunity for alleged torturers 
is tackled. This notion is supported by Resolution 3(1) 1946, as it suggests that states 
should take all necessary measures to arrest war criminals.
779
 The same approach 
was reaffirmed in 1973 in Resolution 3074 (XXVIII).
780
 As far as the evidence of 
opinio juris on the subject of extensive jurisdiction provisions under Article 5 of the 
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CAT is concerned, it can be suggested that Resolution 67/161, together with other 
previous Resolutions, signified that there is a strong proposition that Article 5 of 
CAT may have become a new CIL. This is because all these Resolutions essentially 
had one similar objective which is that jurisdiction is exercisable for acts of torture. 
The next section will deal with the other category of Resolutions which deals with 
force and intervention. It can be suggested that the Committee is one of the 
organisations created by the UN together with the CAT. As a result, the findings by 
the Committee supplement the idea that the failure by states to exercise jurisdictions 
for alleged perpetrators of torture are not accepted. Two relevant cases heard by the 
Committee are worth discussing here in more detail as both of them involved, to a 
certain extent, heads of state. The finding by the Committee will shed some light on 
the importance of compliance by states party to their treaty obligation under Article 
5 of the CAT. The consequence of this is that if the Committee finds that the 
obligation by states party to exercising jurisdiction under Article 5 of the CAT is not 
strictly followed, it would lead to breaches of their commitment to the CAT.   
4.2.1.1 Jurisprudence by the Committee against Torture 
The Committee was set up by the UN as a mechanism dedicated to monitoring the 
implementation of the CAT.
781
 The Committee is established in accordance with 
Article 17 of the CAT.
 782
 The main function of the Committee, therefore, is to 
ensure that the CAT is observed and implemented properly. Moreover, Article 22 of 
the CAT grants rights to individuals, who are most likely to be victims of torture, to 
lodge complaints directly to the Committee.
783
 For example, victims of torture can 
ask the Committee to explain issues of jurisdiction as stipulated by Article 5 of the 
CAT. It is submitted that the Committee may play a vital role in enabling victims of 
torture to obtain a platform when it comes to setting up a trial. Nevertheless, it has 
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been criticised because a State has to first accept the competence of the Committee 
in order for it to have some effect.
784
  
The following cases by the Commission are relevant to the discussion of Article 5 of 
the CAT as they involve the enforcement mechanism regarding jurisdiction issues. 
Notwithstanding that these claims were brought against states rather than directly 
against heads of state, the findings by the Commission were useful in order to 
examine the impact of how states dealt with their obligations and compliance under 
Article 5 of the CAT to exercise jurisdictions. In addition, they will present a clearer 
picture as to the impact of Article 5 of the CAT on states, and whether violation of it 
will constitute a breach of a possible CIL. 
In the Marcos Roitman Rosenmann v Spain case, a group of alleged torture victims 
filed a complaint, in July 1996, requesting that criminal proceedings be opened 
against the former Chilean Head of State, General Augusto Pinochet, for alleged 
violations of human rights committed in Chile between September 1973 and March 
1990.
785
 The alleged violations included those listed in Articles 1, 2, 4 and 16 of the 
CAT. Marcos Roitman Rosenmann, a Spanish citizen of Chilean origin and residing 
in Madrid, claimed that he was subjected to torture during the coup d’etat of 
September 1973.
786
 He subsequently appeared and gave testimony before the 
Audiencia Nacional in Spain as a witness to torture in Chile.
787
 
The background facts about Pinochet were mentioned in the previous chapter. Here, 
the complainant raised the issue that Spain had violated the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over crimes committed against Spanish citizens anywhere in the 
world.
788
 The torture victims argued that Spain had the right to request the 
extradition of General Pinochet from the UK, so that he could be tried before a 
Spanish court for crimes committed against Spanish citizens in Chile.
789
 On 24
th
 
January 2000, the Audiencia Nacional informed the Spanish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of its intention to appeal in case the extradition was not granted.
790
 It is 
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important to note that the claimant was not involved as a victim or as a civil party to 
the proceedings.
791
 Instead, he acted only in the capacity as a witness.
792
 Spain 
argued that the CAT did not impose upon any state the exclusive or preferential 
competence to try a person accused of torture.
793
 Therefore, it was questionable 
whether there was a preferential competence for Spain to try a Chilean citizen for 
crimes committed in Chile.
794
  
The Committee considered that the interpretation of national laws were within the 
competence of the tribunals of states parties.
795
 Accordingly, the Committee was not 
in a position to make a finding with regard to the application or an interpretation of 
Spanish law in matters of extradition.
796
 Furthermore, the Committee explained that 
since the complainant contended that Spain was in breach of an obligation under the 
CAT to investigate fully and prosecute alleged acts of torture falling within its 
jurisdiction, he would have to be personally and directly affected by the alleged 
breach in question in order to pursue the extradition proceedings further.
797
  
Moreover, the Commission raised the issue about states party possessing 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of torture committed against its nationals. It 
recalled that one of the aims of the CAT was to avoid any impunity to persons who 
have committed acts of torture.
798
 The Commission reiterated that the state party law 
should conform with Article 5(1)(c) of the CAT. The Commission observed that 
while the CAT imposed an obligation to bring to trial a person who was alleged to 
have committed torture, Articles 8 and 9 of the CAT did not impose any obligation 
to seek an extradition, or to insist on its procurement in the event of a refusal.
799
 The 
Commission reached the conclusion that the claim was inadmissible.  
In Suleymane Guengueng v Senegal, the claimants were all Chadian nationals who 
were living in Chad. They claimed that Senegal had violated Article 5(2) and Article 
7 of the CAT.
800
 The facts of the case were that the complainants were allegedly 
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tortured by agents of the Chadian State under President Hissène Habré. The alleged 
incidents happened between 1982 and 1990 during the Habré regime.
801
 The 
claimants submitted to the Committee a detailed description of the torture and other 
forms of ill-treatment which they had suffered.
802
 
Another case involves Hissène Habré who, as a head of state, allegedly carried out 
acts of torture.
803
 The issue of the violation of Article 5(2) of the CAT was brought 
to the Commission. The complainants argued that Senegal had not adopted any 
legislation relating to Article 5(2) of the CAT.
804
 The Court of Cassation defended 
this by saying that, “the presence in Senegal of Habré cannot in itself justify the 
proceedings”.805 The claimants argued that it was in fact the presence of the alleged 
offender in Senegalese territory which had constituted the breach of Article 5 of the 
CAT to exercise jurisdiction.
806
 The Commission reached the conclusion by saying 
that the state party (Senegal) had not fulfilled its obligations under Article 5(2) of the 
Convention. It explained that Article 5(2) of the CAT obliged a state party to adopt 
the necessary measures, including a legislative measure to establish its jurisdiction 
over acts of torture. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention set out the obligation for 
parties to perform their obligations under international treaties by ratifying the CAT 
within 15 years.
807
 However, Senegal did not do so.
808
 The next chapter will consider 
whether decisions by international courts can affect judgments by national courts by 
using Habré  as an example. 
Both of these cases, which were heard by the Committee, provided some contrasting 
findings. On the one hand, the objective of the CAT is to avoid impunity for alleged 
perpetrators of torture. On the other hand, states party are obliged to fulfil their 
obligations under CAT by ratifying the treaty so that the jurisdiction provision under 
Article 5 is enforceable. In the claim brought against Spain in the first example, the 
Committee reaffirmed that the aim of the CAT was to avoid impunity. However, in 
that case, the Committee held that despite the CAT’s intention to bring alleged 
                                                          
801
 ibid [2.1]. 
802
 ibid 
803
 The details of the case will be mentioned in more detail in Chapter Five. 
804
 Suleymane Guengueng v Senegal [2006] Comm. 181/2001 (U.N.Doc.A/61/44, 160)  [3.2]. 
805
 ibid[2.7]. 
806
 ibid [3.4]. 
807
 ibid [8.8]. 
808
 ibid [10]. 
142 
 
torture perpetrators to justice, it did not see a state party’s obligation to extradite 
under Article 8
809
 and 9
810
 of the CAT. The Committee’s decision raises some 
dilemmas. As far as Article 5 of the CAT is concerned, it obligates states to establish 
jurisdiction over the offences of torture. Moreover, Article 8 of the CAT obliges 
states to ensure that extradition is available for torturers. It can be submitted that the 
findings by the Committee, that states did not have an obligation to extradite 
torturers under Articles 8 and 9 went directly against those in Article 5 of the CAT, 
which obliges states to establish jurisdiction over offences of torture. It makes one 
wonder whether States are under any obligation to exercise jurisdiction or not as 
required under Article 5 of the CAT. 
The findings of the Committee in the first case can be contrasted with the ones 
concerning Senegal. The Committee held that Senegal has breached its treaty 
obligation by not ratifying the CAT within the 15 year time limit to fulfil its 
obligation under Article 5(2) of the CAT. In this case, the failure by Senegal to ratify 
the CAT has consequently led to it being unable to exercise jurisdiction under 
Article 5(2) of the CAT over Habré. The Committee’s decision pointed to the fact 
that states parties must comply with their treaty obligations to ratify the CAT within 
the time limit. Failure to ratify the CAT resulted in Article 5(2) of the CAT being 
unenforceable. The interesting question here is whether member states are still 
required to exercise jurisdiction under Article 5 of the CAT, provided that they have 
ratified the treaty to try alleged perpetrators of torture. If Article 5 of the CAT 
becomes CIL, then this problem will be solved rather easily since CIL is directly 
applicable to states without the need to consider prima facie ratification. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the evidence of opinio juris with regard to 
Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT showed strong consensus for the definition of torture 
and the extensive jurisdiction provisions to become CIL respectively. The focus on 
the subjective element of opinio juris was used in place of the state practice element 
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to propose that a new CIL could be formed. The sliding scale theory by Kirgis was 
utilised to help the debate over the formation of new CIL for the CAT.
811
  
Therefore, the finding that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL was 
fulfilled by the sliding scale theory analysis. It can be recalled that the sliding scale 
theory put more focus on one of the elements required for the formation of a new 
CIL.
812
 One reason for relying on the sliding scale argument was that the issue in 
question, which related to the entitlement of immunity privileges for former heads of 
state, is a controversial one. It was this problem which led to the strategy to rely on 
this less conventional method of formation of new CIL in relation to the CAT. This 
has been supported by Kirgis who has suggested that the importance of the act in 
question and the accuracy of the legal rule in question were contributing factors.
813
 
This chapter continued by examining the relevant evidence of opinio juris for both 
Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT. This included various UNGA Resolutions.
814
 In the 
Eichmann case, the Israeli Supreme Court stated that: 
“if fifty-eight nations unanimously agree on a statement of existing law, it would 
seem that such a declaration would be all but conclusive evidence of such a rule, and 
agreement by a large majority would have great value in determing what is existing 
law”.815  
 
Furthermore, the jurisprudence by the Committee were also considered. This chapter 
has submitted that the definition of torture contained under Article 1 of the CAT 
corresponded, to a certain extent to the UNGA Resolutions. Accordingly, former 
heads of state should not be accorded the residual immunity ratione materiae for 
their alleged acts of torture. The impact of arguing that Article 1 of the CAT has 
become CIL is that it will be applied to any states irrespective of them being 
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signatories to the CAT. This will create a universal perception of the notion of the 
definition of torture. 
The evidence of opinio juris, supporting that Article 5 of the CAT has become CIL 
has been easier to ascertain. These have mostly included the UNGA Resolutions, as 
well as the jurisprudence from the Committee. The repercussions of the evidence by 
the international tribunals have shown that the alleged offences of acts of torture 
have usually led to the implementation of extensive jurisdiction.  
Through the evidence of UNGA Resolutions, it can be submitted that there is a 
strong consensus by the international community for the condemnation of the acts of 
torture, which has resulted in the exercise of the universal jurisdiction. In other 
words, the extensive jurisdiction provision under Article 5 of the CAT has echoed 
the fundamental agreement on the general prohibition of torture which led to the 
exercise of jurisdiction. Apart from the UNGA Resolutions, the jurisprudence by the 
Committee further reinforced the consensus that signatories to the CAT were obliged 
to exercise jurisdiction for alleged acts of torture. The Committee’s findings brought 
the enforcement mechanism of the CAT into practice. It ensured that states carried 
out their obligations under the CAT to establish jurisdiction over the offences of 
torture as stipulated under Article 5 of the CAT.  
The evidence of opinio juris supporting that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have 
become CIL proved that they contributed to the formation of a new CIL direction. 
The consequence of this is that the residual immunity ratione materiae for heads of 
state and some heads of government could be removed. Nevertheless, this 
observation is argued to be successful under the sliding scale debate. However, the 
method of formation of CIL, relying merely on the opinio juris element is 
nonetheless debatable and controversial. In the next chapter, a critical evaluation will 
be made to show that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have potentially become CIL. It 
will show that the requirement of the state practice element can be reduced in the 
context of the formation of CIL for the protection of human rights. This analysis will 
be approached from a theoretical angle - the way that international courts and ad hoc 
tribunals can influence the decisions of domestic courts through their interpretation 
of the definition of torture as well as the scope of the jurisdiction provision; and the 
role of domestic courts in interpreting and safeguarding international law standards.  
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Chapter 5 
An Alternative Approach to the Argument on the 
Formation of CIL 
The previous chapter examined the evidence of opinio juris in relation to the 
possibility of Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT becoming CIL. This has been debated by 
Kirgis under the sliding scale theory. This chapter seeks to investigate whether 
Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL through other  approaches. Since 
Chapter Four has brought together all relevant evidence of opinio juris for each of 
the articles of the CAT, this chapter will analyse cases which have been decided after 
the Pinochet (No.3) case that appear to be evidence of the willingness of states to 
abrogate immunity ratione materiae for heads of state and other senior government 
officials.  
Based on the examination of national and international courts after the Pinochet 
(No.3) case, there is an increasing trend towards the abrogation of immunity ratione 
materiae for former heads of state and other state officials. It is a matter of 
contention whether this can be interpreted as a sign that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT 
have become CIL. If this is true then immunity ratione materiae will be 
automatically removed from former heads of state who have allegedly committed 
acts of torture, violating jus cogens norms. 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section discusses three cases that 
were heard after Pinochet (No.3), namely those involving Bat Khurts, Khaled Nezzar 
and Hissène Habré. The former two cases were decided by domestic courts and the 
latter by the ICJ. These cases are significant because they may be considered as 
evidence that the law has moved on since the Pinochet (No.3) case and that Articles 
1 and 5 of the CAT may have become CIL. The second section suggests that 
international courts may influence national courts with regard to the issue of head of 
state immunity, in particular, on reaching the decision of the application of immunity 
ratione materiae. Chapter Five considers the jurisprudence of other courts in not 
applying the CAT, but which may have influenced other international tribunals such 
as the ICTY and the ICTR in their understanding of the definition of torture as well 
as the jurisdiction. For instance: the ICJ, the ICTY, and the European Court of 
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Human Rights have all stated that the UNGA Resolution confirms the principles of 
the Nuremberg Charter and judgments as an authoritative declaration of CIL.
816
 
Evidence from the statutes of the international tribunals therefore, shows that there is 
an increasing tendency to favour the definition of torture and the scope of extensive 
jurisdiction under CAT. Notwithstanding that international courts and tribunals are 
set up under different legal mechanisms, their judgments can influence the decision 
making of national courts. Therefore, they are relevant to the discussion because they 
depict the wider consensus by the international community on the issues relating to 
the understanding of the definition of torture and the extensive jurisdictions. The 
third section proposes that national courts interpret international law and contribute 
to the development of international law. This, in turn, can be put forward as evidence 
of the increasing willingness of states to abrogate on the issue of immunity ratione 
materiae.  
Through a different approach, as illustrated by the use of the three cases and 
analysis, this chapter will argue that there is an increasing trend towards the removal 
of immunity ratione materiae both at the international and domestic levels. This is 
strong evidence to suggest that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT may have potentially 
become CIL. 
5.1 Recent Cases Developments  
It is important to note from the outset that the Khurts Bat and Khaled Nezzar cases 
were both decided by national courts. On the other hand, the Hissène Habré case was 
decided by the ICJ. Nevertheless, the latter is directly relevant to the discussion here 
as there are similarities between it and the Pinochet (No.3) case. This is because 
parties to the case are signatories to the CAT and it has ramifications on the 
immunity ratione materiae issue. 
5.1.1 Khurts Bat 
The first case concerned whether Bat Khurts, the Head of the Executive Office of 
National Security in Mongolia, could plead immunity and thus prevent his 
extradition to Germany for the prosecution of municipal crimes. Khurts was wanted 
by Germany for crimes allegedly committed in May 2003 in French, Belgian and 
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German territories. He was alleged to have been involved in the kidnapping, 
imprisonment and questioning of a Mongolian national. On 30 January 2006, the 
German Federal Court of Justice issued a domestic arrest warrant. A European arrest 
warrant (hereafter ‘EAW’) was also issued by the same court on 9 February 2006. 
The EAW stated that Khurts was not entitled to immunity in Germany. When Khurts 
travelled to the UK on 17 September 2010, officers from Scotland Yard’s 
Extradition Squad arrested him onboard a Russian plane. He was brought before the 
City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court. On 18 February 2011, District Judge Purdy 
ordered his extradition. However, Khurts raised two submissions about the 
extradition. Firstly, he argued that he enjoyed immunity ratione personae under CIL 
from the jurisdiction of national courts. This was because he was visiting the UK on 
a special mission on behalf of Mongolia when he was arrested. Secondly, he enjoyed 
immunity under CIL because he was representing his government as a high-ranking 
official civil servant. However, the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court rejected 
both these submissions.  
Khurts next appealed to the High Court and argued that the acts he committed were 
official acts. Hence, they were carried out pursuant to the orders of the government 
of Mongolia. He claimed that he was entitled to immunity ratione materiae both in 
Germany and the UK. In addition, the government of Mongolia claimed before the 
English court that he was “entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution in 
Germany ratione materiae”.817 The UK High Court (Administrative Court) had to 
consider whether Khurts: 
as an official acting on behalf of the Government of Mongolia is entitled to 
immunity from criminal prosecution in Germany ratione materiae, that is, entitled to 
immunity  by virtue of his actions on behalf of that State as opposed to his status, 
i.e., ratione personae.
818
 
Judge Purdy held that the Head of the Executive Office of National Security 
Mongolia did not benefit from immunity ratione personae since he was not “of 
ministerial rank or above”, nor was he engaged in foreign affairs.819 Once again, the 
High Court rejected all of his submissions and found that there was no “special 
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mission” and he was not a sufficiently high-ranking official to benefit from personal 
immunity or immunity ratione personae.
820
 Furthermore, he could not take 
advantage of the functional immunity of the Mongolian state because “there is no 
customary international law which affords immunity ratione materiae for municipal 
criminal offences committed in the territory of the forum state”.821  
At a domestic level, the Khurts Bat decision is one of the significant cases since 
Pinochet (No.3). The court held that the immunity ratione materiae privilege of 
Khurts, a senior security officer of the Mongolian government, did not provide a bar 
to the execution of a EAW issued by a federal German court in respect of the 
abduction and serious bodily injury of another Mongolian national committed by 
Khurts in France and Germany.
822
  
The Khurts Bat decision can be distinguished from the Arrest Warrant case which 
concerned the immunity of high-ranking government official. The British court had 
to consider the case on the basis of the principle laid down in the Arrest Warrant 
case to determine whether Khurts fell within the group of ‘high-ranking’ state 
officials. In the past, English district judges have recognised immunity of ministers 
of defence
823
 and a minister of commerce.
824
 In the Khurts Bat, District Judge Pratt 
explained that: 
The function of various Ministers will vary enormously depending upon their sphere 
of responsibility. I would think it very unlikely that ministerial appointments such as 
Home Secretary, Employment Minister, Environmental Minister, Culture Media and 
Sports Minister would automatically acquire a label of State immunity. However, I 
do believe that the Defence Minister may be a different matter.
825
  
The view held by Judge Pratt can also be seen in Djibouti v France.
826
 This case 
confirmed that officials holding non-ministerial posts did not enjoy immunity as 
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officials occupying high-ranking offices of the state.
827
 Therefore, Moses LJ found 
that a non-ministerial high-ranking civil servant fell outside the narrow circle of 
officials entitled to immunity ratione personae.
828
 Moses LJ agreed with Franey and 
said that: 
State officials do not have immunity ratione materiae for criminal charges in respect 
of acts committed on the territory of the forum state, or the territory of a third state, 
unless that immunity is accorded by a special regime.
829
 
The decision in the Khurts Bat case by the British court is important because it 
clarifies the existing law as stipulated by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case that only 
serving senior state officials or ministers can enjoy immunity ratione personae. The 
question of what constitutes ‘high-ranking’ or sufficiently ‘senior-ranking’ is 
submitted to be rather subjective. It is a rebuttable assumption to argue that the Head 
of the Executive Office of National Security of Mongolia is neither a high ranking 
government official nor a senior civil servant. Nonetheless, the decision of the court 
has asserted that not all government officials, irrespective of their seniority position, 
can enjoy immunity ratione personae in most cases. The Khurts Bat decision further 
strengthens the law in relation to the exclusivity of the rule on immunity ratione 
personae, that is to say, it is not enjoyed by all serving government officials.   
Furthermore, it was explained that Khurts was not considered to be on a special 
mission in the UK since there was neither evidence of an invitation from the 
receiving state, nor an acceptance by the sending state, nor an agreed programme of 
meetings.
830
 The British High Court rejected all three grounds for immunity. He was 
eventually extradited to Germany. Khurts Bat was a case which dealt with the 
customary special missions immunity. It also dealt with the question of whether state 
officials who have allegedly committed crimes on the territory of a foreign state can 
benefit from the immunity of their state. This case examined the relevant state 
practice and found that state officials could not benefit from immunity ratione 
materiae to protect them from the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign court. Therefore, 
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the UK High Court decided that the head of the Mongolian Intelligence Service was 
not protected by immunity ratione materiae either.
831
 Moses LJ explained that: 
the question whether Mr Khurts Bat came to the UK on 18 September 2010 on a 
Special Mission was a question of law for the court to determine but that, in my 
judgment, was no more than a proper and respectful acknowledgement that the 
consequences of absence of consent to Mr Khurt’s visit as a Special Mission were a 
matter for the court.
832
 
This view is also supported by Special Rapporteur Kolodin of the ILC. Moreover, 
Moses LJ said that it had not been established that Bat Khurts’ visit was a special 
mission.
833
 Moses LJ agreed with the District Judge that Bat Khurts was not immune 
because much of the evidence on which this relied on was not placed before him.
834
 
However, it can be submitted that the court ought to have explained in more detail 
whether a very senior governmental officer would generally enjoy immunity ratione 
materiae. Nonetheless, the decision does not weaken this judgment. One important 
legal issue from this case is that there is no guarantee that even a very senior 
government civil servant, such as Bat Khurts, is entitled to immunity ratione 
materiae when entering the territory of a foreign state without consent. It was 
explained that his job description and his authority, as provided by the government 
of Mongolia, suggested that his status was as an administrator. Hence, it was 
nowhere near to the restricted criteria of those associated with high-ranking 
offices.
835
 
As far as immunity is concerned, the High Court stated that: 
It was agreed that whilst not all the rules of customary international law are what 
might loosely be described as part of the law of England, English courts should 
apply the rules of customary law relating to immunities and recognise that those 
rules are a part of or one of the sources of English law.
836
 
Furthermore, it has been said that: 
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It is for the United Kingdom Government to decide whether to recognise a mission 
as a Special Mission, just as it is for the Government to decide whether it recognises 
an individual as a Head of State.
837
 
Khurts Bat also raised an interesting point regarding the removal of immunity 
ratione materiae in a so called territorial exception. It has been explained that 
immunity ratione materiae is not enjoyed by a state official who enters the territory 
of a foreign state without the consent of that state.
838
 Moreover, the functional 
immunity is also not available when the foreign state has no knowledge of the acts 
and security is breached. The issue that consent is needed when some government 
officials enter into the territory of another state in order for them to be given 
immunity ratione materiae is arguably a controversial one. It can be submitted that 
the consent factor will influence and further develop the law relating to immunity 
privileges. It remains to be seen whether these types of restrictions will generally 
affect the mobility of some senior or high ranking government officials on overseas 
visits but it is clear that they will certainly cause tension between states when 
officials from one state have to disclose their presence every time they visit another 
state, be it on official or unofficial missions, in order to claim immunity privileges. 
It is disputable in this contemporary context whether it is still an area relevant for the 
implementation of immunity ratione materiae for the state concerned to grant 
immunity ratione materiae for government officials when entering another state’s 
territory. This is because the restriction on the immunity ratione materiae may affect 
the diplomatic relationship between the two states and may prevent government 
officials from carrying out their duties properly. This confirms the view that the 
scope of application for immunity ratione materiae is getting more restricted, just 
like immunity ratione personae whereby only certain senior government officials 
can enjoy this privilege. It does defeat the purpose of immunity ratione materiae 
which aims to cover the acts of ministers if the acts concerned are carried out on 
behalf of the government. Nevertheless, this upholds the legal precedent that only a 
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certain group of senior serving government officials may enjoy immunity ratione 
personae as suggested by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case.
839
  
On the other hand, the High Court’s judgment did not clarify to say whether Khurts 
did engage in “foreign affairs” or not.840 This was argued despite the fact that Khurts 
might be called a “very senior governmental officer”, he was nevertheless not 
categorised within the exclusive group as laid down under the Arrest Warrant 
case.
841
 Notwithstanding this, the Secretary General of the Mongolian National 
Security Council, Mr Tsagaandari, said that he had informed Mr Dickson, the 
Ambassador, that: 
Khurts Bat, Head of the Executive Office, was being sent to London on 13 
September, and the purpose of his visit was to meet the Head of the National 
Security Secretariat of Great Britain so as to exchange views on establishing ties and 
developing co-operation between the two organisations. Mr Dickson said that he 
would inform the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about Khurts Bat’s visit and 
gave his full support in helping in arrange the visit.
842
 
The Khurts Bat case clarified two points. Firstly, it clarified that not all ‘senior’ 
government officials are entitled to immunity ratione personae. This type of 
immunity is limited to certain categories of senior state officials as previously held 
by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case. The Khurts Bat case reaffirms the ICJ’s view 
on the law of immunity. Secondly, it confirms that immunity ratione materiae will 
not be available to those state officials who enter into another state without consent. 
It creates a new barrier for state officials to claim the functional immunity privileges. 
Whether this new restriction will cause any diplomatic rows between states will 
depend on future case law. 
5.1.2 Khaled Nezzar 
The next case concerns the former Algerian Minister of Defence, Khaled Nezzar. On 
October 2011, Nezzar was stopped and arrested by the Swiss police. He was 
allegedly responsible for the commission of war crimes during the Algerian internal 
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armed conflict.
843
 Nezzar was a former general and, in 1988, was the Chief of the 
Algerian Army. He was later promoted to Chief of Staff and subsequently to 
Minister of Defence. Two individuals of Algerian origin with refugee status in 
Switzerland filed criminal complaints against Nezzar, stating that they had been 
tortured in 1993. Nezzar argued that, as a Minister of Defence, he enjoyed both 
immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae for the period between 
14 January 1992 and 30 January 1994. 
On 1 January 2011, Swiss legislators codified crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and genocide into their domestic law through the Swiss Criminal Code. However, 
Nezzar’s counsel submitted that these provisions were not applicable to him due to 
the principle of non-retroactivity in criminal law. The Federal Criminal Court 
rejected this argument. The defence counsel then argued that under CIL it was 
necessary for there to be a “strict link” between the accused and the country 
concerned. The Federal Criminal Court also rejected this argument and took a 
different approach. It explained that “it is undeniable that there is an explicit trend at 
the international level to restrict the immunity of a former head of state for crimes 
contrary to rules of jus cogens”.844  
It was also argued that, as a former Minister of Defence of the Republic of Algeria, 
Nezzar should continue to enjoy immunity privileges from the Swiss authorities for 
all acts performed in the course of his official duties.
845
 This refers to immunity 
ratione materiae. However, on 25 July 2012, the Swiss Federal Criminal Court 
denied the existence of immunity ratione materiae for the former Algerian Minister 
of Defence accused of war crimes.
846
 It is important to note that both Switzerland 
and Algeria are parties to the Geneva Convention 1949. Therefore, states parties to 
the Geneva Conventions must investigate and extradite any alleged war crimes 
perpetrators from their jurisdictions.
847
 This means that if a state has information that 
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a war criminal is present within its territory and jurisdiction, it must investigate the 
case even when no formal request for extradition has been made. Nezzar could 
therefore be tried in Switzerland for war crimes. 
This decision by the Swiss Court shows the erosion of the doctrine of immunity 
ratione materiae. It strengthens the willingness of domestic courts to abrogate 
immunity ratione materiae as previously shown in Pinochet (No.3) and Khurts Bat. 
The Swiss Court’s judgment illustrates that domestic courts are beginning to 
overcome barriers, specifically political ones, to taking perpetrators of international 
crimes to justice. The Swiss Court justified its decision to remove immunity ratione 
materiae on the fact that both states, Switzerland and Algeria, were signatories to the 
Geneva Conventions. This fact mirrors the one in Pinochet (No.3) where both the 
UK and Chile are signatories to the CAT. It can be submitted that both the Geneva 
Conventions and the CAT have shown that they are major international human rights 
treaties which are able to constrain the application of immunity ratione materiae for 
former heads of state and other senior high ranking government officials at the level 
of domestic courts.  
The decision by the Swiss Court will likely be followed by other domestic courts 
when the alleged perpetrators of international crimes are found in their domestic 
jurisdictions. If there is a consistent trend by states to remove residual immunity 
ratione materiae, then it can be submitted that the trend may lead to the 
crystallisation of the rule of immunity into CIL. Thus, it can be said that the Nezzar 
case further underlines the function of domestic courts to comply with the 
international standards notwithstanding that they have limited jurisdiction provisions 
unlike international courts. The latter point will be discussed further in the third 
section where an analysis will be made of the connection between interpretation by 
national courts and subsequent enforcement of international laws at the domestic 
level.  
5.1.3 Hissène Habré  
The third case is that of Hissène Habré. Despite the fact that the case is still ongoing 
and is awaiting trial by the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) set up in 
Senegal, the outcome of this case is set to provide a further development to the law 
of head of state immunity. Pinochet (No.3) and Hissène Habré share some grounds 
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where the CAT was involved. The findings by the ICJ in Hissène Habré have 
clarified the obligations placed upon states who are signatories to the CAT.
848
  
Habré was the President of the Republic of Chad for eight years.
849
 Human rights 
violations began after he took office in 1982.
850
 During his presidency, it was alleged 
that he committed large-scale violations of human rights.
851
 These included: arrests 
of actual or presumed political opponents, detentions without trial or under inhumane 
conditions, mistreatment, torture, extrajudicial executions and enforced 
disappearances.
852
 His presidency ended in 1990 when he was overthrown by Idriss 
Déby Itno. Habré subsequently fled to Senegal and has been living in exile there ever 
since.
853
  
The Chadian victims filed a criminal complaint against Habré in January 2000.
854
 
After examining the case, the senior investigating judge indicted Habré for “having 
aided or abetted X … in the commission of crimes against humanity and acts of 
torture and barbarity”.855 Habré then sought to file an appeal at the Chambre 
d’accusation of the Dakar Court of Appeal for the proceedings against him, arguing 
that the courts of Senegal had no jurisdiction.
856
 The Chamber of the Court of 
Appeal found that the investigating judge lacked the necessary jurisdiction and 
annulled the proceedings against Habré.
857
 It was explained that the alleged crimes 
were committed outside the territory of Senegal by a foreign national against foreign 
nationals and it would involve the exercise of universal jurisdiction. However, the 
Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure did not provide such jurisdiction at that 
time.
858
 Therefore, the Senegalese Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal by the 
civil claims and held that the investigating judge had no jurisdiction.
859
 On 19 
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September 2005, the Belgian investigating judge issued an international warrant for 
the arrest of Habré.
860
 He was indicted as the perpetrator or co-perpetrator of the acts 
of torture, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
861
 In a judgment of 25 
November 2005, the Chambre d’accusation of the Dakar Court of Appeal ruled on 
Belgium’s extradition request, stating that: 
a court of ordinary law [cannot] extend its jurisdiction to matters relating to the 
investigation or prosecution of a Head of State for acts allegedly committed in the 
exercise of his functions.
862
 
It was suggested that Habré should be given “jurisdictional immunity” up to the 
point when he ceased to be the President of the Republic. Therefore, the Dakar Court 
of Appeal could not “adjudicate the lawfulness of [the] proceedings and the validity 
of the arrest warrant against a Head of State”.863 Senegal then referred the case to the 
African Union. The African Union’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 
by Decision 127 (VII), decided that the case fell “within the competence of the 
African Union” and ordered Senegal to ensure that Hissène Habré be tried and 
prosecuted, on behalf of Africa, by a competent Senegalese court for a fair trial.
864
 
The report of the African Union-European Union Technical Ad Hoc Expert Group 
on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction steered around the tricky issue by simply 
stating that: 
those national criminal justice authorities considering exercising universal 
jurisdiction over persons suspected of serious crimes of international concern are 
legally bound to take into account all the immunities to which foreign state officials 
may be entitled under international law and are consequently obliged to refrain from 
prosecuting those officials entitled to such immunities.
865
 
As far as the CAT is concerned, Senegal ratified it on 21 August 1986 without 
reservation. The CAT became binding on it on 26 June 1987, which was the date of 
its entry into force. Senegal then passed domestic legislation in 1996 which defined 
torture as a crime under the Senegalese Penal Code.
866
 Belgium, on the other hand, 
ratified the Convention on 25 June 1999, without reservation, and became bound by 
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it on 25 July 1999. Therefore, the CAT is weighted in favour of the victims in that 
case.
867
 On 19 May 2006, the Committee against Torture concluded that Senegal had 
violated Article 5(2) of the CAT by failing to establish its jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial torture and had also violated Article 7 of the CAT which says that 
states parties are under an obligation to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders.
868
 
Due to the relevant legal backing, the victims strongly believed that they could craft 
an “African Pinochet” out of the case.869 The Hissène Habré case can certainly be 
compared to the Pinochet (No.3) case because, as far as the ICJ was concerned, there 
was an expectation of the removal of immunity ratione materiae in that case. 
Pinochet (No.3) confirms that the law is proceeding in that direction and this 
precedent is directly relevant to the discussion here because the HL found that the 
jurisdiction in that case was due to the UK’s ratification and implementation of the 
CAT. Similarly, Senegal has also ratified the CAT and its Article 1 outlaws acts of 
torture. It can be submitted that if Pinochet (No.3) was the first to consider the 
immunity issue then that acts as confirmation of the trend that courts are much more 
willing to abrogate immunity ratione materiae following its judgment. 
The Senegalese Supreme Court consequently dismissed the case in 2001 for lack of 
jurisdiction over foreign nationals for extraterritorial crimes.
870
 Notwithstanding that 
Senegal has passed the appropriate legislation to comply with the requirements under 
Article 5 of the CAT, the Court of Appeal still found insufficient jurisdiction 
provision. It has been suggested that Article 5 of the CAT has two requirements, 
namely: “jurisdiction to prescribe” and “jurisdiction to adjudicate”.871 The Court of 
Appeal found that Senegal had met the first jurisdiction criteria but not the second. 
This led to the CAT provision being inapplicable in the national courts.
872
 The 
Senegalese Supreme Court explained that the law has to be interpreted as requiring a 
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second element in order to establish the jurisdiction provision. In other words, the 
law must say that the relevant domestic tribunal is competent to adjudicate violations 
of the CAT.
873
 Therefore, it has been advocated that further amendment of Article 
669 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is needed in order for the universal 
jurisdiction provision under Article 5 of the CAT to be fully exercisable.
874
 The 
argument that the second requirement under the CAT is needed, as suggested by the 
Senegalese court, will cause controversy. Since the CAT is an international treaty 
and Senegal has enacted a domestic law provision bringing the CAT into effect, the 
second requirement, as put forward by the Senegalese court, creates a conflict 
between Senegal’s legal obligations under the CAT and how the law ought to be 
carried out. It can be argued that it should not matter whether the second requirement 
as suggested by the Senegalese court should be met or not. This is because Senegal 
has signed the CAT and has ratified the treaty, the extensive jurisdiction provision 
under Article 5 of the CAT should be applied into Senegalese domestic law. One can 
argue that the jurisdiction provision under Article 5 of the CAT has been 
intentionally drafted to be a broad provision. Therefore, the additional second 
requirement as required by the Senegalese court could be in breach of the CAT 
provision.   
Belgium filed a case against Senegal at the ICJ after the Senegalese Supreme Court 
held that it had no jurisdiction to try Habré. The ICJ heard arguments about the case 
between 12 to 21 March 2012 about the fate of the former dictator and ruled that a 
state must inform a foreign court that the acts belong to the state itself. It also ruled 
that: 
[t]he State which seeks to claim immunity for one of its State organs is expected to 
notify the authorities of the other State concerned. This would allow the court of the 
forum State to ensure that it does not fail to respect any entitlement to immunity and 
might thereby engage the responsibility of that State.
875
 
On 20 July 2012, the ICJ ordered Senegal to prosecute Habré “without further delay” 
if it did not intend to extradite him.
876
 The pre-trial investigation is expected to last 
15 months and will potentially be followed by a trial in late 2014 or 2015. If Habré is 
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eventually found guilty by the EAC then the judgment of that case will add to and 
support the findings of Pinochet (No.3). It will also suggest that the CAT poses a 
significant impact on the removal of immunity ratione materiae for former heads of 
state due to the treaty obligations of the state parties  the case. If Habré is found 
guilty, the Chambers could impose a sentence of up to life imprisonment, depending 
on the circumstances and the gravity of the crimes. They could also order him to pay 
a fine or forfeit any of the proceeds, property or assets derived directly or indirectly 
from the crimes.  
Some believe that the dismissal of the case was due to political interference by the 
Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade,
877
 and that the failure of the Habré litigation 
shows the vulnerabilities of universal jurisdiction as an instrument of accountability. 
It also shows that an African country is unable to take a lead role in enforcing 
international law.
878
 The trial of Habré will prove to be important especially as a 
means of showing the rest of the international community that the African nations 
can operate a fair legal system to deal with immunity of former heads of state and 
bring the perpetrators of torture to justice. Moreover, if Habré is successfully brought 
to trial then it would clarify the law as set down by the Pinochet (No.3) precedent. 
The effect of this will crystallise the significance of the CAT, especially Articles 1 
and 5 when dealing with removal of immunity for former heads of state in future 
cases.   
As far as the substantive law on the doctrine of the law of immunity is concerned, 
Habré is no longer Chad’s head of state. Therefore, he does not theoretically enjoy 
immunity ratione personae which is only given to serving heads of state and limited 
senior serving government ministers. It can be recalled that this particular type of 
immunity is lost once a high ranking government official or head of state leaves 
office.
879
 When the first type of immunity, ratione personae, is not available then the 
only remaining immunity, ratione materiae, will inevitably be raised in the defence 
submission. This is because a senior government official is entitled to this residual 
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type of immunity provided the acts are official and are carried out in the course of 
official functions. In other words, immunity ratione materiae is given according to 
the “subject-matter” of the acts concerned. Traditionally, the customary rule of 
immunity ratione materiae was used to safeguard the sovereign equality of states by 
shielding “acts performed by State officials acting in an official capacity” even after 
they have left office.
880
 Moreover, it aims to prevent foreign states from interfering 
with sovereign prerogatives and functions to call state officials to account for acts 
performed in their public capacity.
881
  
Besides, in the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ clarified that government ministers who 
had left office would enjoy some immunities given under international law because 
certain acts would still be covered.
882
 It has been argued by some commentators that 
under CIL there is an exception which permits foreign states from derogating from 
the immunity ratione materiae rule for acts amounting to international crimes.
883
 
Hence, they argue that this allows states to exercise jurisdiction over the state official 
who has performed those unlawful acts under his or her official capacity even 
without the consent of the state that he or she represented.
884
 The idea of restricting 
immunity ratione materiae for low-ranking state officials prima facie seems logical. 
Therefore, one can also argue that the same rationale should be applied for the 
removal of immunities from former heads of state and other government officials.
885
  
It has been stated that the functional immunity does not prevent the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Belgian courts against the former head of state of Chad. This is 
because Chad has waived any residual immunity rights for Habré which he would 
have otherwise enjoyed in respect of international crimes.
886
  In Prosecutor v Blaskic 
it was explained that state officials acting in an official capacity: 
are mere instruments of a State and their official action can only be attributed to the 
State. They cannot be subject of sanctions or penalties for conduct that is not private 
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but undertaken on behalf of a State. In other words, State officials cannot suffer the 
consequences of wrongful acts which are not attributable to them personally but to 
the State on whose behalf they act: they enjoy so-called “functional immunity.887 
In addition, the letter by the Minister of Justice of Chad, dated 7 October 2002, also 
formally and explicitly removed the residual immunity ratione materiae claims to 
which Habré was entitled to.
888
 This letter further supported the view that Habré was 
not entitled to any immunity privileges. The formal removal by Chad strengthens the 
prosecution’s case against the former head of state and shows that perpetrators of 
acts of torture will not be protected by the rule of immunity. This removal also goes 
against the majority of national courts’ decisions on immunity ratione materiae.889 It 
can be submitted that, even if Chad had not formally withdrawn Habré’s immunity 
privileges, the CAT should have an impact on the case due to the definition of torture 
under Article 1 of the CAT. The impact of this is that any acts of torture go against 
the customary consensus under international law. The judgment by the ICJ in Habré 
further supports the views in Pinochet (No.3), in particular, of the significance of the 
CAT as an international treaty to safeguard the prohibition of torture.  
In the same way as the Genocide Convention,
890
 under Article 7 the CAT requires 
states parties to prosecute or extradite those suspected of such crimes.
891892
 It has 
been said that judges are usually reluctant to exercise universal jurisdiction due to its 
political implications and the “general discomfort” felt because of the lack of a 
connection between the forum state and the accused.
893
 More importantly, there is a 
reluctance to indict high-ranking leaders from the most powerful nations.
894
 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the danger of causing “general discomfort” should 
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not be of concern in Habré because Article 5 of the CAT obligates member states to 
establish jurisdiction over the offences of torture. Therefore, this extensive 
jurisdiction provision under Article 5 of the CAT corresponds with the concept of 
universal jurisdiction under international criminal law. The concept of universal 
jurisdiction is based on the idea that certain crimes are so serious and contrary to 
universally recognised norms that all states have an obligation to prosecute the 
perpetrators.
895
  
Notwithstanding the sensitivity of prosecuting and trying heads of state and other 
senior high-ranking government officials, it can be submitted that this issue would 
not cause any problems when the CAT, in particular Articles 1 and 5, has become 
CIL. This is because when these two Articles of the CAT are considered CIL then 
they will be secured as universal norms. As a result, the perception of causing 
“general discomfort” would not have been ab initio an issue. Moreover, most of the 
countries are signatories to the CAT and other international human rights 
conventions. There are 80 signatories and 154 parties to the CAT. Hence, it will be 
easier for countries to work together on this common ground for the removal of 
immunity ratione materiae as shown in Pinochet (No.3).  
Although the main focus of this thesis is on how the national courts have dealt with 
heads of state who have allegedly committed acts of torture and how they have 
adjudicated on the immunity issue, it can be said that international courts and ad hoc 
tribunals may influence the judgments of national courts because the relationship 
between international courts and national courts is becoming increasingly 
interconnected. It will be seen that the function of international courts can provide 
standards for developing international law especially in relation to the law of head of 
state immunity. The following section will explore this argument in more detail. 
5.2 Comparative Approach to Immunity Before International Courts  
The International Criminal Court (hereafter the ‘ICC’) is the first permanent 
international criminal court established to end impunity for the perpetrators of the 
most serious crimes.
896 
The ICC requires states to remove criminal immunity under 
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national law from government officials.
897
 Therefore, this view expresses the 
determination to put an end to impunity and “thus to contribute to the prevention of 
such crimes”.898 Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute states that: 
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a 
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government 
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this 
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
Therefore, the ICC embodies the general consensus in the international community 
of the urgent need to prosecute acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.
899
 However, it is important to be cautious and state that there are restrictions 
with the ICC when dealing with case admissibility.
900
 This is because the ICC is set 
up to “be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”.901 In other words, the 
burden to hear cases still falls on the national justice systems. As a result, the ICC is 
the last resort for hearing cases when states fail to take necessary investigations and 
prosecutions. Thus, this puts pressure on states to improve their national 
investigation and prosecution systems. When states hear cases involving incumbent 
or former heads of state who have allegedly committed acts of torture, the previous 
decisions by the ICC or other international courts and ad hoc tribunals provide 
guidelines on the adjudication of such cases. In the past, national courts have 
referred to past judgments of international courts and ad hoc tribunals when reaching 
their judgments. An example of this is the judgment of the ICTY in Blaskic, where it 
was firmly asserted that functional immunity “from national or international 
jurisdiction was not available in the case of a prosecution for international 
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crimes”.902 The Pinochet (No.3) and the Khurts Bat cases best highlight this point. 
Therefore, it can be submitted that due to the influence of decisions by international 
courts, domestic courts have been encouraged to develop the international law norms 
at national levels when deciding cases involving heads of state or other senior 
government officials that involve immunity issues in order to create a universal 
standard. For example, if state parties to the CAT follow past precedents of the 
international courts and agree on the definition of torture under Article 1 of the CAT 
and the obligation to establish jurisdictions over the crimes of torture as set down in 
Article 5 of the CAT, this will further strengthen the evidence for the intention to 
create CIL for both of the CAT Articles.  
Nevertheless, it has been identified that immunities attached to the official capacity 
of a person do not restrict the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction. The ICC has 
jurisdiction over crimes such as war crimes.
903
 However, one of the disadvantages of 
the Rome Statute is that it does not make this clear with regard to immunity ratione 
materiae. Having said this, jurisdiction and immunity are two separate issues. 
Jurisdictional immunity involves a procedural bar; while immunity from criminal 
responsibility is substantive in nature.
904
 In the Al-Adsani case, the ECtHR held that 
“the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a 
procedural bar on the national courts’ power to determine the right”.905 Similarly, the 
ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case found that: 
immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
does not mean that they may enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes that they may 
have committed, irrespective of their gravity. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While 
jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question 
of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar criminal prosecution for a 
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certain period or for certain offences: it cannot exonerate the person to whom it 
applies from all criminal responsibility.
906
 
Hence, even if the ICC has jurisdiction to try perpetrators of serious crimes such as 
genocide, it still faces a restriction when it comes to immunity ratione materiae for 
former heads of state and other senior government officials. This is because having 
the necessary jurisdiction to try someone does not necessarily mean immunity 
ratione materiae may be removed from former heads of state or other high ranking 
government officials as they are separate issues. Nevertheless, as far as the 
international courts and the ad hoc tribunals are concerned, there is a tendency 
towards the removal of immunity ratione materiae. In particular, there is an explicit 
trend at the international level that the immunity for former heads of state is 
restricted especially for crimes contrary to rules of jus cogens.
907
 The establishment 
of international tribunals, such as the tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, are examples of the above trend against the prohibition of torture. Former 
ICTY Judge Cassese has said that: 
It would seem that the Nuremberg model still has much merit. It is logical and 
consistent for very serious international crimes allegedly perpetrated by leaders to be 
adjudicated by an international court offering the advantages that will be outlined.
908
 
Therefore, previous precedents set by the international courts can help national 
courts to develop international law with regards to the prohibition of torture and to 
enforce extensive jurisdiction provisions under the CAT to try perpetrators of acts of 
torture, especially those involving senior government officials. This will encourage 
the formation of CIL for Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT. In support of this view, the 
former ICC President has said that the “Court is also envisaged to play a part in 
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guaranteeing respect for and enforcement of international law”.909 It can be 
submitted that the progression of international law through international courts 
provides an incentive for domestic courts to comply with the international consensus 
when enforcing the CAT and removing immunity ratione materiae from high 
ranking government officials.  
From another perspective, in Europe, Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereafter ‘ECvHR’) also focuses on the prohibition of torture 
amongst other issues.
910
 Notwithstanding the fact that this Convention technically 
only applies to European member states, it may still have an impact in providing a 
wider picture as to the general norm on the matter regarding the definition of torture 
(Article 1 CAT) and jurisdiction (Article 5 CAT). The wording of Article 3 ECvHR 
is relatively short on first inspection. Although the Article itself is very short and 
does not offer an explanation as to what constitutes torture, it can be suggested that it 
still provides an implicit indication that it could be a wider legal obligation for other 
states. This is due to the fact that the ECvHR itself is drafted in terms of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter ‘UDHR’) which was proclaimed 
by the UNGA on 10th December 1948 as mentioned in its Preamble. The wording of 
Article 5 of the UDHR has been reproduced in the ECvHR.
911
 Therefore, the point 
regarding the scope of universalism of the ECvHR can be rebutted. It shows that the 
definition of torture is much wider and to a certain extent, has provided the 
framework for the drafters of the CAT to expand on the meaning of torture.  
Furthermore, the jurisprudence of other courts, in not applying the CAT, may 
provide a consensus on the definition of torture under the CAT. This is because the 
decisions by the international tribunals may have been influenced by the CAT. 
Article 3 of the ECvHR mentioned earlier best illustrates this point. The ad hoc 
tribunals have described the definition of torture under Article 1 of the CAT as a 
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reflection of CIL.
912
 In the Furundzija case, the Appeal Chamber said that, “there is 
now general acceptance of the main elements contained in the definition set out in 
Article 1 of the Torture Convention”.913 A similar view about the customary nature 
of the definition of torture can also be seen in the Celebici case. The Trial Chamber 
explained in that case that: 
The same international human rights and United Nations instruments that contain the 
prohibition against torture, also proscribe inhuman treatment. On the strength of this 
almost universal condemnation of the practice of inhuman treatment, it can be said that 
its prohibition is a norm of customary international law.
914
 
Therefore, the Trial Chamber clarified in the Celebici case that the criminal nature of 
torture, both under customary and conventional law, was indisputable.
915
 Besides, it 
was maintained that the prohibition of torture could be found in most human rights 
instruments.
916
 These have included: the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ECvHR.
917
 In 
the Celebici case, the Trial Chamber balanced the definitions of the elements of 
torture contained in UNGA’s Declaration of Torture, the CAT and the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights.
918
 The Trial Chamber explained that: 
It may, therefore, be said that the definition of torture contained in the Torture 
Convention includes the definitions contained in both the Declaration on Torture 
and the Inter-American Convention and thus reflects a consensus which the Trial 
Chamber considers to be representative of customary international law.
919
  
In other words, the Trial Chamber concluded that, based on the consensus of opinio 
juris, the definition of torture under Article 1 of the CAT was a reflection of CIL. It 
is important to note that the Trial Chamber reached such a finding purely on the 
contents of the appropriate international instruments mentioned earlier. 
Similarly, in the Furundzija case the Trial Chamber maintained that the prohibition 
of torture had crystallised into CIL due to the fact that it echoed various international 
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instruments.
920
 The Trial Chamber based its decision on the large amount of 
evidence of ratification of those international legal instruments.
921
 To illustrate this, 
the Trial Chamber referred to the judgment of the Nicaragua case where it affirmed 
that Article 3 of the Geneva Convention contained the “corpus of customary 
international law … applicable both in international and internal armed conflicts”.922 
Thus, there was general consensus that the prohibition of torture was now part of 
CIL in an ‘incontrovertible’ way.923 The Chamber also added that states had, under 
international human rights conventions, the obligation to punish individuals for the 
perpetration of acts of torture.
924
 This arguably related to the universal jurisdiction 
provision contained under Article 5 of the CAT. Further, the Trial Chamber in the 
Furundzija case recognised that the definition of torture under Article 1 of the CAT 
corresponded with the definition given under the UNGA’s Declaration on Torture.925 
The same definition can also be found in the Inter-American Declaration on Human 
Rights, which has been applied by several international human rights bodies.
926
 It 
has also been argued that the relevant opinio juris was achieved through the adoption 
of the definition of torture in the UNGA Declaration on Torture.
927
 Hence, it can be 
submitted that the customary nature of the definitions of torture under the ECvHR, 
the ICTY and the UNGA Resolutions coincide to some considerable degree with the 
CAT. All this seems to hint at the general consensus from the evidence of Article 1 
of the CAT in favour of a customary definition of torture. 
In Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac (hereafter ‘Kunarac’ case), the Trial Chamber 
questioned the meaning of the prohibition of torture as stated in various international 
human rights instruments.
928
 In other words, it doubted that those legal instruments 
mirrored the definition of the crime of torture applicable under international criminal 
law.
929
 The Trial Chamber in Kunarac maintained that the decisions in Furundzija 
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and Celebici wrongly referred to Article 1 of the CAT for the definition of torture as 
the relevant customary law definition of the crime.
930
 The Tribunal argued that the 
definition of torture under Article 1 of the CAT was intended to apply mainly at an 
inter-state level.
931
 As a result, it was suggested that the definition of torture could 
only be used “as an interpretation aid” in general.932 This meant that its usage was 
rather limited for a definition of torture in international humanitarian law.
933
 The 
decision in Kunarac illustrated that if the definition of torture was obtained through 
human rights law alone, then it may not be said to be representative of the 
“universal” application of the principles.934 Despite the fact that the Kunarac case 
suggested that the definition of torture could only be used in a limited context, this 
assumption can be rebutted. This is because the general definition of torture has been 
widely accepted by the international community with the consensus that the violation 
of torture should be condemned. This view can be supported by the fact that there is 
a rich history to the prohibition of torture as indicated by various UNGA 
Resolutions. It can be submitted that, due to the nature of the criminality of the acts 
of torture, Article 1 of the CAT will arguably become CIL as the treaty itself has 
achieved more than half of its ratifications.935 This reflects the universal consensus 
on the issue of the prohibition of torture. Higgins, for example, has argued that the 
issue of the prohibition of torture would not lose its customary nature despite the fact 
that the majority of states did not engage in contrary practice and withdraw their 
opinio juris.
936
 
The repercussions of decisions of international courts together with ad hoc tribunals 
and how they affect national courts have been explored. The next section evaluates 
the role of domestic courts in interpreting international laws. The discussion will 
provide the counter-argument, that domestic courts can also play an important role in 
the development of international law. It will be seen that the decisions by domestic 
courts can amount to a strong indication for the argument supporting the view on the 
removal of immunity ratione materiae.  
                                                          
930
 ibid [473]  
931
 ibid [482] 
932
 ibid 
933
 ibid  
934
 Schlutter (n 888) 213.  
935
 See: < http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
9&chapter=4&lang=en> Accessed 28 December 2012. 
936
 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and process : international law and how we use it,( Clarendon Press 
1994) 22.  
170 
 
5.3 The Effect of National Courts on Interpreting International Laws 
One of the ways of confirming that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL is 
through a discussion of the role of national courts in interpreting international law. It 
has been suggested that domestic courts play an important function in the 
international legal order.
937
 This is a proposal as to whether domestic courts are 
given authority over an international judicial function under international law.
938
 It 
also explores whether domestic courts have the power to assume and exercise that 
function
939
 because the distinctions between international and domestic norms have 
become blurred.
940
 Domestic courts apply international law in a variety of cases.
941
 
Many international norms are either outward-looking or inward-looking.
942
 The 
inward-looking norms are norms that seek to target the conduct of states within their 
domestic jurisdictions.
943
 In other words, it imposes obligations on states to take 
certain measures in their domestic jurisdiction, in particular, obligations on their 
executives who have both legislative and executive functions.
944
 Typical examples of 
areas involved include international criminal law, international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law.
945
  
International norms may have an impact on the domestic legal system.
946
 Thus, it is 
important to establish whether international law is complied with appropriately under 
domestic courts.
947
 A domestic decision following the interpretation or application of 
an international norm can be seen as a form of enforcement of international law.
948
 
This is so even if it is simply declaratory.
949
 There are ways in which domestic 
courts enforce international norms notwithstanding that they do not explicitly refer to 
                                                          
937
 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic courts in international law: the international judicial function 
of national courts’ [2011] 34 Loyola of Los Angeles international and comparative law review 133, 
134. 
938
 ibid, 134.  
939
 ibid   
940
 ibid, 137  
941
 ibid   
942
 ibid, 139.   
943
 Ibid 138   
944
 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic courts in international law: the international judicial function 
of national courts’ [2011] 34 Loyola of Los Angeles international and comparative law review 133, , 
140. 
945
 ibid, 139. 
946
 ibid,142. 
947
 ibid, 144. 
948
 ibid, 146. 
949
 ibid 
171 
 
international law.
950
 These include: applying a domestic norm adopted to give effect 
to an international obligation; interpreting a domestic norm in harmony with an 
international obligation; and enforcing a domestic rule which has a parallel existence 
in international law.
951
 On the other hand, certain international rules are incorporated 
immediately, such as: customary norms, international human rights norms, and 
ratification of international treaties.
952
 
One example is the compliance by the signatory states to the CAT to implement the 
treaty provisions into their domestic laws. It can be suggested that if states parties to 
the CAT apply or interpret the definition of torture under Article 1 of the CAT and 
the jurisdiction provision under Article 5 of the CAT into the domestic context to 
give effect to an international obligation, then this reflects a general acceptance of 
those international norms. In other words, it echoes the general consensus of the 
international community on the definition of torture and the universal jurisdiction 
provision associated under those two CAT articles. For instance, it has been said that 
crimes against international law do not qualify as official acts for the purposes of the 
application of immunity ratione materiae. This include the reliance  on an ‘artificial’ 
distinction between the official nature of the act of torture, as defined in the CAT, 
and the official nature required for qualification of the acts under the functional 
immunity rule.
953
 In the Pinochet (No.3) case, Lord Hope said that “the sovereign or 
governmental acts of one state are not matters upon which the courts of other states 
will adjudicate”.954 On the other hand, Lord Millett considered the issue to be one 
relating to the scope of state immunity ratione materiae. He described it as: 
a subject matter immunity. It operates to prevent the official and governmental acts 
of one state from being called into question in proceedings before the courts of 
another, and only incidentally, confers immunity on the individual.
955
 
Moreover, Barker argues that “to deny the official character of such acts would be to 
remove any liability which the State might have under both international law and 
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municipal law for the acts of its officials”.956 The Pinochet (No.3) case showed that 
the Law Lords interpreted and brought into effect the purpose of the CAT into the 
domestic court. One could argue that the judges in the Pinochet (No.3) case had to 
deal with specific legal challenges of proceedings involving former heads of state 
being brought at the domestic court level. In that case, the Law Lords interpreted 
international law by saying that all parties to the proceedings were signatories to the 
CAT, rather than relying on the more uncertain approach of deciding the immunity 
issue based on the traditional CIL. It can be argued that national courts are in the best 
position to adjudicate cases involving incumbent or former heads of state and other 
senior government officials. National courts are usually the starting point of legal 
proceedings. One can argue that it is better for national courts to decide on the 
immunity issue because most states are signatories to major international treaties. 
Those treaties create platforms for domestic courts to interpret international laws at a 
domestic level and subsequently restrict immunity ratione materiae for cases 
involving alleged acts of torture. Moreover, another advantage of domestic courts 
deciding cases involving immunity ratione materiae is that domestic courts’ 
judgments, which have been created by state organs, can amount to state practice. In 
addition, the role of domestic courts in interpreting international law is that they can 
bring the views of international and national courts into the same uniform line, with 
both shaping the law involving immunity cases. 
Another point is that international law questions can be raised and answered at the 
domestic court level.
957
 This gives domestic courts an international judicial function 
as part of their judicial function to adjudicate disputes and this can subsequently 
develop the law.
958
 An example of this can be seen in Pinochet (No.3) and Khurts 
Bat. In the Khurts Bat, the HL played a role in expanding the law on the question of 
whether senior government civil servants could also be entitled to immunity ratione 
personae and immunity ratione materiae. It can be said that the HL has developed 
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the criteria on the question of which categories of senior government officials are 
entitled to the immunity privileges. Therefore, the judgment in the Khurts Bat case 
expanded on the existing criteria as laid down by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case. 
One can argue that the domestic courts have provided clarification to existing laws if 
needed and the law has expanded accordingly. Khurts Bat is one example of this. 
Subsequent practice has shown that the view that national courts would increasingly 
provide a forum for the prosecution of foreign state officials accused of committing 
international crimes seem optimistic.
959
 Van Alebeek suggests that national courts 
around the world have taken different approaches in comparable cases.
960
 
Nevertheless, in the Pinochet (No.3) case the law relating to head of state immunity 
has been explored and developed especially in relation to the effect of the CAT to 
immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state. The finding in that case was 
followed by other cases in the UK, such as the Khurts Bat case where the courts 
came to the conclusion that no immunity ratione materiae was available to a senior 
civil servant. It showed that domestic courts could play a role in furthering the law of 
immunity ratione materiae which related to international law matters.  
However, states usually interpret and apply international law “at their own risk”.961 
Hence, it is inevitable that their interpretation and application will be challenged.
962
 
Despite some of the objections which may occur, it can be submitted that provided 
there is a steady trend, for example, on establishing extensive jurisdiction provision 
on the offences of torture involving former heads of state or high ranking 
government officials, then the view of domestic law will prove on the increasing 
incentive to remove and restrict on immunity ratione materiae. The long term effect 
of this is that new CIL can be formed as a result. Therefore, the domestic courts’ 
decisions can produce both state practice and opinio juris, which in turn can create 
and contribute to the formation of customary norms.
963
 This view is supported by the 
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ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case where it was said that domestic courts could develop 
the law of immunity through state practices.
964
  
The role of the ICC
965
 under the Rome Statute is to enforce international criminal 
law. Under international criminal law, there is an obligation to extradite or prosecute 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity. The same principle also applies at a 
domestic level. Some believe, based on this requirement, that international crimes 
are best dealt with locally - especially if the state concerned is directly affected.
966
 In 
terms of the implementation of Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT, domestic courts of the 
signatory states have a duty to ensure that the treaty provisions are being ratified and 
properly implemented. This ensures that the relevant future state practices mirror the 
international law standards. When the state practices by domestic states are 
consistent with international norms, opinio juris can be assumed due to the fact that 
states are all united on the general consensus on the prohibition of torture and none 
provide a safe haven for torture perpetrators. Therefore, this argument offers a strong 
ground for the proposition that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT may become CIL 
through the judgments of domestic courts.  
From another angle, there has been a suggestion that domestic court decisions can be 
considered to be ‘judicial decisions’ under Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute.967 One 
of the views that has been put forward is that the interpretation by courts constitutes 
the application of international rule.
968
 This is because domestic courts are said to be 
‘guardian’s of the law for both states and the international community.969 Domestic 
courts are, therefore, ‘agents’ of international law development under the supervision 
of the international courts.
970
 If Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have reached customary 
law status, then the decisions by domestic courts may fall under the ‘judicial 
decisions’ under Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute. As domestic courts have such 
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‘guardian’ roles for interpreting law, the prohibition and eradication of the acts of 
torture under CAT, for example, should be reflected in the views by domestic courts. 
The impact of this is that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT increasingly show signs of 
becoming CIL especially it comes from a politically and judicially stable states. 
Nevertheless, one should be cautious as any domestic court decisions that exercise 
an international judicial function can be overruled by the agreement of other 
states.
971
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the development of case law since Pinochet (No.3). The 
three cases discussed: Khurts Bat, Khaled Nezzar and Hissène Habré have been 
explored in detail. The significance of these cases is that they provide a clearer 
understanding of the position of the law relating to head of state immunity post-
Pinochet (No.3). The Khurts Bat judgment expanded the law as laid down by the ICJ 
in the Arrest Warrant case. It has been made clear that not all ‘senior’ government 
officials are entitled to immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione 
materiae.
972
 The Khurts Bat case showed that senior civil servants were not covered 
by the immunity privileges. Moreover, the court noted that in order to claim the 
immunity privileges, states must disclose their officials that are present in another 
state. Khaled Nezzar was another case whereby a domestic court refused immunity 
ratione materiae for a former Minister of Defence.
973
 Both of these cases upheld the 
view previously held by the Pinochet (No.3) case that former heads of state are not 
entitled to the residual functional immunity when there were allegations of torture.
974
 
Comparisons can be drawn between Hissène Habré and Pinochet (No.3) as all 
parties were signatories to the CAT. The difference between the two cases is that one 
was dealt with by a domestic court and the other by the ICJ. It is anticipated that 
Habré will be convicted when the trial proceeds at the EAC which has been specially 
set up in Senegal for the hearing. The impact of the EAC decision will be to confirm 
the previous judgment held by the HL in the Pinochet (No.3) case.   
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It has been explained that based on the examination of national and international 
courts after Pinochet (No.3), there is a clear trend towards the abrogation of 
immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state. International courts are said to 
have influenced national courts’ decision making regarding international law 
matters. For example, in the Khurts Bat case, the HL illustrated that not all senior 
government officials were entitled to immunity ratione materiae. This judgment 
reinforced the Arrest Warrant case held by the ICJ that only a strict category of 
senior government officials can enjoy residual immunity ratione materiae. The 
development of international law by the international courts has created guidelines 
for national courts when deciding cases involving the immunity rights of former 
heads of state or other senior government officials. The Swiss Court’s judgment in 
the Khaled Nezzar case shows that domestic courts are more willing to restrict 
immunity ratione materiae for a former Minister of Defence due to alleged 
violations of international crimes such as torture.  
As far as the influence of international courts and ad hoc tribunals are concerned, 
various jurisprudence have shown that they corresponded in favour of a customary 
definition of torture under Article 1 of CAT as well as the extensive jurisdiction 
provision under Article 5 of the CAT. These findings by the international courts also 
support those contained under various UNGA resolutions shown in Chapter Four 
earlier. Therefore, the combination of the evidence of UNGA resolutions which can 
be supported by jurisprudence of international tribunals further reinforced the claim 
that there is a strong indication that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL 
despite the lack of state practice requirement.  
On the other hand, national courts also have a role to play in interpreting 
international law, which can eventually lead to the advancement of international 
law.
975
 This is because the decisions by domestic courts can contribute to the view of 
the restriction of immunity ratione materiae. The effect of this is that, if there are 
consistent and sufficient evidence of a general consensus, there is a strong 
presumption that it will become a new CIL. The cases discussed earlier in this 
chapter have shown that domestic courts are increasingly more willing to interpret 
the law to comply with the general consensus of international law. For example, in 
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the Khaled Nezzar case the Swiss Court was more prepared to interpret the law to 
mean that the former Minister of Defence was not entitled to immunity ratione 
materiae, despite the fact that he had previously held a senior ministerial position.
976
 
It is not only the case that international courts have a role to play in international law 
matters but it can also be submitted that domestic courts play an important role in the 
interpretation and development of international law.
977
 As a result of this, domestic 
courts can assist in the formation of new CIL by handling down decisions that 
comply with the general consensus of international norms. Finally, one can argue 
that both international and domestic courts complement each other when it comes to 
the application of international law. This is especially useful in the argument for the 
formation of new CIL, such as those of Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT. 
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Conclusion 
The main aim of this thesis was to examine whether the definition of torture and the 
extensive jurisdiction provisions contained under the CAT had become CIL. This 
was done to determine whether it has had any impact on the law of head of state 
immunity. This thesis concludes that both Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become 
CIL. The effect of this is that it abrogates immunity ratione materiae for former 
heads of state and some senior heads of government. The thesis started by explaining 
the distinction between two essential terms in Chapter One. The basic distinctions 
between ‘jurisdictional immunities of states’ and ‘immunities of senior State 
officials’ were made. It was noted that the former was not within the scope of 
discussion for this thesis as it related to procedural bar. This means that a 
prosecution is barred for a certain period or for certain offences.
978
. In other words, 
all claims against a State would be barred due to the absolute immunity doctrine. 
However, absolute immunity has slowly evolved to the doctrine of restricte 
immunity where it only covers governmental acts or acta jure gestionis.
979
  Chapter 
One briefly clarified this vital contrast in order to understand the two terms.  
As far as immunities of senior state officials are concerned, this has been the primary 
focus of this thesis. Chapter One explained the two doctrines of immunities granted 
under CIL in detail. They are: immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione 
materiae. Immunity ratione personae or personal immunity is attached to serving 
heads of state and some selected senior heads of government.
980
 One of the questions 
that Chapter One addressed was whether this exclusive type of immunity, which 
usually attached itself to serving heads of state, could be made available to other 
serving heads of government and other senior state officials. Therefore, the scope of 
the application of immunity ratione personae was one of the questions to be dealt 
with in Chapter One. Thus, in order to determine who was entitled to immunity 
ratione personae, Chapter One defined the terms heads of state and heads of 
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government. This was due to the fact that immunity ratione personae is status 
based,
981
 and hence the position of the individual was a factor in the application of 
the personal immunity. Chapter One identified that heads of state were the chief 
representatives of the states concerned. Moreover, it was conceded that immunity 
ratione personae was absolute for serving heads of state due to the functions 
attached to them and the necessity to be able to travel abroad on official duties 
without the fear of prosecution.
982
 This would cover even those who have allegedly 
committed acts of torture provided they were still serving in the government. It can 
be seen in state practices that states are generally reluctant to remove immunity 
ratione personae for serving heads of state and other senior heads of government due 
to the doctrine of state sovereignty. This controversial point regarding immunity for 
serving heads of state, who have allegedly committed acts of torture, was later dealt 
with in more detail in Chapter Two. 
Chapter One then proceeded to determine which other class of senior state officials, 
apart from serving heads of state, might enjoy the absolute immunity ratione 
personae. This chapter considered the way to identify the immunity position of 
senior state officials through the judgment of the Arrest Warrant case held by the 
ICJ. It was held in that case that a serving minister for foreign affairs was entitled to 
immunity from the jurisdiction of other states notwithstanding the allegations of 
torture. The Court explained that: 
certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of 
Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in 
other States, both civil and criminal.
983
  
In relation to this type of immunity privileges, the ICJ explained the criteria in 
paragraph 53 of its judgment in the Arrest Warrant case, which aimed to establish 
which other class of government officials might enjoy personal immunity.
984
 It has 
been suggested that factors such as: the requirement to travel internationally 
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frequently; to be in constant need to communicate with the government and 
representatives of other states; being in charge of a government’s diplomatic 
activities, and attending international negotiations and intergovernmental meetings 
should all be taken into consideration when determining whether certain government 
personnel should benefit from the protection of jurisdiction of other courts through 
immunity ratione personae while abroad. Therefore, Chapter One used the ICJ’s 
reasoning in the Arrest Warrant case to ascertain which other serving senior state 
officials could benefit from immunity ratione personae. It has been submitted in 
Chapter One that the class of serving state officials who might enjoy immunity 
ratione personae include: the defence, finance
985
, international development and 
business ministers. This finding was achieved based on the view of the ICJ in 
paragraph 53 in the Arrest Warrant case. The author called this the ‘functional 
justification test’ as immunity ratione personae was given purely according to the 
specific function and the position of the serving heads of government. In other 
words, Chapter One has argued that only select senior serving heads of government 
can profit from this special type of immunity while abroad on governmental duties. 
Hence, it would not apply to other lower ranked government ministers and officials. 
This was because their job functions only required them to deal with domestic 
matters. Thus, it would be highly unlikely that they were required to have a direct 
working relationship with other states. This view of restricting the application of 
immunity ratione personae to only serving heads of state and a select few serving 
heads of government appears to be a reasonable and plausible decision. The fact that 
immunity ratione personae was an exclusive privilege attached according to the 
status of the government officials would prevent the abuse of this type of immunity. 
Besides, if immunity ratione personae was available to all government ministers, 
then it would deflect from its purpose of protecting those who really should have 
protection especially those representing states on governmental and diplomatic 
affairs. The judgment by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case confirmed the 
exclusivity of the position of serving heads of state in terms of their immunity.
986
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The contention as to whether the qualification of torture, as an international crime, 
had any bearing on the rule of immunity was considered in Chapter Two. It was 
evaluated whether immunity could be denied to serving heads of state and other 
senior heads of government who have allegedly committed acts of torture. The 
decision by the ECHR in the Al-Adsani case was central to this discussion. It was 
held in that case that the compliance with the prohibition of torture did not 
necessarily mean the suspension of immunity.
987
 Chapter Two strongly disputed the 
assumption that peremptory norms could overwrite the rule of immunity for serving 
heads of state. The view that violation of jus cogens norms could not abrogate 
immunity for serving heads of state and some senior heads of government, was 
achieved through the discussion of the ‘normative hierarchy theory’.988 It was 
submitted in Chapter Two that, when two corresponding conflicting rules under 
international law collide, it would be inappropriate for one to trump another equally 
important rule. In other words, when two international rules have the same status, 
one cannot trump another as they are on a par. Chapter Two used an analogy 
between the two Houses of Parliament to clarify this point. More importantly, the 
ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case made it clear that an alleged violation of jus cogens 
norms could not abrogate immunity for serving ministers for foreign affairs, which 
was absolute.
989
 This would apply to serving heads of state and heads of 
government.
990
 The Court reached its finding after examining various state practices 
and national legislations, and concluded that there was no sufficient ground on the 
restriction of immunity.
991
 The impact of this was that the allegation of torture was 
not a factor in the limitation of immunity ratione personae for serving heads of state 
and certain heads of government as mentioned earlier. 
The position of immunity ratione personae for serving heads of state has been 
ascertained. Chapter Three moved on to the dilemma surrounding the second type of 
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immunity given under CIL, in particular, concerning immunity ratione materiae for 
former heads of state and heads of government who have allegedly committed acts 
of torture. The judgment by the House of Lords in the Pinochet (No.3) case was the 
pinnacle of this because it removed the residual immunity ratione materiae normally 
given to former heads of state through the CAT.
992
  
It was noted in this thesis that the CAT was generally silent on the issue of 
immunity. Nevertheless, the majority of Law Lords in the Pinochet (No.3) case 
interpreted the CAT to reach the outcome that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity 
ratione materiae, which was normally given to former heads of state and heads of 
government under the CIL rule.
993
 It has been pointed out that all three parties to the 
proceedings – the United Kingdom, Spain and Chile – were signatories to the CAT 
and this assisted the House of Lords to reach the decision to abrogate the surplus 
immunity ratione materiae for General Pinochet.
994
 The judgment of the Pinochet 
(No.3) case was, without doubt, significant. It showed that the removal of immunity 
ratione materiae for former heads of state had given hope that it was not the purpose 
or functions of the state to torture people under the law. This was because it would 
weaken the perception of the rule of law and parliamentary democracy. Moreover, it 
has sent a warning message to other former heads of state and also contributed to the 
international jurisprudence concerning crimes against humanity.
995
 It is fair to say 
that the acts of torture usually happened in states which were not rooted in the 
principles of democracy. In other words, the Pinochet judgment has raised the need 
for the discussion of a coherent system of international criminal justice.
996
 Thus, on 
the balance of probability, the practice of torture tends to be more widespread in 
authoritarian states, where their leaders are not elected by its people.  
According to the critical analysis which has been carried out on the Pinochet (No.3) 
case by the House of Lords, the majority of the Law Lords reasoned that the 
enactment and ratification of the CAT by states endorsed the fact that perpetrators of 
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acts of torture should not have safe haven for the crimes of torture that they have 
allegedly committed.
997
 Hence, the application of immunity ratione materiae to 
former heads of state, who have allegedly committed acts of torture, would be 
untenable in the long run. Chapter Three explored the dilemma that the CAT was 
generally silent on the issue of immunity. Lord Goff, the dissenting judge in the 
Pinochet (No.3) case raised this significant question.
998
 His Lordship argued that, if 
the CAT had any effect on immunity ratione materiae, this point would have been 
made expressly in the provisions of the Convention.
999
 Lord Goff maintained that the 
“proposed implied term has not been precisely formulated”, in relation to the issue 
associated with immunity ratione materiae.
1000
  
It has been argued that the opinion held by Lord Goff was valid, but it only revealed 
half the story. This thesis therefore attempted to expand on this point by considering 
whether the CAT had become CIL through the ‘circularity issue’ debate. The 
outcome of this would eradicate the complication that the CAT was silent on the 
immunity issue, as CIL, which was directly applicable on states notwithstanding that 
they were not signatories or had not ratified the CAT. The circularity issue related to 
the process of examining whether Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT had become CIL. This 
thesis has submitted that they have indeed become CIL, and that consequently this 
has abrogated immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state. Since the CAT 
was silent on the immunity issue, Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT were used in 
Chapter Three to interpret whether Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT had become CIL. It 
can be recalled that Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT were identical to the rules as 
laid down by CIL.
1001
 In other words, Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT stipulated that, 
when interpreting a treaty, it should be sensitive to the existing rules of CIL; that is 
to say, when interpreting the CAT, the existing CIL on the law of immunity must be 
taken into consideration. This would include national practices. However, it has been 
submitted in Chapter Three that there were few subsequent decisions by the House 
of Lords clarifying the judgment of the Pinochet (No.3) case, with the exception of 
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the Jones case. The Jones case has provided confirmation of the removal of 
immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state as suggested in Pinochet 
(No.3).
1002
 Nonetheless, it has been argued that the combined effect of Articles 1 and 
5 of the CAT did serve to abrogate immunity ratione materiae through treaty 
interpretation. The significance of this is that the opinions in the Pinochet (No.3) 
case have had an impact on the law of head of state immunity especially concerning 
former heads of state. This has prompted one writer, Woodhouse, to suggest that the 
impact of the judgments in Pinochet (No.1) and Pinochet (No.3) are important, and 
the criticism of the judicial reasonings in Pinochet (No.3) should not diminish from 
its importance.
1003
  
Chapter Four resumed the investigation of the ‘circular’ relationship between the 
CAT and CIL. Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT had been interpreted in Chapter Three by 
Articles 31(3)(c) of the VCLT to suggest that they had become CIL, and therefore 
abrogated the residual immunity ratione materiae, which was normally given to 
former heads of state. However, this claim would not be solid enough as it was a 
subjective view. Hence, Chapter Four continued by demonstrating the collective 
evidence of opinio juris supporting the fact that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT had 
indeed become CIL. This evidence has included the jurisprudence of other courts not 
applying the CAT. The jurisprudence of the international tribunals and the 
Committee against Torture proved to be beneficial for the understanding of the 
definition of torture under Article 1 of the CAT as well as the extensive jurisdiction 
provision under Article 5 of the CAT.  
It has been submitted that the lack of practice along the lines of Pinochet (No.3) 
would not affect the formation of new CIL by the CAT under the sliding scale 
theory.
1004
 Kirgis argued that, if one of the elements was fulfilled, then it would be 
acceptable to assume that a new CIL had been formed.
1005
 Therefore, it weighted one 
of the elements in favour of the other. In other words, the sliding scale theory 
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suggested that if the opinio juris element appeared to have more consistency than 
state practices, then new CIL could be formed.
1006
 Chapter Four used the sliding 
scale theory to support the opinio juris aspect on the formation of new CIL. Article 
2(b) of the ICTY Statute, Article 3 of the ECvHR, jurisprudence from the 
international tribunals, and the various UNGA Resolutions were some of the 
evidence provided in Chapter Four to argue that the definition of torture, as 
contained under Article 1 of the CAT, matched the general consensus of the 
definition of torture and the nature of the crime under international law. The 
challenge of proving that Article 1 of the CAT had become CIL was that the wording 
in the treaty itself was ambiguous. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the 
definition of torture under the CAT indicated a strong consensus with other 
international legal instruments.
1007
 As a result, it indicated a compelling view in 
favour of the customary norm definition of torture. Besides, it has been argued that 
the impact of the decisions by the international tribunals was noteworthy. Despite the 
fact that they did not apply the CAT directly, their findings were arguably influenced 
by the CAT to a certain extent.  
As far as the extensive jurisdiction provision under Article 5 of the CAT was 
concerned, it has been submitted in Chapter Four that the UNGA Resolutions, 
together with those of the Committee against Torture, led to the persuasive evidence 
that the extensive jurisdiction under Article 5 of the CAT had become CIL. This was 
supported by the long-standing consensus that perpetrators of torture would not have 
a safe haven from their crimes.
1008
 In other words, the evidence from the UNGA 
Resolutions and the findings by the Committee against Torture, which served as an 
enforcement mechanism to obligate states to establish jurisdiction over the offences 
of torture, strengthen the argument. Hence, there was a strong sign that the extensive 
jurisdiction provision under Article 5 of the CAT had become CIL. The significance 
of this is that immunity ratione materiae can be abrogated for former heads of state 
and some senior heads of government who have allegedly committed acts of torture 
as jurisdictions can be exercised by other states.  
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Chapter Five noted the controversy surrounding the question that new CIL could be 
created based merely on the opinio juris element under the sliding scale theory. It 
has been submitted that the reliance on the subjective element, in the context of the 
prohibition of torture, further supported that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT should 
become CIL. Therefore, Chapter Five supplemented Chapter Four to propose the 
argument that the two provisions under CAT had become CIL and thus the 
abrogation of immunity ratione materiae for former heads of state and some senior 
heads of government should follow. Furthermore, Chapter Five analysed cases which 
had been decided after the Pinochet (No.3) case which can be taken as a sign of the 
willingness states to abrogate immunity ratione materiae for heads of state and other 
senior government state officials. Therefore, this thesis argued the formation of new 
CIL from another perspective.   
The critique of the sliding scale theory provided convincing arguments on the 
formation of new CIL for the CAT. This was because the requirement of state 
practice would make the new formation of custom impossible. By focusing on the 
evidence of the opinio juris element under the sliding scale theory, new CIL could be 
created, rather than relying on the traditional method under the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases.
1009
 The Nicaragua case suggested that the element of opinio 
juris could satisfy the lack of conformity of state practice.
1010
 Thus, according to the 
ICJ, new CIL could be formed by relying on the subjective element. This matched 
the idea behind the sliding scale theory, which this thesis based its discussion on. 
Equally important, Chapter Five submitted that the CAT, as an international treaty, 
manifested the opinio juris or consensus of states over the notion of the prohibition 
of torture. The ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases further conceded that in 
certain circumstances a treaty could become CIL.
1011
  
As may have become clear from the previous discussion, this thesis based its 
findings on the assertion that the collective evidence of opinio juris supporting 
Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT had become CIL. The impact of the Committee against 
Torture has been noted. It can be submitted that the jurisprudence of the Committee 
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against Torture, as shown in Chapter Four, highlighted the general acceptance of 
Article 5 of the CAT with regard to the obligation upon states to establish 
jurisdiction over the offences of torture. This view was supported by the fact that the 
majority of cases, which have been dealt with by the Committee, concerned Article 3 
of the CAT, which considered the obligation on states not to return or expel people 
to countries where they may be subjected to torture. On balance, it seems that the 
argument that Article 5 of the CAT can result in the formation of new CIL becomes 
more plausible as there is a general consensus by states to exercise jurisdiction over 
the offences of torture and the general acceptance of the norm of the elimination of 
the acts of torture.    
The remaining challenge was to argue that the UNGA Resolutions were the opinions 
of states. It can be argued that notwithstanding that the UNGA Resolutions are not 
generally considered to be binding, in practice that is not necessarily the case. In the 
Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons case, the ICJ maintained that “it is 
necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary 
to see whether an opinio juris exists as to its normative character”.1012 In other 
words, the content and the purpose of the UNGA Resolutions were paramount in the 
understanding of the aims of the resolutions. It has been submitted that 
notwithstanding that the UNGA Resolutions are not generally binding, they do 
contribute to the normative value for establishing the existence of a rule.  
It can be submitted that the evidence of UNGA Resolutions displayed overwhelming 
consensus by the international community on certain legal issues, such as on the 
offences of torture. As far as the CAT is concerned, it has attracted more than half of 
the ratifications of states.
1013
 This indicated a strong consensus of the acceptance of 
the prohibition of acts of torture and the universal jurisdiction provision under 
Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT. Moreover, it can also be asserted that states would not 
adopt any UNGA Resolutions or the CAT for the prohibition of torture had they not 
agreed to such an agreement.  
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Finally, existing opinio juris, in the forms of UNGA Resolutions, have helped with 
the interpretation of the CAT.  It can be submitted that the reason for justification, 
that is to say, the strong evidence of one of the elements mentioned in Chapter Four 
are compelling enough to suggest that the reliance on the opinio juris element alone 
will be sufficient for the recommendation on the formation of new CIL for the CAT, 
which involved human rights and development.
1014
 The method of interpreting the 
CAT under Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT has further helped to achieve this objective. 
Moreover, based on the examination of national and international court decisions 
after Pinochet (No.3) in Chapter Five, it is clear that there is a trend to restrict 
immunity ratione materiae for serving and former heads of state.  
Chapter Five discussed how international courts have influenced the decision making 
of national courts when considering the issue of head of state immunity. This is 
particularly relevant when reaching the decision on the application of immunity 
ratione materiae. Furthermore, Chapter Five noted the role of national courts in 
interpreting international law which could arguably contribute to the development of 
international law of head of state immunity.
1015
 It has been suggested that 
international law questions are best raised and answered at the domestic court 
level.
1016
 This is important when the particular laws relating to head of state 
immunity are still unclear. Therefore, the functions and roles of domestic courts 
should not be underestimated. Domestic courts provide their judicial function to 
adjudicate disputes and this can subsequently develop the law.
1017
 Chapter Five 
illustrated this point by discussing the findings of the Khurts Bat and the Khaled 
Nezzar cases in relation to how domestic courts interpreted the law to restrict 
immunity ratione materiae. These are encouraging signs and show that domestic 
courts are increasingly willing to abrogate the residual immunity ratione materiae 
which coincides with the general consensus of the international community. 
Another advantage is that national courts are the best forum and platform to deal 
with international crimes. Chapter Five showed that most cases involving senior 
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government officials started proceedings at a domestic level. Therefore, national 
courts could provide clarifications on the law of head of state immunity during these 
trial proceedings. For example, the cases discussed in Chapter Five illustrated that 
domestic courts are prepared to abrogate immunity ratione materiae for senior 
government officials and this reflected the intention of Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT. 
The encouragement shown by national courts to interpret the law specifically suggest 
that there are strong indications that the definition of torture under Article 1 of the 
CAT and the extensive jurisdiction provision under Article 5 of the CAT have 
become CIL. This reinforces the views of the Committee that amnesties for the crime 
of torture are incompatible with the obligation of States parties to the CAT.
1018
  
If the argument that the decisions by domestic courts can be considered as ‘judicial 
decisions under Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute,
1019
 then this arguably suggests 
that the ratio decidendi of domestic courts can have an impact on the law of head of 
state immunity. It indirectly indicates, for instance, that the findings in the Pinochet 
(No.3) case which interpreted an application of international rule under the CAT, is 
significant. This will create a new precedent not only at the domestic level, but also 
at an international level. On this theoretical approach, this in turn reflects evidence of 
the increasing willingness of states to abrogate on the issue of immunity ratione 
materiae. Although it appears that there is a lack of practice along the lines of 
Pinochet (No.3), it can be submitted that the state practice requirement is not needed 
as there is enough evidence of opinio juris. The subjective element on the formation 
of CIL will be sufficient to show that there are strong indications that Articles 1 and 
5 of the CAT have become CIL. Chapter Five provided an alternative explanation 
that there is an increasing tendency by states to remove immunity ratione materiae 
for senior state officials such as heads of state post the Pinochet (No.3) case. This 
validates the fact that the state practice requirement is not needed when there is 
general consensus, arguably through the influence of international courts and 
tribunals as well as the role of domestic courts interpreting international laws. There 
is an indication that States are now more eager to remove the residual immunity 
privileges for such senior government officials.  
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This thesis concluded by arguing that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT have become CIL, 
and that this removed the residual immunity ratione materiae usually given to 
former heads of state. It acknowledged that the judgment by the House of Lords in 
the Pinochet (No.3) case has given encouraging signs for the future, that former 
heads of state and some senior heads of government cannot be shielded by their 
immunity. The immunity position for serving heads of state and some senior heads 
of government was said to be absolute due to the fact that they represented their 
states at an international level. However, the scenario shifted once they have left 
office as immunity ratione materiae would not protect them from the alleged acts of 
torture. This thesis primarily obtained such a finding through the circularity issue 
argument. The traditional method of formation of CIL under North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases has failed due to the lack of a consistent state practice criteria. An 
alternative argument by the modern approach of formation of CIL, under the sliding 
scale theory, has been considered in lieu. Therefore, this thesis centred the discussion 
that the CAT had become CIL by relying on the opinio juris element and the sliding 
scale theory. It is submitted that there are strong indications that CAT have become 
CIL with the effect of abrogating immunity ratione materiae. All the evidence of 
opinio juris in the discussion included: Committee against Torture and UNGA 
Resolutions, pointed towards the consensus of the customary nature for the 
definition of torture (Article 1 of CAT) and the legitimacy of the exercise of 
universal jurisdictions (Article 5 of  CAT). In addition, the jurisprudence of other 
courts not applying the CAT and yet being influenced by it further supported the 
understanding of the definition of torture under their respective statutes. These 
showed strong corresponded evidence for the definitions of torture in favour of a 
customary definitions. Furthermore, evidence from international courts and treaty 
bodies have shown that immunities are incompatible with the general duty to 
investigate and prosecute the acts of torture.
1020
 
To sum up, this thesis ventured to provide an alternative legal view on the hypothesis 
of whether Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT had become CIL through the circularity 
debate. It argued that those two Articles have successfully become CIL through 
treaty interpretation and the overwhelming evidence of opinio juris supporting that 
they had become CIL through international consensus. This thesis has provided an 
                                                          
1020
 Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija [1998] Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY, Trial Chamber)  
191 
 
explanation that the requirement of consistent state practice for the formation of CIL 
is not really needed, provided that there is sufficient evidence of opinio juris 
supporting that Articles 1 and 5 of the CAT had become CIL, which this thesis has 
demonstrated. The result of this finding will hopefully close the loophole that allows 
former heads of state to escape from criminal liability for alleged acts of torture that 
they have committed while they are in office. The removal of residual immunity 
ratione materiae will banish the perception that the rule of immunity is a barrier to 
justice. 
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